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ABSTRACT 
Tanya M. Hayes  
 
FOREST GOVERNANCE IN A FRONTIER:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC INTERPLAY BETWEEN PROPERTY RIGHTS, LAND-USE 
NORMS, AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION IN THE MOSQUITIA FOREST CORRIDOR OF 
HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA 
 
Government legislation of protected areas is frequently prescribed as a means to protect 
forest lands.  The effectiveness of protected areas is, however, highly questionable as 
protected areas have been found to fail as often as they succeed.  This dissertation takes a 
nuanced approach to forest policy analysis by examining how specific property rights 
interact with resource users’ institutions to either promote or thwart frontier forest 
conservation.   
Frontier forests represent the last remaining swaths of tropical forest.  They are also 
the homelands of indigenous peoples who have lived in these remote regions for 
centuries.  A principal threat to frontier forests, and the people living within them, is 
agricultural expansion caused by mestizo (non-indigenous) migration.   
This study integrates methods that include institutional analysis, ethnographic 
fieldwork, and land-cover analysis to examine how property-rights policies influence 
agricultural expansion in the Mosquitia Forest Corridor, a biological corridor that runs 
from eastern Honduras into northern Nicaragua.  I compare the ability to stop mestizo 
expansion in two protected areas in the Mosquitia: one reserve under government 
management and the other governed by native residents who hold common-property 
rights to their lands.  The variation between sites creates opportune conditions to 
investigate whether property rights are a determining factor in preventing mestizo 
encroachment, and the impact that different property-rights policies have on residents’ 
resource institutions and the broader resilience of the social and ecological systems.  
The study findings are that public policies that recognize local governance institutions 
promote resilient forest management systems.  I find that native residents who hold 
common-property rights are better able to stop agricultural expansion than are public 
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managers.  Forests under indigenous territorial management are better conserved than 
those under public management. Furthermore, the analysis of institutional change finds 
that native residents are better able to address market and demographic pressures 
introduced by mestizo settlers when they are supported by public policies that recognize 
their common-property claims.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CAN COMMON-PROPERTY RIGHTS CONSERVE THE MOSQUITIA FOREST CORRIDOR?  
THE CHALLENGE OF CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS TO PROTECT ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAIN 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING FRONTIER FORESTS 
 
In 1992, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro highlighted the environmental destruction 
occurring in the world and the need to craft international agreements and national 
conservation policies to protect the world’s remaining biodiversity. Set in Brazil, the 
Earth Summit drew attention to the plight of the world’s frontier forests as images of the 
Amazon aflame awakened many to the threats that agricultural expansion poses to remote 
forest lands. As a result of the Earth Summit, 150 government leaders signed the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and agreed to “[e]stablish a system of 
protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological 
diversity” (CBD, 1992, art. 8a). Today, over 100,000 protected areas have been 
established throughout the world and encompass roughly 10% of the world’s forests 
(Chape et al., 2003; Molnar et al., 2004).  
Frontier forests—large, relatively undisturbed natural forests—are particularly 
valuable safeguards of ecosystem communities and ecological processes. Their protection 
is vital for sustained ecological diversity (Bryant et al., 1997).i  Frontier forests also serve 
as invaluable cultural and economic resources that range from sustaining traditional and 
indigenous peoples to providing lucrative benefits from timber exploitation and land 
speculation. The forested lands are characterized by ecosystems and socioeconomic 
arrangements operating on the fringe of mainland political and economic systems. As the 
number of forest users and their demands increase, these forests are disappearing at an 
alarming rate. A World Resources Institute report estimates that only 20% of the world’s 
original forests remain in large intact stands, and that approximately half of these forests 
lie in the tropics. The report notes that between 1960 and 1990 approximately one-fifth of 
the world’s entire tropical forests were cleared (Bryant et al., 1997).  
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In Latin America, clearing caused by agricultural expansion is the greatest proximate 
cause of deforestation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Geist and Lambin, 2001). The 
sources of agricultural expansion are twofold: first, the expansion of permanent crop and 
pasture land by “shifted” agriculturalists or colonizers, and, second, the land-use practices 
of traditional shifting (swidden) agriculturalists. Of the two sources, colonization 
accounts for the majority of the deforestation (Geist and Lambin, 2001).  
Broadly speaking, three types of colonists migrate to the frontier: poor landless 
farmers, cattle ranchers, and land speculators. The colonists come for a variety of 
reasons. Many landless farmers move to the frontier because they have nowhere else to 
farm. In some cases, ranchers pay landless farmers to invade a piece of forest, clear the 
land to farm, and then leave it after a few years planted with pasture. In other cases, 
government colonization programs encourage farmers to settle remote forest lands. 
Generally speaking, the farmers, ranchers, and land speculators stake their claims in one 
of three ways: they buy lands from residents (often indigenous or traditional peoples), 
obtain titles from the government, or they invade. In deciding to clear frontier forest 
lands, neither the colonists nor the traditional swidden agriculturalists act in isolation. 
Economic, institutional, cultural, technical, and sociopolitical factors have all been found 
to influence farmers’ and ranchers’ land-use decisions (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Boserup, 1965; Geist and Lambin, 2001; Hecht, 1993; Rudel and Roper, 1997).  
Of particular concern are Central American forests where farmers and ranchers are 
moving into previously remote frontiers in search of land. World Resources Institute 
estimates that 87% of the frontier forests in Central America are under moderate or high 
threat due to land clearing and logging (Bryant et al., 1997, p. 44). Although 
deforestation in Brazil has typically been at the center of attention, according to a World 
Bank study, from 1990 to 1995 the rate of forest clearing in Central America was almost 
six times that of Brazil (Carr, 2004, p. 173).  
The Mosquitia Forest Corridor, five million acres of tropical forest that runs from 
eastern Honduras into northern Nicaragua, contains the largest contiguous tract of 
tropical forest remaining in Central America. It holds indispensable concentrations of 
biological resources, and is considered to be the “heart” of the Mesoamerican Biological 
Corridor that extends from southern Mexico through eastern Panama (Herlihy, 1997; 
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Miller et al., 2001). The forests in the Mosquitia Forest Corridor are, however, presently 
threatened by agricultural clearing, ranching, and illicit logging (personal 
communication, J. Barborak, 2004; Herlihy, 1997; Stocks, 1996).  
The Mosquitia is home to six different ethnic groups who struggle to balance the 
cultural, economic, and ecological demands on the land. Previous research (Chiriboga, 
2002; Dodds, 1994; Herlihy, 1997; Stocks, 1996) demonstrates that native communities 
within the region are accustomed to living in relative isolation and have a history of 
crafting their own land-use institutions. Today, outside encroachment by mestizo (non-
indigenous) farmers, ranchers, and timber harvesters challenges these traditional systems 
and threatens the social and ecological sustainability of the region (Dodds, 1994; Herlihy, 
1997; Stocks, 1998).  
 
2 CAN PROPERTY-RIGHTS POLICIES CONSERVE FRONTIER FORESTS? 
 
Protected areas have been seen by many as the preeminent means for protecting forests 
(Brandon et al., 1998; Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997; Terborgh, 1999). In Honduras and 
Nicaragua, a series of protected areas was created to thwart agricultural expansion and 
protect tropical forests in the Mosquitia. The efficacy and legitimacy of these protected 
areas are, however, contested by residents, practitioners, and scholars who disagree over 
who should have legal rights to the land and the best way to protect the biodiversity in the 
region (AFE-COHDEFOR, 2000; Barborak, 1992; Herlihy, 1997; Miller et al., 2001; 
Stocks, 2003). As in many disputes over forest conservation policy and protected-area 
management, there is a division between those who advocate for government jurisdiction 
over protected areas and those who support protected-area policies that recognize 
resource users’ property rights.  
One of the weaknesses in forest conservation policy analysis is the limited 
understanding of the existence and dynamics of locally evolved land-use institutions, how 
they react to exogenous shocks, and how they relate to broader formal forest policies of 
national and international regimes. Despite conservationists’ emphasis on laws, 
regulations, and rules, we lack a rigorous understanding of whether, or under what 
conditions, traditional peoples are able to sustain their resource systems and how broader 
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protected-area policies influence the evolution of traditional land-use norms to either 
thwart or support forest conservation (Agrawal, 2001; Berkes, 2001; Dietz et al., 2003; 
Ensminger and Knight, 1997; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Richards, 1997). The 
challenge we face is how to design forest governance regimes in which formal policies 
complement informal land-use rules and norms to recognize resource user rights and 
promote broader conservation goals.  
 
2.1 Research Questions  
 
The purpose of the study is to understand how the policies and laws that govern the 
Mosquitia lands interact with the norms and rules used by the Mosquitia residents, and 
how they ultimately influence land-use decisions with respect to agricultural expansion. 
A principal focus of the study is institutions. Institutions are the formal and informal 
norms and rules that shape the interactions between the actors. In analyzing land use in 
the Mosquitia forests, I consider the informal institutions recognized by the residents to 
regulate their property rights and respective land uses as well as the formal laws and 
policies that define the official tenure rights and land-use restrictions.  The study asks 
four principal questions:  
 
1. Are property-rights policies a determining factor in efforts to prevent mestizo 
encroachment? Is a reserve under government jurisdiction or a reserve under a 
common-property regime of the indigenous residents better able to control 
agricultural expansion? 
 
2. Do indigenous residents change their traditional land-use institutions in response 
to the demographic and market pressures introduced by mestizo migration? Do 
these changes bolster indigenous residents’ customary common-property 
institutions or are the traditional institutions collapsing? 
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3. Given that the indigenous land-use institutions do change in response to mestizo 
migration, what impact do the reserve property-rights policies have on the 
direction and development of these changes?  
 
4. How do different property-rights policies impact the short-term outcomes and 
long-term prospects for sustained forest conservation and resilient indigenous 
governance institutions?  
 
2.2 The Relationship between Property Rights, Encroachment, and Indigenous 
Land-Use Institutions 
 
This dissertation tests whether a forest reserve under government jurisdiction or a reserve 
under a common-property regime of indigenous residents is better able to control 
agricultural expansion. I compare two protected areas in the Mosquitia Corridor: Río 
Plátano Biosphere Reserve and Bosawas Biosphere Reserve. The reserves were 
purposefully selected based on variation in land tenure rights and their similar ecological, 
economic, technological, demographic, and cultural characteristics. The two dependent 
variables of interest are mestizo encroachment and indigenous institutional change. The 
independent variable of interest is property rights.  
In the context of the Mosquitia, I aim to show that property rights do influence 
mestizo encroachment, and that they do so by either supporting or thwarting indigenous 
peoples’ customary rights over their land. My central thesis is that, in remote frontier 
regions such as the Mosquitia, property-rights processes and the resultant policies that 
legitimize indigenous common-property rights bolster the robustness of indigenous land-
use institutions and by doing so, work to control outside encroachment. Property-rights 
processes and policies that do not support indigenous common-property rights detract 
from the robustness of indigenous governance systems, and, unless public agencies invest 
in consistent patrolling and enforcement of reserve boundaries, they will fail to control 
mestizo colonization in the region. Moreover, I contend that the formal establishment of 
indigenous land rights contributes to the ability of indigenous residents to address future 
land-use challenges and possibly promote long-term forest management. 
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In order to validate my central thesis, I must show (1) that property rights impact 
mestizo encroachment patterns, and (2) that mestizo encroachment disrupts indigenous 
land-use institutions. Furthermore, I must be able to link property rights to indigenous 
land-use institutions and the resultant encroachment patterns. Four hypotheses provide a 
foundation by which the findings will either support or oppose conjectures about the 
relationships between property rights, mestizo encroachment, and indigenous land-use 
practices. The hypotheses used to guide the research data gathering and to analyze the 
results are:  
 
Hypotheses 
 
1. In the Mosquitia, mestizo migration will have stopped on forest lands under 
indigenous common-property ownership; mestizo migration will continue on 
forest lands under public management.   
 
2. Indigenous land-use institutions change in the face of demographic and market 
changes produced by mestizo migration. 
 
3. Property-rights policies affect how indigenous land-use institutions change when 
faced with exogenous shocks caused by mestizo migration. Property-rights 
policies that support indigenous common-property customs will bolster 
indigenous land-use institutions and residents’ responses to mestizo migration. 
Property-rights policies that disregard indigenous common-property customs will 
further stress indigenous institutions and hinder the ability of indigenous residents 
to address mestizo migration.   
 
4. Indigenous communities that share common-property rights to their lands are 
better able to address future land-use challenges than are those that live on public 
lands. 
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Note that the hypotheses are interdependent, and one set of findings leads to the next 
hypothesis. If property rights have no effect on mestizo encroachment, I expect the 
findings to show that mestizo farmers and ranchers continue to migrate into both the Río 
Plátano and Bosawas reserves irrespective of whether the area has been designated as 
government reserve or indigenous territory. If however, the mestizos continue to migrate 
into one reserve and not the other, crucial questions are whether the migration patterns 
are linked to the robustness of indigenous land-use institutions, and, if so, whether the 
respective property-rights arrangements influence the fortitude of these indigenous 
systems.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 seek to answer these questions by showing results that 
demonstrate whether indigenous land-use institutions dissolve in the face of mestizo 
migration, thereby facilitating encroachment and whether the indigenous responses to 
mestizo migration differ depending on the particular property-rights regime the residents 
live under. Hypothesis 4 takes a broader approach to the issue and looks at some of the 
possible long-time effects on forest governance under different property-rights 
arrangements.  
 
3 STUDY CONTEXT: THE RÍO PLÁTANO AND BOSAWAS BIOSPHERE RESERVES, 
MESOAMERICA 
  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Honduran and Nicaraguan governments created a system of 
protected areas to safeguard the biological and cultural wealth of the Mosquitia. The two 
largest reserves in the Corridor—Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve (Honduras) and 
Bosawas Biosphere Reserve (Nicaragua)—are internationally acclaimed United Nations 
Educational Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Man and Biosphere Reserves. 
Río Plátano reserve, hereafter “Río Plátano,” and Bosawas reserve, hereafter “Bosawas,” 
provide an excellent setting to examine the influence of property rights on mestizo 
encroachment and indigenous land-use institutions. Río Plátano and Bosawas share 
similar geographic, cultural, and economic characteristics. However, they are governed 
by very different property rights regimes. Río Plátano is under the jurisdiction of the 
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Honduran Ministry of Forestry (AFE-COHDEFOR). In contrast, in Bosawas the 
indigenous residents hold common-property rights over their land and resources.  
Figure 1.1 shows the location of the two reserves and the specific study sites in this 
dissertation. The Mosquitia Forest Corridor starts at Río Plátano in the north and runs 
south to Bosawas. There are two smaller forest reserves between Río Plátano and 
Bosawas that complete the entire Corridor. Both Río Plátano and Bosawas encompass 
roughly 8,000 km2 of forest land.ii Río Plátano reserve lies in northeastern Honduras 
along the Caribbean coast and runs south into the interior of Honduras. It is located at the 
intersection of the departments of Colon, Gracias a Dios, and Olancho and bound to the 
east by the Sico River and to the west by the Patuca River. The Plátano River, the 
reserve’s namesake, flows through the core of the park. To the south of Río Plátano 
reserve, Bosawas lies along the Coco River at the border between Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Its name comes from three geographically important sites in the Reserve: the 
Bocay River, the Saslaya Mountain, and the Waspuk River. The major ecosystem in the 
two reserves is tropical humid forest and the terrain varies from flat coastal plains and 
riparian zones to rugged mountains. In Río Plátano, the highest peak is 1,326 m, and 
mountains in Bosawas reach up to 1,750 m (UNESCO, 2002).  
Río Plátano was created in 1980 and declared a World Heritage Site in 1982. In 1991, 
law 74-91 transferred management of Río Plátano from the Honduran Natural Resource 
Management Institute (RENARE) to AFE-COHDEFOR. Nonetheless, it was essentially a 
“paper park” until the mid-1990s. The reserve regulations were not publicized, 
monitored, or enforced, and few, if any, residents, in Río Plátano knew they were living 
in a reserve (Herlihy, 2001). In the mid-1990s, reserve policies were restructured in an 
attempt to gain greater awareness of, and compliance with, reserve regulations on the part 
of the residents. The process rezoned the reserve and established a management plan. 
Today, Río Plátano is divided into three management zones: a cultural zone for the 
indigenous residents, a buffer zone for the mestizo residents, and a core zone for strict 
preservation. All Río Plátano reserve lands are under the jurisdiction of the Honduran 
Ministry of Forestry. 
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Figure 1.1. Mosquitia Forest Corridor Reserves and Study Sites 
 
   
Bosawas was created by Executive Decree 44-91 in 1991 by the newly elected 
President Violeta Chamorro. With minimal recognition of the indigenous peoples living 
in Bosawas, the reserve was originally placed under the jurisdiction of the Institute for 
Natural Resources, now known as the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Environment and 
Natural Resources (MARENA), and zoned as a strict conservation area or “core zone” 
(Stocks, 2003). Similar to Río Plátano, in the mid-1990s, management of Bosawas was 
also restructured. As part of the process, the conservation area of Bosawas was rezoned 
into six separate indigenous territories and the indigenous residents in each territory 
established their territorial property rights and land management plans. By 1997, the 
indigenous residents had established de facto governing rights over their territories. The 
establishment of the de facto rights is the focus of this study. However, it is important to 
note that in May 2005, the Nicaraguan government formally recognized their tenure 
rights by granting them territorial titles to their lands.iii  A predominately mestizo buffer 
zone extends around the reserve. All buffer-zone lands lie under the jurisdiction of 
MARENA.  
 There are five different groups of indigenous or traditional peoples living in Río 
Plátano and Bosawas: Miskito, Mayangna, Garifuna, Pech, and Tawahka. In addition to 
the indigenous groups, mestizos live in each reserve, some of whom have lived in the 
region for decades; others are more recent arrivals.  In this study, I focus on the activities 
of the Miskito and Mayangna peoples and the more recent mestizo settlers. 
 In each reserve, certain regions are designated specifically for the indigenous 
residents, and certain regions are predominately mestizo. In Río Plátano, a “cultural 
zone” is designated for the indigenous residents. In Bosawas, the indigenous lands are 
divided into six indigenous territories. The principal difference between the indigenous 
lands in Río Plátano and Bosawas is that only the indigenous peoples in Bosawas have 
established common-property rights over their lands. In both reserves, a buffer zone was 
created for mestizo populations. The buffer zone in each reserve is public land. 
 In this dissertation, I focus on activities in the Río Plátano cultural zone and the 
indigenous territories in Bosawas. The advantages of comparing the indigenous land in 
Río Plátano to the indigenous territories in Bosawas is that I am able to focus on the 
impact that the different property-rights processes and the resultant policies have had on 
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agricultural expansion while controlling for ecological, technological, cultural, 
infrastructural, and economic factors that might otherwise influence mestizo migration 
and indigenous land-use decisions. The regions are predominately humid tropical forests 
that are difficult to access and relatively isolated from mainland markets. Furthermore, 
the Mayangna and Miskito people that live in the reserves share similar land-use customs 
and practices. The similarities between the two regions make these two reserves ideal 
study sites to test whether a reserve under government jurisdiction or a reserve under a 
common-property regime of the indigenous residents is better able to control agricultural 
expansion. 
 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND STUDY SITES 
 
In this dissertation, I focus specifically on the activities in the cultural zone of Río 
Plátano, two territories in Bosawas (Miskitu Indian Tasbaika Kum [MITK] and 
Mayangna Sauni Bu [MSB]), and the Bosawas buffer zone. Taking the property-rights 
processes enacted in the mid-1990s as a starting point, I examine present land-use 
institutions and land-use practices across sites. The research design enables a comparison 
of land-use institutions and land-use practices in: (1) a cultural zone designated for 
indigenous residents but under the jurisdiction of the government; (2) indigenous 
territories with common-property tenure rights; and (3) a government-managed buffer 
zone that is predominately mestizo, but also has indigenous communities.  
 The cultural zone of Río Plátano is in the department of Gracias a Dios and 
encompasses 3,895 km2 in the northern and eastern regions of the park. It is bordered to 
the west by the Sico River and to the east by the Patuca River. It is managed as a 
sustainable-use zone with permitted activities corresponding to the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’ Category VI. Certain restrictions 
apply to the types of farming, forestry, and hunting activities the populations can partake 
in. Restrictions also limit entry into the zone to only those who are indigenous, or are 
“native” mestizos previously living in the zone. Approximately 21,300 people live in the 
cultural zone, the majority of whom are Miskito peoples. According to the 1997–1998 
census, 84% of the population was Miskito, and only 10% were mestizo natives (PBRP, 
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1997/98). However, this number is changing as mestizo farmers and ranchers continue to 
move into the region. 
 To the west of the cultural zone is the valley of Sico-Paulaya, a region designated 
specifically for mestizo residents. The region of Sico-Paulaya consists of 676 km2 of land 
that runs along both sides of the Sico River and into the northern region of the Río 
Plátano buffer zone. Much of the pressure on the cultural zone comes from mestizo 
migration to this region. In 1997–1998 there were approximately 5,019 people living in 
Sico-Paulaya, however this number was expected to reach 10,000 by 2000 due to 
migration (PBRP, 1997/98). Exact figures are not given for the entire region in more 
recent censuses; nevertheless, the 2001 census does give figures for the principal 
community in the region, Sico: an increase from 1,294 in 1997–1998 to 4,141 in 2001 
(PBRP, 1997/98; INE, 2001).  
In Bosawas, the territories investigated in this study are all located on the 
southwestern edge of the reserve in the department of Jinotega. The territories lie to the 
west of the North Atlantic Autonomous Region. MITK and MSB are both indigenous 
territories recognized by the Nicaraguan government. MITK is a Miskito territory that 
covers approximately 681 km2 along the River Coco that divides Nicaragua from 
Honduras. In 1995–1996 there were 3,454 people living in 14 principal communities in 
MITK (TNC, 1997b). In 2006, the population was expected to reach 5,040.iv MSB is a 
Mayangna territory covering 1024 km2. In 1995–1996, 1,773 Mayangna lived in the 
region and, today, an estimated 2,442 Mayangna live in the territory (Stocks, 1998; TNC, 
1997a). The Bocay River runs through MSB and the majority of the residents live along 
the Bocay. 
The buffer zone investigated in this study lies just south of the two indigenous 
territories between the Coco and Bocay rivers. Within the buffer zone, the mestizos have 
divided the zone into two mestizo territories. This study includes mestizo and indigenous 
communities in one of the mestizo territories. The territory is not officially recognized by 
the Nicaraguan government and mestizos do not hold property rights to the lands. The 
territory in this study is, however, under the de facto jurisdiction of the mestizo political 
organization Association for the Protection and Development of the Mestizo 
Communities in Bosawas (APDECOMEBO). In 2005, 14,000 mestizos lived in the 
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region (personal communication, Mayor Plisito, September 2005).  There are also four 
indigenous communities in the mestizo territory.   
Table 1.1 shows the principal characteristics in each of the study regions including 
the predominant ethnicity of the residents living in the region, the population for the 
region, area in km2, population density, and the type of tenure arrangement that governs 
the respective region. The population figures presented in Table 1.1 are from censuses 
conducted in the mid-1990s in each reserve. The figures for Río Plátano are from a 
census of the reserve conducted in 1997–1998 by the Río Plátano Biosphere Project 
(PBRP, 1997/98). The figures for Bosawas are from a census of the reserve conducted in 
1995–1996 by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) (Hurtado de Mendoza, 2001; TNC, 
1997a, 1997b).v
 
Table 1.1. Demographic Characteristics of Río Plátano and Bosawas 
  
Predominant 
Ethnicity Population 
Area 
(km2) Pop/km2 Tenure Regime 
Cultural Zone, Río 
Plátano Miskito 21,320 3,895 5.47 PUBLIC 
Buffer Zone (Sico-
Paulaya), Río Plátano Mestizo 5,019 676 7.42 PUBLIC 
MITK, Bosawas Miskito 3,454 681 5.07 TERRITORIAL
MSB, Bosawas Mayangna 1,773 1,024 1.73 TERRITORIAL
Buffer Zone, Bosawasvi Mestizo 4,193 569 7.37 PUBLIC 
 
 
4.1 Research Design to Test Hypotheses 
 
The research design and specific fieldwork sites are shown in Table 1.2. In total, I 
conducted fieldwork in four sites in the Río Plátano cultural zone and four sites in 
Bosawas. The study sites are shown in red in Figure 1.1. Each study site includes a 
principal indigenous community and, where appropriate, the satellite indigenous and 
mestizo communities in the region. The sites are, for the most part, located along rivers, 
and broadleaf tropical forests cover the surrounding hills. The settlements are 
inaccessible by car and have remained relatively isolated from mainland economic 
activities.  
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 The research design presented in Table 1.2 shows how the property-rights differences 
between Río Plátano and Bosawas reserves facilitate a natural experiment to test the 
influence of tenure on mestizo encroachment and indigenous land-use institutions 
(Shadish et al., 2002). I compare the cultural zone of Río Plátano with the two indigenous 
territories (MITK and MSB) to test for differences in mestizo migration and indigenous 
land-use institutions under public management and indigenous common-property 
management. Mestizos began migrating to the cultural zone of Río Plátano and to the two 
indigenous territories in Bosawas in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In order to further 
substantiate the impact of the property-rights policies, I also contrast encroachment 
activities in the government-managed Bosawas buffer zone to encroachment in the 
Bosawas indigenous territories.  
 In order to test whether mestizo migration produces institutional change in Miskito 
communities, I selected three sites in the cultural zone of Río Plátano. The principal 
difference between the three sites is the history of mestizo migration to the area. The sites 
all contain Miskito communities that share similar geographical, economic, and cultural 
characteristics; however, mestizos have been migrating to one site since the late 1980s, 
whereas they just started to encroach on the second site in 2004 and mestizo migrants 
have not yet reached the third site. The natural variation in encroachment pressures 
enabled me to test if and how indigenous land-use institutions change. 
 Finally, in order to assess the long-term outlook for forest conservation and 
indigenous land-use institutions in Bosawas, I compare land management and forest 
threats in one community in the Miskito territory MITK to a neighboring Miskito 
community that lies on government lands. If property rights do not make a difference in 
current or future land management, I would expect to find similar land-use conditions and 
future challenges in each community. 
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Table 1.2 Principal Research Questions and Associated Research Sites 
 
 
 
 
The impact of property rights on mestizo migration is tested by comparing 
encroachment in the cultural zone of Río Plátano to encroachment in the two 
indigenous territories in Bosawas. I also compare mestizo activities in the two 
indigenous territories to mestizo activities in the buffer zone. If property rights matter, I 
expect to find differences in mestizo encroachment across sites.  
 
Study Sites Tenure Ethnicity 
Cultural Zone, Río Plátano Government Miskito 
Miskitu Indian Tasbaika Kum (MITK), Bosawas Territorial Miskito 
Mayangna Sauni Bu (MSB), Bosawas Territorial Mayangna 
Buffer Zone, Bosawas Government Mestizo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of encroachment on indigenous institutions is tested by comparing land-use 
activities in three study sites in the cultural zone of Río Plátano.  Each site is a Miskito 
community that has experienced different histories of encroachment. If mestizo 
migration produces change, I expect to find differences in land-use institutions and 
land-use practices between the three communities.  
 
Study Sites Encroachment Ethnicity Reserve 
Banaka YES, since late 1980s Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
Wampusirpe YES, since 2004 Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
Ahuas NO Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
 
Does mestizo migration produce change in indigenous land-use institutions? 
Are property-rights policies a determining factor in controlling mestizo 
encroachment?  
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Table 1.2. continued 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of property-rights processes on the robustness of indigenous land-use 
institutions is examined by comparing how the different property-rights processes 
impacted decisions to create, monitor, and comply with indigenous common-property 
rules. I compare the perceived costs and benefits of rule making and compliance in Río 
Plátano and Bosawas reserves. If the processes had no impact, I expect to see no 
difference with respect to rule making and compliance.  
 
Study Sites Tenure Ethnicity Reserve 
Brus Laguna Government Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
Banaka Government Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
Wampusirpe Government Miskito Cultural Zone, Río Plátano 
Pueblo Nuevo Territorial Miskito MITK and MSB, Bosawas 
Wina Territorial Mayangna MITK and MSB, Bosawas 
 
 
 
Are indigenous residents who share common-property rights better able to 
address future land-use pressures than those who live on public lands?  
 
 
 
 
The long-term governance prospects are explored by comparing two Bosawas 
communities: Pueblo Nuevo and Plis. The two communities share similar cultural, 
social, and economic characteristics but have different property rights. The analysis 
considers different hypothetical challenges to the current institutional regimes and 
examines the stresses these challenges would place on the two communities. 
 
Study Sites Tenure Ethnicity Reserve 
Pueblo Nuevo Territorial Miskito MITK, Bosawas 
Plis Government Miskito Buffer zone, Bosawas 
 
 
 
What impact do the property-rights policies have on the robustness of indigenous 
common-property institutions?  
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4.2 Site Specifics 
 
The four sites in the cultural zone of Río Plátano are Banaka, Ahuas, Wampusirpe, and 
Brus Laguna. Banaka, Ahuas, and Wampusirpe are the principal study sites, and I chose 
them specifically to examine the effect of outside encroachment on resident land-use 
practices and institutions because the regions share similar geographies and levels of 
market integration, but each region faces a different level of outside encroachment. Brus 
Laguna serves as the center for much of the Miskito political activity occurring in the 
cultural zone and is an excellent site for learning about the constitutional and collective-
choice decisions made by the Miskito leaders in the region.  
The four sites in Bosawas include Wina, Yapuwas, Pueblo Nuevo, and Plis. In MITK 
and MSB, I chose to study one indigenous community located just inside the territorial 
boundaries and one indigenous community located just outside the respective territory. 
The sites were specifically selected to test for the impact that the indigenous territorial 
rights have on mestizo encroachment.  Wina is a Mayangna site that is located just inside 
the Mayangna territory MSB. Yapuwas is a Mayangna site just outside the border of 
MSB, on government lands in the buffer zone. Similarly, Pueblo Nuevo is a Miskito site 
that is located just inside of the Miskito territory MITK.  Plis is a Miskito site in the 
buffer zone just outside of MITK. I also conducted fieldwork in four mestizo settlements 
located near the principal indigenous sites.  
 
4.3 Possible Threats to Validity 
 
I structured the study to control for factors such as roads or market access that might also 
influence mestizo migration and indigenous institutional change (in addition to property-
rights policies). Nevertheless, as in any research design, and particularly in a fieldwork 
investigation, there are possible threats to the validity of the results. A difference between 
Río Plátano and Bosawas that did raise some concern is the Nicaraguan civil war (1980–
1990). At the start of the civil war, the residents of Bosawas were evacuated and did not 
return to their homes until 1991. It is difficult to determine the impact the war had on 
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indigenous land-use practices and organizational capabilities. I tried to account for this 
difference by asking elders, community leaders, and residents about impacts the war had 
on land-use practices, integration with the market, and community cohesion. I cannot 
attribute any significant differences in indigenous land-use decisions to the war.  
Nicaraguan land distribution policies after the war encouraged migration to the Bosawas 
region. However, similar policies were also enacted in Honduras. I do not consider the 
civil war to threaten the validity of the results. Considering the difficulties of performing 
policy experiments in real-life settings, I consider Río Plátano and Bosawas to be an 
exceptional natural experiment that transpired by happenstance. 
 
5 DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
 
Understanding land-use institutions and behavior in the frontier depends on knowledge of 
the different actors’ perspectives, the geophysical and geopolitical factors that influence 
their behaviors and the current institutions in operation. Data were collected per 
fieldwork in the respective reserves as well as per interviews with government and non-
government personnel working in the reserves, but stationed in the capital cities. I spent a 
total of approximately 15 months in Honduras from 2002 to 2006. Roughly half that time 
was spent in Río Plátano and half in Tegucigalpa, the capital. I conducted fieldwork in 
Bosawas and research in Managua in August 2004 and August–October 2005.   
Data on the resource users, policy context, land use, and institutional change were 
gathered via three different data-gathering methods. The following provides an overview 
of the principal data-collection methods. The specific interview methods and sampling 
procedures are specified in the relevant chapters.  
  
5.1 International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Protocols 
 
I used the IFRI protocols to gather data on the individuals living and working in the 
reserves, their institutional practices, and the land-use outcomes. IFRI is a set of research 
protocols that enable scholars to examine the impact of diverse ways of owning and 
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governing forests on protection and management activities and their consequences on 
forest conditions (CIPEC, 2004; Gibson et al., 2000). The IFRI protocols include an 
interview guide to gather information on the attributes of the people that use the forests, 
attributes of the forests, and the institutions that influence forest use and management 
practices. In addition to the IFRI protocols, I added specific questions with respect to 
agricultural expansion and mestizo encroachment. The IFRI protocols also ask forest 
users to map their forests and include any characteristics that the community deems 
important. In addition, researchers and community members conduct walks through the 
forest to qualitatively assess forest use and forest condition.  
In each study site, I followed the interview protocols and conducted in-depth 
individual and group interviews with community residents. The residents were 
purposefully selected based on leadership, age, gender, and their specific activities within 
the community (for example, if someone was known for cutting timber or having cattle).  
I also conducted interviews with territorial leaders, indigenous organizations, public 
officials, and non-government personnel working in the region. Archival records from 
The Nature Conservancy, other non-government organizations (NGOs), and the 
ministries for the environment and protected areas provided a foundation for 
understanding the past policy processes within the region and indigenous institutional and 
organization histories. 
 
5.2 Questionnaire of Land-Use Institutions and Land-Use Preferences 
 
I administered a questionnaire to purposefully selected samples of reserve residents in 
order to compare resident perceptions of encroachment, land-use institutions, and their 
own land-use preferences. Sample selection was based on the geographic location of the 
houses within the settlements, gender, and ethnicity. Interviewees were asked to respond 
to a series of statements that asked (1) who should own the Mosquitia forests, (2) whether 
the residents believed that they could control mestizo migration, (3) the types of property 
rights that should be appropriated to the entire region and specifically the forests, and (4) 
their participation in the land market.  
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The questionnaire consisted of a series of portrait statements that gave the opinion of 
a fictitious person, Miguel. The respondent was then asked to respond whether he/she 
thought that his/her household thinks like Miguel and then to explain. This statement 
strategy was used so the respondent did not have to respond directly to the question and 
would feel less interrogated. This technique was roughly based on work by Schwartz and 
colleagues (Schwartz et al., 2001) on questionnaire techniques to gather information on 
attitudes towards different value statements from a cross-cultural sample. In Schwartz 
and colleagues’ questionnaire, respondents are asked to compare a portrait statement that 
expresses a value preference to their own preferences. For example, in order to 
understand how a person values wealth, Schwartz et al. might use a portrait statement 
“He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things” and then ask the respondent, 
“how much like you is this person” (Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 523). Schwartz and 
colleagues found the technique of using concrete examples and asking the respondent 
how much the person in the example is like them to be a particularly effective means of 
soliciting opinions from rural respondents.  
 My own set of statements were more content specific and drawn from earlier 
interviews on customary Miskito land-use practices and some of the conflicts emerging in 
the communities as a result of mestizo encroachment. The questionnaire responses were 
first coded as strongly agree with this person, somewhat agree, or do not agree. However, 
for many statements, respondents expanded their answers, and these responses were then 
coded and included in the present analysis of attitudes toward land-use institutions. The 
specific questions and response codes are given in Appendix A. The total number of 
respondents interviewed in each community is specified in Appendix B. The 
questionnaire responses are used for different analyses in several of the chapters; in each 
analysis I specify the community and the number of respondents for the particular 
questionnaire statement. The questionnaire is hereafter referred to as the “Miguel 
questionnaire.” 
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5.3 Spatial Analysis of Land Use and Land Cover 
 
I combined fieldwork with satellite images of land cover to assess agricultural expansion 
and encroachment in the study sites. I used geographic position system (GPS) units on 
forest transects and field walks within each community to geographically locate the 
community boundaries, forest edges, indigenous farms, and mestizo settlements and 
farms. I then mapped these points onto satellite images of land cover. I obtained Landsat 
images of Río Plátano from AFE-COHDEFOR and Landsat images of Bosawas from 
MARENA. The images were already classified by the respective ministries. In my 
analyses, I used geographic information systems (GIS) to calculate the amount of land 
under agriculture, pasture and forest. When possible, I also calculated land-cover change. 
The fieldwork and images enabled me to examine the association between encroachment 
and land-cover changes in the respective regions.   
 
6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND KEY CONCEPTS 
  
Institutions are tricky to investigate. They’re often ill-defined and never act in isolation. 
Furthermore, analysis of actors and institutions operating in the frontier is particularly 
challenging, given (1) the nature of the resource, (2) the value-laden relationships that 
many actors have toward the land, and (3) the complex configuration of formal laws and 
informal land-use norms that ultimately determine land-use activities.  
I combine two theoretical frameworks to analyze institutional change and forest 
conservation in the two reserves: the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework created by Ostrom and colleagues at Indiana University (Ostrom, 1986, 1990, 
2005) and the policy sciences (Clark, 2002; Lasswell, 1951, 1971). The frameworks help 
map out the characteristics of the participants, attributes of the resources, the costs and 
benefits of different property rights and land-use decisions, and the outcomes and effects 
of the current governance regimes. The IAD framework disentangles the web of 
interactions by considering the physical conditions of the resource to be managed, the 
attributes of the community of actors, and the rules shaping their actions (Ostrom 1990, 
2005). Similarly, the policy sciences analyze the context of the policy issue by 
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considering the actors and their perspectives, values, and goals. The policy sciences also 
consider how previous policies and interactions have shaped the actors’ present behaviors 
and future expectations (Clark, 2002; Lasswell, 1971).  
 
6.1 Framing the Context 
 
Both frameworks begin by considering the geophysical and geopolitical characteristics of 
the situation, the specific attributes of the resource to be managed, and the individuals 
involved. Works by Feeny, Ostrom, and colleagues (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990, 
2003; Poteete and Ostrom, in press) on common-pool resource management are 
particularly useful in the analysis. Frontier governance arrangements are challenged by 
the dilemmas that plague common-pool resource management: it is difficult to exclude 
users from the frontier, and one person’s use of frontier lands subtracts from total 
resource availability.  
The ability to mediate the different interests and enforce the respective agreements 
depends largely on the attributes of the different actors working and living in the frontier.  
This study assumes that all actors in the Mosquitia frontier draw on their values, 
ideologies or identities, and the information available to them to make decisions that 
support their preferred outcomes. I consider institutions to result from decisions made by 
individuals. Institutions may be consciously crafted or they may arise out of particular 
behavioral patterns. Nevertheless, I presume that individuals are conscious of their 
decisions and that behaviors are context specific.  
In this study, I expect that actors behave in ways characterized by Lasswell’s (1971, 
p. 16) postulate that states that all individuals act in ways that each perceives will leave 
the individual better off than if he had acted differently. The key word in this analysis of 
decision making is perceives. Unlike the completely rational actor, the individuals in this 
study are considered to be boundedly rational with information and time limitations. 
Furthermore, the individual’s perception of the costs and benefits of different institutional 
choices is assumed to heavily influence his/her behavior.  
Analysis of the actor’s perspective is central in the policy sciences. In particular, the 
social process as mapped per Clark (2002) highlights how to identify the participants’ 
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perspectives, their identities, their values and demands with respect to the resource in 
question, and their strategies for achieving their demands.  In Lasswell’s (1971) work, the 
set of values an individual holds (base values) and those that he/she hopes to gain (scope 
values) play an important role in understanding individual decisions. Identity is closely 
linked to one’s values and largely shaped by the myths that orient one’s life by giving 
meaning to daily experiences (Clark 2002, p. 37). For example, many mestizo colonists 
identify with the myth of the campesino, the farmer who takes pride in the struggle to 
feed his/her family by working the land. As a campesino, the colonist draws on a set of 
base values such as skill and enlightenment, or knowledge of the land and farming to 
achieve wealth (crops) and secure his/her family’s well-being. The world views, 
ideologies, and social groups that the farmer identifies with provide insights into his/her 
values, goals, and the institutional choices he/she might prioritize.  
Ultimately, my interest in the actors’ identities and perspectives is in how these 
factors influence their abilities to act collectively. Frontier forest conservation requires 
that the individuals living and working in the region agree to some common land 
management strategies and restrictions. Many authors point to the importance of 
community characteristics in determining the types of rules and collective activities that 
arise out of different social dilemmas (Libecap, 1994; McCay, 2001; Olson, 1965; 
Poteete and Ostrom, in press; Taylor and Singleton, 1993). Taylor and Singleton (1993) 
characterize different degrees of community based in part on the perspectives, 
expectations, and identities of the actors and their shared institutions. They hypothesize 
that the ability of actors to overcome collective-action problems depends on the number 
and types of interactions members of the group have, whether the relations are fairly 
autonomous, and whether members of the group share similar beliefs and preferences.  
Thus, for example, colonists might be considered to have a high degree of community 
due to their shared identities, numerous and varied interactions, and similar land-use 
preferences; however, they form only one of several actors operating in the frontier. I 
consider how the identities and values of different actors in the reserve influence their 
actions and abilities to act collectively in greater detail in the following analyses of the 
ability to control outside encroachment under the different property-rights regimes.   
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6.2 Actors and Institutions Interacting in the Action Arena 
 
In IAD language, outcomes are produced by the decisions made by actors in an action 
arena. Actors, their previous experiences, information and preferences, the current 
institutions, and the resource with its specific attributes all come together in an action 
arena (Ostrom, 1986). In Río Plátano and Bosawas, there are a variety of actors, all with 
their own institutions, goals, and strategies for interacting with other actors in the 
reserves. In broad terms, the actors can be divided into those who are “on-the-ground” 
residents of the reserve, and those who work in the reserve or influence reserve policy—
“influential actors.” The on-the-ground actors include the indigenous residents and the 
colonists. The primary influential actors are the in-country NGOs, government ministries 
that deal with the environment and land, and international non-government and 
government organizations that donate money, and at times personnel, to influence land-
use policies in the Mosquitia. 
Each actor works with various sets of institutions that may be either informal or 
formal. North (1990) distinguishes between formal institutions, such as laws or 
regulations that are consciously created and legally binding, and informal institutions, 
which may be customs, norms, or rules that are respected by the actors in a given 
situation but are not legally binding. Informal institutions may be tacitly understood or 
collectively decided upon, and compliance is based on informal constraints that may 
range from community gossip to fines and shunning. 
Both formal and informal institutions may be created and operate at different 
decision-making levels. The IAD framework traces decision-making processes at four 
decision-making levels: meta-constitutional, constitutional, collective-choice, and 
operational. Decisions at the meta-constitutional and constitutional levels determine who 
is eligible to craft the rules and the framework for how the rules will be shaped. The 
actors working at this level in the Mosquitia are generally the national and international 
government agencies. Nested within the constitutional rules, collective-choice rules 
decide how a particular good or service will be accessed and allocated. Collective-choice 
rules stipulate who is authorized to make policy decisions and what regulations govern 
their procedures. Decisions made at the collective-choice level affect the provision and 
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distribution of a resource as well as specify the expected input from each user and the 
sanctions to be applied for failure to comply with the rules. At the ground level, the 
operational rules regulate the day-to-day activities concerning the use of a specific good. 
These activities include harvesting, protecting a resource, monitoring users, providing 
information, and rewarding or sanctioning (Ostrom, 1990).  
It is important to recognize that the decision-making levels are not necessarily neatly 
nested and several decision-making levels may be in parallel operation. For example, in 
Río Plátano, AFE-COHDEFOR may make collective-choice decisions in relative 
isolation from the collective-choice rules created by the Miskito peoples. Furthermore, 
not all formal rules are necessarily rules-in-use. Both Ostrom and Lasswell distinguish 
between rules that are created on paper and those that are actually applied. Ostrom (1986) 
notes that a formal institution such as a law is not necessarily a rule-in-use. To be a rule-
in-use, the law or regulation must be recognized and applied. Similarly, Lasswell (1971) 
distinguishes between the prescription, invocation, and application stages in the policy 
process. A rule or law may be prescribed, but that does not necessarily mean it will be 
fully invoked or applied. For example, many protected areas are prescribed or created on 
paper, but the appropriate management, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms are not 
invoked or applied. In accordance with Ostrom, these “paper parks” are rules-in-form 
only; they are not rules-in-use.  
An emphasis in this dissertation is on understanding disjuncture between different 
rights, rules, and norms created by different actors at the respective decision-making 
levels. Specifically, I focus on the formal property-rights rules, the informal land-use 
institutions, and their relationships in order to understand the ability to control 
agricultural expansion and the long-term forest management prospects for the region. 
 
6.3 Evaluating Outcomes and Effects 
 
In his work, Lasswell (1951, 1971) calls on the policy analyst to define the preferred 
outcomes for a region. As stated, the two outcomes of interest in this study are 
agricultural expansion caused by mestizo encroachment and indigenous institutional 
change. In evaluating outcomes, I consider forest conservation as the immediate policy 
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goal for the Mosquitia Corridor. This is a goal generally shared and stated by all actors in 
the reserve (the mestizo colonists also state concern over widespread forest destruction, 
particularly of watersheds).  
Nevertheless, this shared concern should not disguise the conflicting demands and 
degrees of conservation that the actors aim for in the Mosquitia. Ecological conservation 
may be one of the benefits of institutional arrangements that grant rights to the resource 
users; however, environmental conservation is not necessarily guaranteed, and at times it 
may not be the preferred outcome of all the participants. Therefore, in considering the 
long-term effects of different institutional alternatives, it is important to keep the 
conflicting demands and means for mediating the demands at the forefront of the analysis 
of governance alternatives in the region.  
In evaluating the long-term effects of the different institutional arrangements, I 
deviate from prioritizing the ecological goals for the region and instead emphasize how 
each property-rights regime supports citizens’ rights and responsibilities in making land-
use decisions. The work of Dewey (1927) shapes my perspective of my role as a 
researcher and analyst of the institutional dynamics and land-use outcomes in the 
Mosquitia. Specifically, Dewey recognized that one of the greatest challenges to the 
democratic system in the United States is the ability of citizens to identify common 
problems, understand their sources and the relevant consequences, and then mobilize 
themselves as a public capable of defining and expressing its interests (p. 146).  
The greatest challenges for residents in frontier regions such as the Mosquitia are 
understanding how their actions are part of the changing environment within which they 
live, defining their particular interests, and organizing to act accordingly. The remote 
location, limited information, minimal level of political organization and organizational 
experience, and the high levels of conflict all demand a management regime that provides 
a means whereby citizens can make educated land-use decisions and resolve their 
conflicts peacefully. Therefore, in evaluating the different institutional alternatives for 
managing the Mosquitia, I pay careful attention to how each system works not only to 
promote forest conservation, but also how the systems facilitate the acquisition of 
information and support local organization so that frontier residents can participate in the 
land-use decisions that will effect their livelihoods and the sustainability of the region.  
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7 SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This introductory chapter has pointed to the key problems in frontier forest management 
and the need to understand how individuals devise institutions to address agricultural 
expansion and promote forest conservation in the region. The scope of the dissertation is 
limited in that I focus primarily on the activities of on-the-ground actors, the indigenous 
and mestizo residents, and consider the influential actors only in how their activities and 
policies affect the behavior of reserve residents. In considering forest conservation, I 
focus specifically on agricultural expansion, largely due to mestizo migration. I do not 
consider other types of exploitative activities such as logging or hunting, nor do I provide 
detailed analyses of the sustainability of the indigenous agricultural practices, although 
this is addressed partially in chapter 5.  
Furthermore, in my analyses, I do not question indigenous rights to their traditional 
homelands. I recognize that granting indigenous peoples rights to their homelands is a 
politically costly and at times an ethically questionable, constitutional decision. The 
purpose of the dissertation however, is not to question the indigenous land rights in 
themselves, but rather to narrowly examine whether by establishing common-property 
rights over their lands, indigenous peoples are able to control agricultural expansion. 
The key questions this dissertation does tackle are how indigenous residents are 
addressing agricultural expansion in the Mosquitia Forest Corridor and the impact that 
different protected-area property-rights policies have on indigenous land-management 
institutions and the ability to control the agricultural frontier. I intend for these analyses 
of the interplay between formal property rights, informal land-use institutions, and 
agricultural expansion to contribute to our understanding of ways to craft forest 
governance systems that promote conservation while recognizing citizen’s rights.   
In chapter 2, I use the policy sciences and concepts from institutional analysis to 
describe the context of agricultural expansion and forest conservation policy in the two 
reserves. Chapters 3–6 are the empirical analyses of institutional change and forest 
management in each reserve. In chapter 3, I examine the influence that different property 
rights have on the ability to control outside encroachment, and in chapter 4 I analyze how 
local land-use institutions are changing in the cultural zone of the Río Plátano, given 
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different levels of outside encroachment. In chapter 5, I explain why the property-rights 
processes have produced different outcomes. I dig deeper into the property-rights analysis 
and analyze if and how specific factors in these processes impacted indigenous and 
mestizo land-use decisions and the supply, monitoring, and compliance with indigenous 
common-property institutions. Chapter 6 further substantiates differences in agricultural 
expansion under government and common-property regimes as I consider the long-term 
ecological and institutional sustainability of the territorial property-rights structure in 
Bosawas. Finally, in chapter 7, I summarize the contributions made by this dissertation, 
offer policy suggestions for future frontier forest management, and discuss areas for 
future research.  
 
Endnotes for Chapter 1 
 
i A World Resources Institute report defines frontier forests as being primarily forested; of sufficient size to 
support viable populations of the full range of indigenous species with that particular forest ecosystem 
given periodic natural disturbance episodes; and exhibiting a structure and composition shaped largely by 
natural events, as well as by limited human disturbance from traditional activities (Bryant et al. 1997, 40). 
iiIn Bosawas, 8000 km2 constitutes the six indigenous territories that make up the core zone of the reserve. 
It does not include the buffer zone that was added later. Total area of the reserve including the buffer is 
approximately 20,000 km2.   
iii In May 2005, the indigenous associations were given titles to their respective territories. Nevertheless, as 
of April 2006 the Nicaraguan government had not yet registered the titles.  
ivIndigenous population statistics are based on the The Nature Conservancy census conducted in 1995–
1996, and the natural fertility rate is estimated to be 0.035 (Stocks, 1998). 
v I have chosen to present the population data for 1997–1998 for Río Plátano and 1995–1996 for Bosawas 
because in these years censuses were conducted specifically to assess population in each reserve. Although 
the Honduran Institute of Statistics conduced a census in 2001, this did not necessarily include all of the 
communities in Río Plátano. Similarly, although individual communities in Bosawas have conducted more 
recent population counts, I did not have recent numbers for all communities in the two territories. 
Furthermore, all current and future estimates of the population of indigenous residents in Bosawas are 
based on the 1995–1996 census conducted by TNC. 
vi The mestizo study region does not coincide directly with the TNC mestizo study sites and respective 
population counts. Therefore, the population estimates for the mestizo buffer zone, as demarcated in this 
study, are based on present-day population counts given by mestizo leaders and the 1995–1996 census 
conducted by TNC (Hurtado de Mendoza, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM:  
THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, THEIR PRACTICES, AND THE POLICY CONTEXT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” exemplifies some of the challenges to 
managing frontier forests and highlights the important role that property rights may play 
in forest conservation. In Hardin’s commons, much of the difficulty lies in the high costs 
of excluding other herders from the pasturelands, the presumed inability of the herders to 
act collectively to regulate their use of the land, and the subtractability of the 
pasturelands. Hardin predicts that, under these conditions, the herders will overexploit the 
commons because it is in each person’s best interest to use the commons until it is utterly 
degraded. He assumes that the herders are unable assess their collective impact on the 
commons and incapable of jointly constructing rules to sustain the pasturelands. In order 
to prevent the tragedy of the commons, Hardin contends that the government must either 
own or privatize the resource in question.  
The land and forest management challenges found in the Mosquitia and other frontier 
forests are similar to the challenges posed in Hardin’s commons and are, in large part, 
characterized by the regions’ geopolitical, ecological and spatial dimensions. By 
definition, frontiers are relatively distant from market centers and central governance 
systems. They are often considered lawless regions where every person must fend for 
him/herself. In economic terms, the frontier begins at the point where the net present 
value of land just covers the opportunity costs to the claimants (Alston et al., 1997, 
p.147). In ecological terms, frontier forests are considered to be those areas that are 
relatively undisturbed by human activities and of sufficient size to support a viable 
population of native species (Bryant et al., 1997, p.40). 
As in Hardin’s commons, one person’s use of the frontier detracts from the total 
benefits available to others. However, unlike Hardin, who focused primarily on a single 
benefit of pastureland for each herder, frontier forests offer a variety of benefits to 
different users, many of which are mutually exclusive. For example, when a settler clears 
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a hectare of forest land for crops, his clearing detracts from the total benefits available in 
several ways. First, less land is now available for others to farm. Second, the clearing 
may negatively impact the ecological services that the forest provides, such as the 
prevention of erosion and protection of water sources. Furthermore, the settler has 
reduced others’ access to forest products, because they are no longer able to gather timber 
and non-timber forest products from that area.  
The difficulty in managing frontier lands is finding a way to mediate the competing 
demands for the land and its resources, and to monitor and enforce the respective 
decisions. In the search for a solution to these governance challenges, Hardin’s theory of 
environmental demise has greatly influenced forest management policy and provides a 
staunch rationale for government-owned protected areas and forest reserves (McKean, 
2000; Terborgh, 1999, 2000; Wilshusen et al., 2002). Presuming Hardin’s theory to be 
fact, many advocates of government-owned protected areas maintain that resource users 
will necessarily destroy the natural resource systems unless the government steps in to 
regulate their use (Redford, 1991; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Terborgh, 1999, 2000).  
While it is true that it is difficult to coordinate activities to manage the commons, 
Hardin’s work is a hypothetical scenario. Overexploitation of the resource is one possible 
outcome; Hardin wrongfully assumes, however, that without government regulations, 
resource users will necessarily act individually without jointly constructing rules that 
affect what each can do and how their combined actions impact the resource in question 
(Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Furthermore, in his scenario, Hardin examines some 
of the obstacles to collective rule making on the part of the resource users, but he fails to 
examine the difficulties encountered in government or individual ownership. He implies 
that public or private property rights are somehow inherently capable of sustaining 
resource systems. Unfortunately, resource management is not so simple. No single 
property-rights system will necessarily conserve common-pool resource systems; 
management is context specific.  
Nevertheless, Hardin’s work does highlight some significant challenges to common-
pool resource management and the effect that different property-rights arrangements may 
have on resource use. If Hardin’s tragedy is examined as a theory, not as a fact, his work 
serves as a foundation for gathering empirical evidence to test if and when resource users 
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act collectively to create resource management rules and under what conditions a 
resource is sustained.  
In real-world resource management, a variety of contextual factors may influence if 
and how a resource is exploited and the impact that different property-rights policies may 
have. Does the location or scale of the resource matter? How does resource-user 
heterogeneity influence collective rule making and resource use? By understanding the 
characteristics of the resource, the resource users, and the institutional systems they 
operate within, we may be able to adapt property-rights systems to specific contexts and 
provide incentives to maintain resource systems.  
In the case of the Mosquitia, the immense scale and the political and geographical 
isolation of the region pose thorny governance challenges for forest management. Before 
we consider how the current property-rights policies impact forest governance in the 
Mosquitia, we must first examine the attributes of the region, the people, their land-use 
customs, and the broader institutional systems they interact within.  
In this chapter, I provide a context in which to ground the study of land-use decisions 
and institutional arrangements in the Río Plátano and Bosawas reserves. I highlight 
important differences in the specific property-rights processes and resultant policies 
enacted in each reserve. In subsequent analyses, I examine the link between the policy 
processes and the ecological and institutional outcomes in each reserve. 
 
2 DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
 
The data on the reserve residents, principal organizations working in the reserve, the 
political structure, and policy processes that occurred in Río Plátano and Bosawas are 
primarily based on my own fieldwork in the region. I also draw on previous research 
conducted by other investigators (principally Anthony Stocks, Peter Herlihy, and David 
Dodds). I used the International Forestry Resources and Institutions protocols (as 
discussed in chapter 1) to gather information on the community characteristics, land-use 
practices, and political structures.  
Information on the design, prescription, and application of the reserve property rights 
and resource management processes and policies was gathered from interviews with 
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residents, government and non-government employees, and reserve consultants who 
participated in the reserve restructuring processes. In July–August 2004, I conducted 
research that aimed to understand the policy processes enacted in Río Plátano in the mid-
1990s. At that time, I spoke with mestizo and indigenous leaders in all but one of the 
municipalities in Río Plátano about their rights and responsibilities in the reserve, their 
actual governance activities, and their opinions about the participatory process. I also 
spoke with AFE-COHDEFOR and Biosphere Project personnel and reserve consultants, 
including Peter Herlihy, about the Río Plátano management plan. In the spring of 2005, I 
followed up this work by asking reserve leaders and residents in the study sites their 
opinions on their rights and the management plan.  
In Bosawas, I also interviewed indigenous and mestizo leaders and residents about 
the property-rights process that occurred in the mid-1990s. In August 2005, I visited four 
of the six indigenous territories in Bosawas to gain a better understanding of the process. 
In addition, I spoke with municipal mayors, employees from MARENA, and reserve 
consultants, including Anthony Stocks, about the process that occurred in Bosawas. In 
2005, I revisited two of the territories (MITK and MSB) and spoke with residents in 
greater depth about their opinions and activities with respect to the property-rights 
process and current territorial governance activities. The following is an overview of the 
two reserves, the land, the inhabitants, the existent political structures, and the policy 
processes that produced the present property-rights regimes. 
 
3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOSQUITIA AND ITS INHABITANTS 
 
3.1 The Land 
The Mosquitia Corridor is one of the most remote regions in Central America and is 
geographically and politically isolated from mainland Honduras and Nicaragua. The 
region is approximately the size of the state of New Jersey, and for the most part, it is 
inaccessible by car. While some parts can be reached by small plane, many are only 
accessible by small boats or on foot. At the northern end of the corridor, the coastal 
region of Río Plátano contains beaches and lagoons and is dominated by pine savannah 
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and marshes. The interior sector of Río Plátano is a hilly to mountainous region covered 
by very humid tropical forest (Herlihy, 1997; House et al., 2002). To the south, the 
tropical forest continues into Bosawas, where the interior of the reserve is predominantly 
hilly to mountainous and the dominant ecosystems are humid and very humid tropical 
forest (UNESCO-MAB, 1999).  
 
3.2 The People and Their Land-Use Practices 
 
The Mayangna and Miskito Indians and the mestizo immigrants are the principal 
populations living in the Mosquitia. The Mayangna and Miskito both hold historical 
claim to the lands. The Mayangna consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of 
the Mosquitia. They are descendents of Amerindian groups that in pre-Hispanic times 
occupied much of Nicaragua. Today about 75% of the Mayangna live in Bosawas 
(Stocks, 2003). The Miskito identity and ancestral links to the region are more complex. 
Miskito origins date back to at least the 1600s when the Amerindians living in the region 
began to mix with European colonists, pirates, and African slaves on the shores of eastern 
Honduras and northern Nicaragua (Dodds, 1994; Herlihy, 1997; Stocks, 2003). The 
Miskito consider the Mosquitia to be their native homelands.  
In contrast to the indigenous residents, the mestizos are relative newcomers to the 
region. Although some moved to the Mosquitia in the 1950s–1960s, mestizo migration to 
the cultural zone of Río Plátano and the southern region of Bosawas began in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  
 
3.2.1 Mayangna and Miskito Land-Use Systems 
 
The Miskito of Río Plátano and Bosawas and the Mayangna of Bosawas share similar 
land-use practices and cultural characteristics. The Miskito and Mayangna subsist 
predominantly by farming, hunting, and fishing. Occasionally, individual families sell a 
few quintals of beans to traveling merchants or work for mestizo ranchers to earn a bit of 
money. In addition, some of the Bosawas residents travel to harvest coffee in the 
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neighboring regions, and some residents of Río Plátano obtain temporary jobs on lobster 
boats off the Caribbean coast.  
The relationship that the Mayangna and Miskito have to their lands is closely aligned 
with their ethnic identities. In conversations with Miskito and Mayangna natives, many 
stated that God created the Mosquitia land and its forests for the native people to work 
and subsist on. Several stated that man has no right to own a forest that God created. The 
native residents emphasized that their land-use traditions enable all to benefit from the 
forests and to work the land. Traditionally, all land is shared by the natives and formal or 
physical boundaries do not divide one community’s land from another. In Río Plátano, 
although each community has a general idea of where its lands lie, the boundaries are not 
clearly defined. Residents emphasize that their property rights are based on a “traslape” 
system, or sets of overlapping customary rights in which residents from one community 
can use the land and forest products from another community.  
Forests are held in common and all residents may extract timber and non-timber 
forest products. Usufruct rights are given to the first person to clear a plot of land for 
agriculture. Traditionally, native residents clear plots of less than one hectare which they 
rotate through the forest, generally staying close to stream and river banks. Once a 
resident clears a piece of forest for agriculture, that individual retains de facto usufruct 
rights to the field and no one may use the land without the owner’s permission.  
To an outside eye, individual property lines are not well demarcated and recognition 
of rights often depends on historical knowledge of the region and the residents. All 
agricultural land is held in the family and, while an individual may loan a piece of land to 
a neighbor, land sales are not customary. Land disputes tend to be resolved within the 
community, often referring to an elder to determine who has rights to what lands. While 
timber corporations have periodically extracted timber from different parts of the 
Mosquitia, the lands have historically remained under the dominion of the native peoples. 
 
3.2.2 Mestizo Land-Use Systems 
 
The mestizos in the Mosquitia are predominately farmers and ranchers. They typically 
plant corn, beans, and rice and often maintain cattle for dairy products or meat; the cattle 
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may be for personal consumption and at times, commercial sale. A principal difference 
between the indigenous and mestizo land-use systems is their forest clearing and planting 
patterns. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b show Miskito land uses as compared to mestizo land uses. 
Whereas the Miskito tend to have small plots intermixed with different crops and trees, 
the mestizos completely clear the land, often to plant pasture. 
Like indigenous residents, the mestizos identify themselves by their relationship to 
the land. However, their perceptions of the value of the land and how it should be used 
are quite different. The mestizo often identifies him/herself with the campesino—the 
farmer who works the land to the best of his/her abilities to support the family. The 
campesino colonist believes that it is each individuals’ right to own and work a piece of 
land. Therefore, neither the government nor the indigenous peoples can set aside 
unoccupied lands when there is so much need for land to be worked. Unlike the 
indigenous residents who are minimally connected to market systems, particularly land 
and agricultural markets, the mestizos perceive the land to be a market commodity and 
source of wealth, either through land sales or crops and cattle.  
Mestizo land-use practices and norms conflict with the indigenous customs and 
values. Mestizos do not understand the fluid boundary lines recognized by the indigenous 
residents. Upon arriving in the frontier, mestizos immediately lay claim to their lands by 
physically marking trees and clearing a border around their property. Unlike the 
indigenous farmer, who clears small plots for agriculture and rotates the plots along the 
rivers, mestizo settlers often claim relatively large expanses of land (approx. 50–60 ha) 
that have a major impact on forest fragmentation. Mestizos typically maintain both 
permanent crops and pasturelands (Carr, 2004; Hayes and Murtinho, 2005; Stocks, 1998). 
Any unmarked forest is presumed to be available. 
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Figure 2.1a. Miskito Land-Use Practices 
Photos above: photo 1 shows a Miskito agricultural plot recently burned and ready to be planted; photo 2 shows a Miskito 
agricultural plot; photo 3 shows a Miskito homestead.  
1 2 3
Photos by T. Hayes, 2005–2006. 
 Figure 2.1b. Mestizo Land-Use Practices 
From above: photo 1 shows mestizo plot burned to plant pasture; photo 2 shows mestizo pasturelands; photo 3 shows a mestizo homestead. 
 
   
3.3 Political Structure 
 
Both the Miskito and Mayangna are accustomed to living apart from the rest of Honduras 
and Nicaragua as the Mosquitia has historically been disconnected from mainland politics 
and economic systems (Dodds, 1994; Herlihy, 1997; Kaimowitz, 2002). In the 1600s, the 
region was a stronghold for British colonists and pirates, and the British retained indirect 
control over the region until 1860, when the English signed the Anglo-Nicaraguan Treaty 
and agreed to end territorial claims in the Nicaraguan coast (Dodds, 1994). Nevertheless, 
the Honduran-Nicaraguan Mosquitia remained relatively united as residents generally 
traveled freely along the Coco River between Honduras and Nicaragua until 1960 when 
the Coco was declared the official boundary between the two countries (Helms, 1971). 
Today, although both reserves remain physically isolated, the political and economic 
dynamics in the region are changing. In response to the environmental destruction 
occurring in the Mosquitia, large international organizations such as TNC, the 
development agencies German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and German 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (KfW), and UNESCO have stepped in to 
promote environmental conservation in the region. Likewise, the Honduran and 
Nicaraguan governments have tried to exercise greater dominion over the region and 
promoted oft-times conflicting policies and programs that include municipal 
development, conservation programs, and colonization projects. As national farmers 
organizations push to open the Mosquitia to agricultural development and encourage 
mestizo migration to the region, other national NGOs support sustainable development 
and indigenous autonomy. Finally, among the various programs and projects, the 
Mosquitia residents themselves are trying to define their own goals and objectives for the 
region. The result is a complex milieu of organizations, actors, and policies with 
overlapping and, often ambiguous, rights and responsibilities. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the principal organizations and actors relevant for this study 
of protected-area management, property rights, and agricultural expansion. This list is in 
no way exhaustive of all the organizations and actors in each reserve. Recall that in the 
IAD framework, there are four principal decision-making levels in which actors may 
interact. The metaconstitutional level includes actors that make decisions that influence 
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who is eligible to craft rules and how rules will be shaped. At the constitutional level, 
actors make decisions with respect to who can make and change the rule structure. The 
specific rules regarding provision, distribution of a resource, as well as the 
responsibilities of a resource user are made at the collective-choice level. Finally, at the 
operational level are the decisions that regulate the day-to-day use of a specific good 
(Ostrom 1990). 
 
Table 2.1. Principal Organizations and Actors in Río Plátano Study  
Actor Type of Organization 
Approximate 
Date 
Overarching Goal of 
Actor/Organization for Region 
Meta-Constitutional Level
GTZ and KfW German Govt. Development Org. 1996 Forest conservation 
MOPAWI  National NGO 1985 Conservation/Development/ Indigenous rights 
UNESCO World 
Heritage International Org.  1982 
Biodiversity and cultural 
conservation 
Constitutional Level
Honduran 
President/Legislature Government 1980 Conservation and development 
MASTA Indigenous Federation 1974 Autonomous territory 
Collective-Choice Level
AFE-COHDEFOR Government 1991 Forest management 
Biosphere Project Quasi Govt./Intl. Org 1997 Biodiversity conservation  
CVT  Indigenous Community Org. 1992 
Protect homelands / Autonomous 
territory 
GTZ and KfW German Govt. Development Org. 1996 Forest conservation 
MASTA and 
Federations 
Indigenous Regional 
Org. 1974 Autonomous territory 
MOPAWI  National NGO 1985 Conserv./Development/Indigenous rights 
Municipalities Government 1996  Authority over lands and tax base 
Operational Level
CVT  Indigenous Community Org. 1992 
Protect homelands / Autonomous 
territory 
Miskito Individual Citizens 1600s Rights to forest and farm lands 
Colonists Individual Citizens late 1980s Individual land rights  
Note: Bold text indicates which organizations and actors usually make decisions at the specified decision level. 
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Table 2.2. Principal Organizations and Actors in Bosawas Study 
Actor Type of Organization 
Approximate 
Date 
Overarching Goal of 
Actor/Organization for Region 
Meta-Constitutional Level
UNESCO-MAB International Org. 1997 
Biodiversity and cultural 
conservation 
Centro Humboldt National NGO 1990 
Conserv./Development/ 
Indigenous rights 
TNC International Org. 1993 Biodiversity conservation 
Constitutional Level
ADEPCIMISUJIN 
Indigenous Political 
Association 1992 Autonomous region 
APDECOMEBO 
Mestizo Political 
Association 1997 
Tenure and infrastructure support 
(schools, health, etc) 
Nicaraguan 
President/Legislature Government 1991 Conservation and development 
Collective-Choice Level
ADEPCIMISUJIN 
Indigenous Political 
Association 1992 Autonomous region 
APDECOMEBO 
Mestizo Political 
Association 1997 
Tenure and infrastructure 
support (schools, health, etc) 
Centro Humboldt National NGO 1990 
Conserv./Development/ 
Indigenous rights 
Mayangna/Miskito Individual Citizens 
Amerindian/ 
1600s Rights to forest and farm lands 
Mestizo Colonists Individual Citizens late 1980s Individual land rights  
Municipalities Government N/A Access to resources 
TNC International Org. 1993 Biodiversity conservation 
Operational Level
Coordinators Community Leaders 1960s Apply management plan 
Forest Guards Indigenous Org. 1997 
Monitor management plan / 
territory 
Mayangna/Miskito Individual Citizens 
Amerindian/ 
1600s Rights to forest and farm lands 
Mestizo Colonists Individual Citizens late 1980s Individual land rights  
Note: Bold text indicates which organizations and actors usually make decisions at the specified decision level. 
 
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, I divide the types of organization and actors by reserve and 
decision-making level. When relevant, I have included the members’ overarching 
demands or stated goals for land use in the Mosquitia. It is important to recognize that the 
rights and responsibilities that each actor holds are often ill-defined, and that many actors 
may partake in activities at more than one decision-making level. In the tables, I list the 
actors in all relevant levels in which they make decisions. 
In the meta-constitutional level I have grouped the international actors and 
organizations that wish to influence the constitutional decisions that determine who has 
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the right to make what rules. For example, UNESCO promotes the establishment of 
protected areas that restrict resource use in both Honduras and Nicaragua. It influences 
activities at the constitutional level through international conventions and funding in 
support of protected areas. Similarly, the German development agencies KfW and GTZ 
have greatly influenced who has rights to Río Plátano by providing the Honduran 
government with funds so long as the government restricts exploitative activities. While 
many of the activities of the international agencies and the NGOs trickle down into the 
collective-choice decisions, due to their wide and varied influence, I have chosen to 
group them in the meta-constitutional level. 
In the Mosquitia, who has the right to govern the region and make policies with 
respect to resource use is highly contested. This contestation is illustrated by the different 
actors’ making decisions at both the constitutional and collective-choice levels. At many 
times, two different sets of actors are independently making decisions to assert their 
governance rights and make land-use rules for the region. In Río Plátano and Bosawas, 
there is tension over whether the government and its respective agencies hold sovereignty 
and management rights over the region, or whether the native residents hold the rights to 
govern the Mosquitia.i Although the respective governments may hold the formal rights, 
many of the indigenous (and mestizo) organizations have decided to implement de facto 
land-use rules at the collective-choice level in order to assert their authority and 
demonstrate that they in fact, govern the region. For example, the creation of a 
management plan is a collective-choice activity. However, whoever asserts the right to 
make a management plan is, in a sense, asserting their right to make constitutional 
decisions with respect to governance of a region.  
In Río Plátano, the Honduran government holds the formal rights to govern the 
Mosquitia and granted AFE-COHDEFOR (in conjunction with the Biosphere Project, a 
joint operation of KfW, GTZ, and AFE-COHDEFOR) the right to make resource-use 
policies and regulations. I have therefore classified the Honduran government as a 
constitutional decision maker and AFE-COHDEFOR as an actor that makes decisions at 
the collective-choice level. 
The indigenous federation Unity for the Mosquitia (MASTA) and its regional 
federations will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. MASTA does not 
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hold de jure rights to make constitutional-level decisions with respect to governance of 
Río Plátano. Nevertheless, the mission of the organization is to establish an autonomous 
territory for the indigenous residents of the Honduran Mosquitia.ii In order to assert their 
autonomy, the federation and its regional subfederations have created a set of land-use 
rules that restrict resource use in the area. I argue that the decisions they have made, such 
as the prohibition of land sales and mestizo settlements, are rules made at the collective-
choice level that are intended to support the indigenous peoples’ constitutional decision-
making rights over the region. In Río Plátano, the indigenous federations have not 
established de facto constitutional rights to govern, but they are making de facto land-use 
policies that they hope will eventually further their ability to establish an autonomous 
region.  
In contrast, in Bosawas, the indigenous peoples were able to use their land-use rules 
to establish first their de facto governance rights over Bosawas, and eventually their 
formal governance rights over their territories. The process by which the indigenous 
associations, namely the Association for the Development and Progress of the Miskito 
and Mayangna Communities of Jinotega (ADEPCIMISUJIN), established their 
constitutional decision-making rights will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter. In structuring a management plan to govern the territories, the indigenous 
residents (and the mestizo organizations) essentially developed a de facto constitution of 
how the indigenous lands would be governed. It is important to recognize, however, that 
the basis of this constitutional agreement came from the land-use rules that the 
indigenous associations worked to implement at the collective and operational-choice 
levels.  
At the operational level are the individuals and community organizations that make 
land-use decisions with respect to the day-to-day use and monitoring of the Mosquitia 
forest lands. In Río Plátano and Bosawas, operational-level decisions include the 
activities of community or territorial forest guards to monitor the respective regions and 
also the informal institutions and individual decisions made by residents that shape land 
use and resource rights.  
It can be difficult to follow the various organizations and actors living and working in 
the Mosquitia and the specific decision-making influences they have. In the discussion 
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below, I further untangle some of the organizations and actors in the reserve and their 
rights, responsibilities, and practices.  
 
3.3.1 Governing Río Plátano 
 
At the meta-constitutional level, UNESCO, KfW, and GTZ have been instrumental in 
promoting conservation in the Mosquitia and encouraging the Honduran government to 
designate protected areas and create a management plan. Although the Honduran 
government created Río Plátano in 1980, it was virtually a “paper park” until 1997 when 
the Honduran government signed an agreement with KfW and GTZ to establish a 
management plan for the reserve. At that time the Honduran government gave all 
management rights to AFE-COHDEFOR. 
Today, Río Plátano is owned by AFE-COHDEFOR and managed by the Biosphere 
Project. The Biosphere Project has the right to make all collective-choice decisions with 
respect to reserve management. 
However, within the reserve several municipalities also have collective-choice 
decision-making rights (CNH, 1990). In the cultural zone of the Río Plátano, there are 
four municipalities that pertain to the department of Gracias a Dios. The department of 
Gracias a Dios was created in 1957, but the respective municipalities were not established 
until the mid-1990s. Departmental activities are largely dictated by the municipalities. In 
each municipality there is a municipal seat where the government offices are located. In 
most cases, municipal activities remain within the municipal seat. The relationship with 
respect to the rights and responsibilities assigned to the municipalities and those assigned 
to the Ministry of Forestry are not clearly defined. Generally speaking, the municipalities 
govern “urban” activities occurring in and around the municipal seats, while AFE-
COHDEFOR is responsible for the forest management within the reserve. 
The municipalities are responsible for resolving conflicts among individuals in the 
communities, registering land, and collecting taxes on land and timber products. In each 
community there is a community mediator who is assigned by the municipal mayor to 
resolve community conflicts. In interviews, mediators reported that most conflicts are 
over crop damage done by a neighbor’s cow or pig, customary landholdings, and 
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informal agreements between residents that were not complied with. If the mediator is 
unable to resolve the conflict, or if it is a more severe crime, the disputants may be sent to 
the municipal justice of the peace. If the justice of the peace cannot resolve the problem, 
the police may be called to arrest the perpetrator(s) and the case would be sent to court in 
the departmental capital. 
It is important to note that most residents said that they rarely went to the community 
mediator and even fewer cases ever make it to the municipal justice of the peace. 
Residents stated that they preferred to resolve conflicts among themselves. A typical 
form of retribution for crop damage is that the inflicted resident destroys the neighbors’ 
crops or farm animals so that both suffer equivalent damage to the farms. Residents also 
noted that there is always the threat of black magic and that in general, Miskito do not 
like to have quarrels with their neighbors. Furthermore, the threat of police action is fairly 
remote as the closest police station is in a departmental capital that is, at a minimum, a 
full-day boat trip up river (for most communities it is farther).  
Other responsibilities that the municipalities have include registering lands and 
collecting taxes on land and timber harvests. Although all lands are technically owned by 
AFE-COHDEFOR, the municipalities will register usufruct titles to individual holdings 
within their jurisdictions. According to one registrar, a resident must pay three Honduran 
Lempiras (approximately 12 U.S. cents) per square meter. Most residents do not register 
their lands. One municipal registrar estimated that only 40% of those living in the 
municipal seat had registered their land and less than 10% of those living outside the seat 
had land titles.  
The municipality may also facilitate land sales. Land sales in Río Plátano reserve are 
complicated and, more often than not, illicit activities. Technically, no resident may buy 
or sell land because all land belongs to AFE-COHDEFOR. Nevertheless, residents are 
permitted to sell their mejoras (improvements) to one another. A mejora could be 
pasture, farm, or cleared land. For example, if a resident clears a piece of forest, he/she 
may now sell this mejora (the cleared land) to another resident. Residents may go to the 
municipality to draw up papers to sell their mejoras to fellow natives. However, few 
reported doing so, and most said that land sales (or “improvement” sales) are based on 
informal agreements between the seller and the buyer. Furthermore, although land sales 
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to non-natives are prohibited, both residents and, in several cases, the municipal mayors 
themselves, have been accused of drawing up false papers and selling municipal lands 
within Río Plátano to mestizos.  
In addition to the land registry, the municipalities also issue permits to cut timber and 
collect taxes for timber harvests. None of the municipalities I visited had any records of 
timber permits or taxes. Most residents complained about the tax system and the 
illegitimacy of the municipality to have any rights over the native residents lands; 
nevertheless, few reported ever having paid a timber tax. For the majority of the 
residents, the municipal offices in the municipal seats are difficult and costly to get to, 
and the likelihood of getting caught for cutting a tree illegally is minimal.  
In general, residents in Río Plátano expressed distrust over government involvement 
in the region. Although many residents would like the support of government services 
such as schools, health centers, and roads, they are not willing to pay taxes and do not 
want the government to manage their lands. In Río Plátano, almost all of the residents 
interviewed stated that the forests of the region belong to the native residents and that 
they should be governed as part of an autonomous indigenous territory. 
In many instances, Río Plátano residents are working independently of the municipal 
governments to develop their own political leaders and organizations (Herlihy, 1997). 
Each site in this study is connected to a regional, indigenous political federation that falls 
under the broader indigenous political association MASTA. In 1976, indigenous leaders 
in the department of Gracias a Dios created MASTA to defend indigenous cultural 
preservation and advocate for indigenous territorial rights to the Mosquitia (Herlihy, 
1997, p.109). Today, MASTA serves as an umbrella organization to the indigenous 
federations in the region. In the cultural zone of the Río Plátano, there are four regional 
indigenous federations of MASTA. The regional leaders and the leaders of larger 
federations are all elected by the communities as their representatives in the respective 
regions. I provide a greater discussion of MASTA and its activities in chapter 4. In 
general, MASTA’s activities focus on obtaining land and resource rights, resource 
management, and development assistance. 
Thus far, MASTA has not gained any official property rights over the Mosquitia. 
MASTA is, at times, consulted about some of the management plans for Río Plátano 
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reserve. However, independent of the government management plans, MASTA has 
prescribed rules with respect to land use and indigenous property rights in Río Plátano.  
MASTA and its respective regional federations are often supported by the Honduran 
NGO Mosquitia Pawisa Apiksa (MOPAWI), Miskito for Agency for the Development of 
the Mosquitia. MOPAWI is the principal NGO active in Río Plátano and frequently 
promotes projects for community-based resource management, indigenous land rights, 
and governance capacity building.  
 
3.3.2 Governing Bosawas 
 
Political development in Bosawas is similar to that in Río Plátano. The indigenous 
residents have long considered themselves to be the rightful owners of the region. The 
reserve was originally established under the jurisdiction of MARENA. As will be 
discussed in the following section, in 1997 the indigenous communities established a set 
of de facto property rights over their territories. This produced greater rule-making and 
enforcement activities on the part of the indigenous associations in Bosawas.  
The two indigenous territories MITK and MSB are the primary governing units in 
this study. The territories originally began organizing under a single indigenous 
association, ADEPCIMISUJIN; however, the Mayangna of MSB later split to form their 
own association—MAKALANA. The territorial association received initial support from 
Centro Humboldt, a national NGO based out of Managua and TNC. Today, each 
territorial political association has a board of seven members who are elected by the 
communities to represent the interests of the territorial residents. The political 
associations’ primary responsibilities include promoting development in the respective 
territories and defending their territorial claims. 
Within the territories, in each indigenous community, there is a community 
coordinator who acts as community leader. The coordinator position started during the 
Somoza dictatorship and was further expanded by the Sandinista government that 
appointed community coordinators.iii The community coordinator is now an elected 
position in each community, and each coordinator serves as the community representative 
to the broader territorial political associations (i.e., ADEPCIMISUJIN and 
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MAKALANA). The community coordinator speaks on behalf of the interests of his/her 
community, is responsible for organizing community meetings to discuss community 
issues, helps to monitor land use, and mediates community conflicts. In addition, there is 
a justice of the peace assigned to each community to help resolve conflicts. This position 
was created circa 1995 by the Organization of the American States. Whereas the 
community coordinator is active in every community, it is less evident how active the 
justices of the peace remain.  
The relationship between the indigenous territories, MARENA, and the respective 
municipalities has yet to be defined. Today, MARENA is responsible for the buffer zone 
of Bosawas and holds rather vague advisory responsibilities in the indigenous territories. 
By and large, MARENA has minimal presence in Bosawas. Due to insufficient funds and 
personnel, MARENA employees are unable to travel deep into the reserve.iv Although 
MARENA has a set process for investigating and prosecuting illicit activities in the 
reserve, employees noted that the investigations rarely occur because of the high costs 
incurred and insufficient funds.v On occasion, MARENA officials and the Nicaraguan 
military may be called in to enforce territorial rules; however, the indigenous residents 
assert that MARENA cannot sanction any indigenous resident without permission from 
the territorial governing body. 
The municipalities have virtually no influence over activities in the two indigenous 
territories in this study. The residents do not pay taxes to the municipality, and the 
representatives from the respective municipalities rarely visit the territories.vi In an 
interview with the mayor of one municipality, he complained that the municipality had 
little authority in Bosawas and had not been included in the management plan (interview, 
Bosawas, August 3, 2004). 
Outside of the indigenous territories, in the Bosawas buffer zone, the mestizos are 
also trying to develop their own independent governance system. The mestizo region is 
divided into two unofficial territories that are governed by their respective mestizo 
associations: Farmers Association for the Protection of Bosawas (ACAPROBO) and 
APDECOMEBO. This study includes mestizo communities under the jurisdiction of 
APDECOMEBO. Today APDECOMEBO has an elected board of leaders that govern 
approximately 34 communities in the region. Each community has a mayor who forms 
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part of APDECOMEBO. The mission of the organization is to obtain mestizo tenure 
rights, obtain development assistance for schools, farming, ranching, and other 
community needs and promote environmental conservation of the region.vii
 
4 THE PROBLEM: COLONIZATION FRONTS IN RÍO PLÁTANO AND BOSAWAS 
 
The principal problem that this dissertation aims to examine is agricultural expansion 
produced by mestizo migration to the Mosquitia. Colonization trends in the region were 
(and continue to be) driven by a variety of underlying geographic, cultural, political, and 
economic factors. One of the principal underlying factors is land distribution and 
property-rights policies. Aggressive agroindustry policies initiated after World War II in 
southern Honduras pushed many farmers off their land and, to date, contribute to the 
problem of rural landlessness (Jones, 1988; Stonich, 1993; Utting, 1993). Similarly, land 
pressures and poorly coordinated agricultural reform policies created a land crunch in 
Nicaragua in the early 1990s. In particular, government policies enacted by President 
Violeta Chamorro (1990–1997) re-concentrated land distribution and encouraged 
migration to the Bosawas region after the end of the Nicaraguan civil war (Abu-Lughod, 
2000; Cupples, 1992; Everingham, 2001; Stocks, 1998).  
Migration into the cultural zone in Río Plátano began in the late 1980s. At that time, 
over one-quarter of the rural populace was landless in Honduras (Salgado, 1996, p. 92). 
The colonization front started when national farmers’ organizations began exploring the 
Mosquitia and encouraging farmers to organize and move out to the region and pressured 
the government to open up the Mosquitia to colonization. Much to the dismay of the 
reserve residents, in 1995, the Honduran government declared the northwestern edge of 
Río Plátano a region for agrarian reform and encouraged thousands of families to move to 
the area. A top-down declaration, the Agrarian Reform was poorly organized and did not 
consider that the local population already occupied 80% of the arable land. Upon arriving 
at the edge of the reserve, the migrant families found all the land occupied and many 
decided to move further inside the reserve in search of land (IUCN/ORMA, 1995; 
Messen, 1995). In 1996, UNESCO listed Río Plátano as a World Heritage Site in Danger 
due to unregulated encroachment by cattle ranchers and farmers from outside the region 
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and the absence of an effective management plan (UNEP-WCMC, 1997). By 1997 there 
were approximately 2,200 mestizos living in the cultural zone of the reserve (PBRP, 
1997/98).  
In Bosawas, residents reported that colonization pressures began to build after the 
civil war, in the early 1990s. During the 1980s, Bosawas was a region of heavy conflict 
between the Contras and Sandinistas. At this time, most of the Mayangna and Miskito 
peoples were either forced to serve one of the militant groups or removed to camps in 
Nicaragua and Honduras (Stocks, 1996). After the war, Nicaraguan politicians 
encouraged ex-Contra and ex-Sandinista combatants to relocate in “development poles” 
on the edge of the Bosawas forests. While some came with government-issued land titles, 
others moved to the region by either buying land from native residents or invading 
apparently unoccupied forest lands. According to a study conducted by TNC, in 1980 
there were only 191 mestizo families living in the southern region of Bosawas. By 1996, 
1,977 families had moved to the area (Hurtado de Mendoza, 2001, p. 41). 
 
5 INDIGENOUS STRATEGIES AND DEMANDS IN RESPONSE TO MESTIZO MIGRATION 
5.1 Río Plátano Residents Respond to the Mestizo Migratory Threat  
 
Residents in the cultural zone of Río Plátano first became aware of outside encroachment 
into their homelands in the early 1990s. In 1992, the Honduran NGO MOPAWI began a 
participatory analysis of land use in Río Plátano in which leaders from the various 
communities in the reserve participated in an exploration of those living in and using 
their lands. On this trip, residents saw areas in the northwestern region of the reserve 
deforested by colonizers for farm and pasture lands. Upon returning to his community in 
the coast of the Lagoon of Ibans, one leader called a regionwide meeting of the coastal 
communities to call attention to the threat of outside encroachment. While outsiders had 
not yet intruded into the coastal communities, they were staking out properties on lands 
farmed by the Miskito. 
 At the regionwide community meeting, participants decided to create The Land 
Vigilance Committee [Comite Vigilancia de Tierra (CVT)] to monitor outside intrusions, 
organize groups to tell outsiders that they were not welcome, and report any invasions to 
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the authorities. The CVT was based out of the coastal community Ibans and had 
subcommittees organized in approximately 15 communities in the cultural zone. While 
all monitoring activities were voluntary, MOPAWI supported the organizational 
development of the committee.  
In addition to monitoring outside encroachment, the CVT also demanded that the 
government either give indigenous peoples their own territory to manage or implement a 
management plan to control the colonization process. Residents said that they felt they 
needed greater government support and, if the government truly wished to conserve Río 
Plátano, they needed to work with the residents in its protection.viii  
 
5.2 Bosawas Residents Respond to the Mestizo Migratory Threat  
 
In Bosawas, when the Mayangna and Miskito peoples returned to their communities after 
the war in 1991 they were confronted with two shocks. First, the lands that they 
considered to be theirs had been declared a natural resource reserve to be governed by 
MARENA, and second, mestizo farmers were moving into their homelands in mass.  
In response to the in-migration and threats to their homelands, the Miskito and 
Mayangna joined forces and organized themselves to defend their land and their 
livelihoods. In 1993, the leaders from each group formed the indigenous association 
ADEPCIMISUJIN. The goal of the group was to establish indigenous rights to their lands 
and defend them from mestizo colonizers. One of the first steps of the group was to go to 
Managua to seek financial and political support. Centro Humboldt, an NGO in Managua, 
and two Nicaraguan politicians offered initial financial and legal support and the group 
received official recognition from the Nicaraguan government as a territorial association 
in 1994.  
 
6 POLICY RESPONSES: RESTRUCTURING THE RESERVES’ PROPERTY-RIGHTS 
REGIMES 
 
In the early 1990s, Río Plátano and Bosawas struggled to conserve the ecological and 
cultural diversity in the region. At this time, both reserves were government owned and 
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managed. However, in the mid-1990s, each reserve initiated participatory processes to 
rezone the reserves and create new management plans aimed at controlling agricultural 
expansion and other illegal activities. After the World Heritage Commission declared Río 
Plátano a World Heritage Site in Danger, the Honduran government agreed to implement 
a new management plan with the help of the German development agencies GTZ and 
KfW. Similarly, in the early 1990s, as part of their Parks in Peril program, TNC began to 
work in Bosawas. The process in Río Plátano was primarily concerned with creating 
reserve management rules and guidelines. The Río Plátano process did not strengthen 
residents’ rights to the land and resources. In contrast, the Bosawas process focused on 
establishing indigenous property rights and then working with the existent indigenous 
associations to devise an appropriate management plan. As will be shown in subsequent 
chapters, the respective processes and resultant property-rights policies have produced 
very different outcomes in terms of forest conservation and governance in the region. 
 
6.1 Restructuring Río Plátano 
 
In 1996, the Honduran government signed a bilateral agreement of assistance with the 
German government in which they agreed to bolster the Río Plátano reserve and create 
the Biosphere Project. In 1997, a presidential decree declared that the reserve would be 
managed under a co-management policy. The decree determined that the reserve would 
fall under the jurisdiction of AFE-COHDEFOR, but that AFE-COHDEFOR would 
develop a participatory process in which all those with a stake in Río Plátano would 
participate in the decisions with respect to the conservation and resource use (AFE-
COHDEFOR, 2000, p. 40; CNH 1997). At this time, the Germans began to work with 
AFE-COHDEFOR to establish a management plan for the reserve. With the help of a 
geographer from the University of Kansas, Peter Herlihy, the Biosphere Project 
developed a participatory decision-making process to rezone the reserve.  
 
Tanya M. Hayes 50
   
6.1.1 Implementation 
 
In the first stage of the project, Herlihy, residents, and reserve officials worked to create a 
management plan. As part of the process, the residents mapped out the areas of the forest 
that they used and specified what types of regulations should be applied to each zone 
(AFE-COHDEFOR, 2000; Herlihy, 2001). All of the mapping was done on paper and 
none of the community boundaries or land-use zones were physically demarcated. In 
addition to the mapping, the Biosphere Project organized the residents into two levels of 
conservation committees: community-level conservation committees to monitor daily 
activities and municipal-level committees to provide oversight and monitor the resources. 
The community-level and municipal-level conservation committees were supposed to 
support AFE-COHDEFOR and monitor the resource-use rules designated in the 
participatory mapping process (interview, Río Plátano consultant, 2003). It is important 
to note that the committees were created by the Biosphere Project and the process did not 
support the local land vigilance committees, such as CVT, already in operation. 
 
6.1.2 Application 
 
The second stage was the application of the management plan. The application of the 
management plan differed significantly from what was proposed to the communities 
during the initial mapping and rule-making activities. The final management plan (AFE-
COHDEFOR, 2000) did not include the communities’ rules nor did it recognize the 
community conservation committees.ix The Biosphere Project completely abandoned the 
community-level conservation committees and gave minimal support and recognition to 
the municipal-level committees. The municipal committees were not given any 
management rights or responsibilities.  
 In 2004, I interviewed members of all but one of the municipal-level committees. 
Most members were disinterested and frustrated with the organization due to lack of 
direction and support. The president of one committee said he was simply waiting until 
the Biosphere Project returned and called new elections so he could be relieved of his 
position (Hayes, 2004). In 2005, in interviews with Biosphere Project personnel, officials 
stated that the municipal conservation committees were no longer in operation.  
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Today, residents complain that the rules that govern the Río Plátano are not the ones 
they helped create. The reserve residents hold no property rights or management 
responsibilities. Lack of funds and personnel, however, translates into a minimal 
government presence in the reserve. At the time of my visits in 2005–2006 there were no 
AFE-COHDEFOR or Biosphere Project forest guards working in Río Plátano. 
Furthermore, given the high levels of tension in Río Plátano and lack of judicial support, 
AFE-COHDEFOR employees that do visit the reserve are ill-equipped to deal with the 
conflict and illegal activities in the region. x
 
6.2 Re-Defining Bosawas 
 
In 1993, TNC began a conservation project in Bosawas. During the first meeting, the 
indigenous residents requested help in demarcating their territories and defining their 
territorial rights (Stocks, 2003). In 1994, under the guidance of Idaho State University 
professor Anthony Stocks, TNC started to work with the indigenous residents to 
document the territorial claims of the Miskito and Mayangna peoples and create a system 
of norms to manage their natural resources.  
 
6.2.1 Implementation 
 
The process began with a participatory mapping project in which the indigenous 
communities identified and mapped six indigenous territories. The mapping was followed 
by physical demarcation along the frontiers most threatened by colonists and a group of 
forest guards were organized to patrol the borders. Consultants also worked with the 
leaders of ADEPCIMISUJIN and the individual communities to create land-use 
management plans. Through a series of community and territorial meetings, each territory 
denoted areas for agriculture, forest-product gathering, and strict forest conservation. In 
addition, the territories created a system of management rules that regulated entrance into 
the territories and the residents’ withdrawal and access rights. The forest guards in 
conjunction with the community coordinators and the territorial associations were 
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responsible for monitoring. Enforcement continued to be largely informal and based on 
the traditional customs of shame and community disapproval (Stocks, 2003).  
The demarcation process was highly contentious. Upon hearing about the indigenous 
plan to demand territorial property rights, the mestizos just south of the indigenous 
territories, MITK and MSB, organized themselves into the two mestizo associations: 
ACAPROBO and APDECOMEBO. During the demarcation process, the associations 
fought to maintain mestizo rights to the land. Both mestizo and indigenous residents 
recall incidents of violent conflict between the two groups. At one point, a group of 
mestizos kidnapped the leaders of ADEPCIMISUJIN and held them hostage until they 
agreed to change the territorial boundaries of MITK and MSB. Eventually, the two 
groups engaged in a series of negotiations facilitated by TNC and the Nicaraguan NGO, 
Centro Humboldt. In 1997, the territorial boundaries were finally agreed on and all 
parties signed a series of accords that defined indigenous and mestizo property rights in 
the territories.  
The participants from each association agreed that the indigenous peoples retained 
property rights to their territorial lands. The participants also agreed that mestizos 
currently living in the indigenous territories would be allowed to remain so long as they 
complied with indigenous management rules. The territorial boundaries would be 
monitored by indigenous forest guards. Both the indigenous and mestizo associations 
would be responsible for ensuring that their constituents complied with the accord. The 
accords created a de facto set of property-rights rules for the region.  
 
6.2.2 Application 
 
In interviews, the reserve residents (mestizos and indigenous people) often referred to the 
de facto agreements signed in 1997 as “the law.” Nevertheless, the process did not end 
after the physical demarcation of the territories. Centro Humboldt continued (and 
continues) to provide financial and technical support to the territorial associations and the 
corps of forest guards. Furthermore, the territorial associations in conjunction with 
Centro Humboldt persisted in their pursuit of legal recognition of the indigenous 
territorial property rights from the Nicaraguan government. In 2003, Law 445 passed by 
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President Enrique Bolanos Geyer recognized indigenous rights over the region and 
created a process by which they could legally obtain their territorial titles. In May 2005, 
the territories were given their titles, however, as of April 2006 the Nicaraguan 
government was still in the process of registering the titles.  
 
7 DO DIFFERENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PRODUCE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES? 
 
The Bosawas and Río Plátano property rights processes both had the same goals of 
controlling agricultural expansion into the reserves and promoting forest conservation. 
However, the Río Plátano process differed from the Bosawas process in four significant 
ways. 
 First, Río Plátano remains a government reserve whereas Bosawas residents share 
common-property rights to their ancestral lands. Second, the Río Plátano process did not 
physically demarcate any of the land-use areas or territorial boundaries; the land-use 
maps were defined only on paper. Third, the residents were not fully incorporated into 
collective-choice decisions with respect to management, monitoring, and access to their 
lands. Unlike Bosawas, where indigenous and mestizo residents participated in the 
collective-choice decisions that in a sense created a constitutional agreement with respect 
to land rights and uses in the region, in Río Plátano, residents did not agree to the rules 
and no residents were able to establish property rights. Furthermore, no negotiations were 
held with mestizo residents. The mestizos were informed that only those living in the 
reserve before 1997 could remain; no newcomers were permitted. However, no effort was 
made to ensure that the mestizos would comply with these rules. Finally, the Río Plátano 
process failed to establish resident monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. All 
enforcement activities remained the responsibility of AFE-COHDEFOR.  
 The following chapters show the different outcomes and effects of the property-rights 
policies enacted in each reserve. The chapters examine how property rights influence two 
outcomes of interest: (1) the ability to control agricultural expansion and (2) the 
development of land-use and governance institutions for continued land and forest 
management. In chapter 3, I compare agriculture expansion, specifically mestizo 
colonization, in Río Plátano and Bosawas since the mid-1990s. However, it is not enough 
Tanya M. Hayes 54
   
to show that property rights make a difference; the crucial question is what specific 
factors contribute to these differences. In chapters 4–6, I probe deeper into institutional 
change and how and why property rights influence institutional resilience and how the 
different arrangements impact future land management challenges in the Mosquitia 
Forest Corridor. 
 
Endnotes for Chapter 2
 
i Arguably, this has been largely resolved in Bosawas, but it is still unclear how much authority the 
MARENA believes it holds (and actually holds) over the indigenous territories. 
ii This mission was stated at a regionwide MASTA meeting held in Ahuas, March 2005. In interviews, 
leaders of the regional federations consistently stated that their goal is an autonomous territory. 
iii Interview, MSB leader, San Andres, September 2005. 
iv Interviews with MARENA engineers, Jinotega, August 2, 2004, and Bonanza, August 11, 2004; 
MARENA technician, Bocay, August 3, 2004; lieutenant-colonel of Nicaraguan Army, Jinotega, August 2, 
2004; official of Protected Areas, MARENA, Managua, September 25, 2005. 
v Interview with MARENA engineers, Jinotega, August 2–3, 2004. 
vi Interview, mayor of Bosawas municipality, August 3, 2004.  
vii Interviews with mestizo leaders of APDECOMEBO, Tortuga, August 30, 2005, and Plis, September 12, 
2005. 
viii Interviews with CVT leader, Belen, April 23, 2005; CVT member, Banaka, April 29, 2005. 
ix Interviews with Río Plátano reserve consultant, 2003; Miskito leader, Belen, Honduras, April 23, 2005; 
Río Plátano official, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 8, 2005. 
x Hayes, 2002; interview, AFE-COHDEFOR employee, Tegucigalpa, November 8, 2005. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DOES TENURE MATTER? 
COLONIZATION TRENDS IN RÍO PLÁTANO AND BOSAWAS BIOSPHERE RESERVES 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many Mosquitia residents complain that tenure insecurity is at the root of the 
deforestation occurring in parts of the region.i Although some conservationists and policy 
makers contend that publicly managed lands serve to safeguard forests from 
overexploitation, indigenous residents in the region argue that public management of the 
Mosquitia forests fails to control agricultural expansion and violates their ancestral rights 
to the land and its resources. They demand communal tenure rights in order to protect 
their lands from outside encroachment.  
In 1997, the Honduran government responded to the threat of mestizo expansion into 
Río Plátano reserve by creating a new management plan. The management plan 
established the cultural zone in the reserve as a region specifically for the indigenous 
residents of Río Plátano, and the plan prohibited mestizo entry into the zone. However, 
the management and ownership of the cultural zone (and the entire reserve) remained 
under AFE-COHDEFOR. At the same time, in Nicaragua, the indigenous residents of 
Bosawas, in association with international and national NGOs created a new management 
plan for Bosawas. In contrast to the plan established in Río Plátano, the management plan 
in Bosawas designated a set of indigenous territories and established indigenous property 
rights over their territories. This process was recognized by the Nicaraguan Ministry of 
the Environment and Natural Resources and the rights have since been codified by the 
Nicaraguan legislature.  
Are the protected-area policies enacted in Honduras and Nicaragua equally successful 
in thwarting outside encroachment and promoting forest conservation in the region? In 
this chapter, I use institutional analysis and GIS analysis to identify the different property 
rights policies enacted in Río Plátano and Bosawas and to examine whether and how the 
specific rights are working to prevent further encroachment. I find that both the Río 
Plátano and Bosawas reserves have broadly similar rules that restrict mestizo settlements 
Tanya M. Hayes 56
  
on indigenous lands; however, who made the rules and how they are invoked and applied 
in everyday life vary between the two reserves. The ability to make and enforce the land-
use rules—collective-choice rights—is the crucial difference between the two reserves. I 
find that mestizo expansion is better controlled in Bosawas, where the property-rights 
process established indigenous residents’ collective-choice rights that they used to clearly 
demarcate boundaries, invoke land-use rules, apply monitors, and create mechanisms for 
conflict resolution.  
 
2 THE PROTECTED-AREA DEBATE: LOCAL RESILIENCE VS. GOVERNMENT 
STABILITY 
 
Dispute over forest conservation policies in the Mosquitia echo the debate in the broader 
protected-area arena. At the heart of the debate are (1) the rights and responsibilities to be 
delegated to resource users and (2) the resiliency of traditional natural resource 
institutions, given economic, ecological, and social change.  
Indigenous and traditional peoples often argue that if governments recognize 
traditional residents’ communal property rights to their lands, they will be better able to 
conserve frontier forests and fend off outside encroachers (Bray et al., 2005; Brosius, 
2004; The Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration, 2003). Many scholars and practitioners 
support their claims (Freire, 2003; Godoy et al., 1998; McSweeney and Aarps, 2005; 
Stocks, 1998, 2003). Advocates for community-based conservation approaches contend 
that resident peoples have successfully managed their resource systems, often for 
hundreds of years, and that by excluding residents, conservationists fail to benefit from 
local knowledge and, at times, destroy local governance systems (Borrini-Feyerabend, 
2002; McNeely, 1995; Stevens, 1997; Western and Wright, 1994; Wilshusen et al., 
2002). More recently, some scholars have also begun to address resource users’ demands 
for resource rights and question the legitimacy of protected areas that are often heavily 
financed and governed by government and non-government agencies outside the host 
country (Alcorn, 2005; Romero and Andrade, 2003; Wilshusen et al., 2002). 
At the other end of the spectrum, some conservationists contend that the only way to 
ensure sustained forest conservation is to increase the area of forest reserves under strict 
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government management, monitoring, and enforcement (Bruner et al., 2001; Putz et al., 
2001; Rice et al., 1997; Terborgh, 2000). Many advocates for government-mandated 
reserves suggest that traditional resource management systems are not robust and that 
said institutions will fail when confronted with market integration, conflicts between 
heterogeneous resource users, political influx, or demographic change (Redford, 1991; 
Redford and Stearman, 1993; Terborgh, 1999). In the context of agricultural expansion, 
conservationists worry (1) if indigenous residents are able to control outside 
encroachment and (2) if by recognizing indigenous property rights, the conservation 
community is simply trading the rapid threat of outside encroachment for a slower, but 
inevitable, threat of indigenous resource exploitation as population increases and 
traditional peoples adopt market values (Terborgh, 2000; interview with employee of 
Saint Louis Zoo, Managua, September 2005). Rather than depending on the whims of 
local systems, many put greater faith in the legal systems and argue that, in the long term, 
only legally recognized and publicly managed nature reserves will ensure sustainable 
conservation (Chapman, 2003; Redford, 1991; Redford and Richter, 1999; Terborgh, 
2000).  
Despite the heated debate, studies show that no single property-rights arrangement 
necessarily ensures environmental conservation. Although many conservationists insist 
on publicly protected areas; public, private, and common-property arrangements may all 
sustain (or exploit) natural resource systems (Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 1990, 2005; 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). The key question for policy makers and planners is what 
factors influence how different institutional arrangements function in specific contexts. 
 
3 DEFINING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
 
In order to understand how tenure affects resource management, we must specify the 
property rights in a particular tenure arrangements and disentangle the bundle of rights 
within the context of a specific region, resource, and set of resource users. Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) distinguish between five different property rights related to resources 
operating at two decision-making levels: operational and collective-choice. These five 
rights include the ability to access, withdraw, manage, exclude, and alienate a resource. 
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At the operational decision-making level, individuals are entitled access to and 
withdrawal from a resource system. Decisions made at the operational level do not 
determine rules about resource use. Those with collective-choice decision-making rights 
are entitled to make rules that exclude others and make management decisions that 
determine future access and withdrawal rights and potentially define zones for use 
patterns and change the physical layout of the resource (such as demarking boundaries in 
diverse ways). Alienation is also a right decided at the collective-choice level and entitles 
one to sell or lease access, withdrawal, and management rights. Table 3.1 shows the five 
different rights and their respective decision-making levels. 
 
Table 3.1. Bundles of Property Rights 
Property Rights 
Operational Level 
Access 
Withdrawal 
Use rights 
Collective-Choice Level 
Management Right use and transform resource 
Exclusion Right to decide access rights 
Alienation Right to sell or lease rights 
Table adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992). 
 
Schlager and Ostrom emphasize that different bundles of property rights, whether 
they are de facto or de jure, affect the incentives individuals face, the types of actions 
they take, and the outcomes they achieve. Of particular importance are the collective-
choice rights, as those who hold collective-choice rights have the right to make decisions 
about who will have future rights. For example, in Río Plátano, community residents 
have the right to cut a certain number of board-feet each year. Therefore they hold 
withdrawal rights. However, AFE-COHDEFOR holds the management rights to decide 
who can cut timber and how many board feet. In this case, AFE-COHDEFOR has 
collective-choice rights that determine the future rights assigned to the community. In 
contrast, in Bosawas, residents hold all the collective-choice rights to decide who can 
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access and withdraw resources and to make rules about how the resources will be 
managed. 
 
3.1 Clusters of Rules to Specify the Rights 
 
While it is important to identify who has the right to make specific decisions, it is equally 
important to understand how the right-holder is exercising that right. Management, 
exclusion and alienation rights all enable the right-holders to specify rules that 
characterize the property-rights regime. Ultimately, the types of rules that the right-
holders decide to make (or not make) define the property-rights regime and influence the 
use of the resources. McKean, Ostrom, and colleagues note that within a property-rights 
system, different configurations of rules may affect the ability to successfully manage a 
resource over time. Specifically, rules with respect to management, monitoring, and 
enforcement have been found to be important components of successful common-pool 
resource systems (McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
In order to better understand the different types of rules that influence resource 
management systems, Ostrom and colleagues (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 
1999, 2005) categorize the rules into different clusters, depending on their specific 
functions. For example, boundary rules are all rule statements that specify who the 
participants are and can be used as part of a rule configuration to restrict access rights. 
However, the boundary rule may not be complied with unless it is configured with 
position rules that specify who will monitor and enforce the boundary rule and a pay-off 
rule that specifies a sanction. In this chapter, I focus on five clusters of rules and consider 
how they are configured to define the broader property-rights regimes in Río Plátano and 
Bosawas reserves. Table 3.2 shows the different clusters of rules as defined by Ostrom 
(1999, 2005) and Crawford (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). 
 
 
Tanya M. Hayes 60
  
Table 3.2. Property-Rights Rules 
Property-Rights Rule Clusters 
Boundary Specify who the participants are 
Scope Specify the spatial and temporal constraints on land use 
Choice Specify what is permitted, required, or forbidden 
Payoff Specify the sanctions to be applied 
Position Specify who will monitor and enforce  
Table adapted from Ostrom (2005). 
 
The institutional statements in Table 3.2 define who uses a resource, how it is used, 
and whether/how that use is monitored and enforced. The specification of the rules and 
their configuration with other rules can be particularly useful in understanding natural 
resource management. Say, for example, that a community owns exclusionary rights to 
its land and has crafted the following set of rules to manage their forests: 
 
1. Only those living within the community have the right to use the forest 
(boundary). 
2. The forest boundaries that lie between the two rivers belong to the community 
(scope). 
3. Any outsider caught felling trees in the forest must forfeit all the timber that he or 
she has cut (payoff).  
 
In the case above, the forest access rights are well defined—only those living in the 
community can use the forest between the two rivers. The rules also specify a sanction 
for outside encroachment. However, the rule configuration does not assign a position rule 
that specifies a monitor or enforcer. Therefore, in this example, it is not clear if there is 
anyone out in the forest looking for outside encroachment and, furthermore, if an outsider 
were caught, who would make him/her forfeit the timber?  
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3.2 Analysis of Rule Configurations 
 
Two important criteria apply to an analysis of rule configurations. First, if a right-holder 
does not define the right by a set of institutional configurations, the default is that there is 
no rule. For example if whoever holds an exclusionary right to a forest does not further 
specify the right by specific institutional statements, then the default rule configuration 
would be that anyone is able to enter and use the forest anywhere (Crawford and Ostrom, 
1995; Ostrom, 1990). Second, if the rule is not invoked or applied, it may be only a rule-
in-form and not actually recognized by the resource users. Kaimowitz, Faune, and 
Mendoza (2003) note that in many frontier forests, governments frequently have few (if 
any) personnel, and laws are rarely invoked or applied. In the context of the Mosquitia, 
many laws and regulations that are prescribed are in fact never applied or recognized. 
Therefore, in analyzing how the configuration of property rights and their respective rules 
influence forest conservation in the Mosquitia, I consider not only the prescribed rights 
and rules, but also what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are invoked and 
applied in each reserve.  
 
4 CONTEXT: RIGHTS AND RULES IN RÍO PLÁTANO AND BOSAWAS RESERVES 
 
This chapter compares property rights, rules, and encroachment in the cultural zone of 
Río Plátano and in the two indigenous territories, MITK and MSB, in Bosawas. I focus 
specifically on institutional differences in: (1) who holds what property rights and (2) 
how those rights are exercised (i.e., the configuration of rule clusters associated with each 
right).  
Table 3.3 shows the specific configuration of rights and rules prescribed in each 
reserve. There are two differences that I want to highlight. First is the difference in right-
holders (government versus indigenous residents) and second are the differences in the 
right-holders’ decisions of whether and how to exercise their rights. The Honduran 
Ministry of Forestry and the indigenous residents in Bosawas share similar collective-
choice rights. However, there are significant differences in how they have chosen to 
exercise and apply those rights.  
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Table 3.3. Property Rights in Río Plátano and Bosawas 
RÍO PLÁTANO 
Property Right Right-Holder Rule (IN-FORM) 
Exclusion Ministry of Forestry No new non-natives permitted since 1997 
Alienation Ministry of Forestry No land sales permitted to non-natives 
BOSAWAS 
Property Right Right-Holder Rule (IN-USE) 
Exclusion Indigenous residents No new non-natives permitted since 1997 
Exclusion Indigenous residents Territorial boundaries physically demarcated 
and patrolled 
Alienation Indigenous residents No land sales permitted to non-natives 
 
There are two principal ways that mestizos obtain land: invasion and purchase. The 
broad, formal rules to control these means of encroachment are very similar in each 
reserve. Both forbid mestizos from entering specific zones or territories and both prohibit 
land sales to mestizos. However, the specific rule statements and their applications differ 
in significant ways between the two reserves. 
 
4.1 Right-Holders and Rules in Río Plátano 
 
In Río Plátano, all formal reserve rules are determined by AFE-COHDEFOR (in 
conjunction with the binational Biosphere Project, as discussed in chapter 2). In 1997, 
AFE-COHDEFOR and the Biosphere Project prescribed a management plan for each 
zone in Río Plátano reserve. The cultural zone of Río Plátano reserve was designated as a 
region specifically for the indigenous people. In an effort to control mestizo 
encroachment into the cultural zone, the management plan prohibited new mestizo 
settlements. Only those mestizos who were in the zone before 1997 could remain. 
Likewise, indigenous residents were forbidden from selling land to those outside the 
cultural zone. The management plan included scope and boundary rules that demarcated 
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the limits of the cultural zone (on paper) and restricted mestizo access. The management 
rules were, however, largely a paper plan.  
Today, Río Plátano rules are essentially rules-in-form. In Río Plátano, the cultural 
zone is identified on a map, but the boundaries are not physically demarcated for the 
zone. In interviews, many indigenous residents stated that they did not know where the 
cultural zone begins or ends. Furthermore, although the Río Plátano management plan 
prescribed monitoring activities to the forest guards, this rule has only been sporadically 
applied. During fieldwork I conducted in 2003, I found only two forest guards working in 
the cultural zone (3,895 km2) (Hayes, 2004). In 2006, no forest guards were employed in 
the cultural zone of Río Plátano. Although the management plan prescribed sanctions that 
included fines and possible jail time for forest destruction, the government’s weak 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms have meant that few, if any, sanctions have 
ever been applied. 
 
4.2 Right-Holders and Rules in Bosawas 
 
In Bosawas, the indigenous residents established shared access and withdrawal rights as 
well as collective-choice rights to manage their territorial lands. In 1997, the indigenous 
residents of Bosawas also created a management plan. Similar to the plan proposed in 
Río Plátano, in order to control mestizo encroachment, the residents created rules that 
forbid new mestizo settlements and prohibited indigenous residents from selling 
territorial lands to mestizos. The property rights and the associated rules were drawn up 
into a contract that was signed by indigenous and mestizo leaders in the region. The 
property-rights rule configuration included boundary and scope rules that stated that only 
those mestizos living in the territories before 1997 could remain.  
The Bosawas property-rights rules clearly designated the boundaries of the 
indigenous territories by cutting a carril, or swath of land several meters wide along the 
border of the territorial boundaries. The residents also demarcated the boundaries by 
planting specific trees, and placing yellow posts and signs along the southern territorial 
boundaries that border mestizo lands. Forest guards monitor the land-use rules and the 
boundaries. Figure 3.1 shows two of the boundary markers along the southern borders.  
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Photo on the left shows a yellow post in the boundary carril of Mayangna Sauni Bu. 
Photo on the right is a sign posted on the southern boundary of Miskitu Indian Tasbaika 
Kum. It says, “Welcome to the Indigenous Reserve Miskitu Indian Tasbaika Kum. Stop 
Destructive Colonists” 
Figure 3.1. Boundary Markers in Bosawas 
 
Contrary to Río Plátano, Bosawas rules are rules-in-use. The residents not only 
created a plan that prescribed the boundary, scope rules, and position rules to prohibit and 
monitor mestizo encroachment, they applied the rules by physically demarcating the 
boundaries of their territories. The physical demarcation clarified indigenous property-
rights boundaries to the mestizo settlers and the indigenous residents. Furthermore, as 
part of the property-rights process, indigenous residents established shared rights to the 
lands. This meant that no individual could sell lands inside the boundaries of the 
territories.  
The boundaries and land-use rules were further established by the position rule that 
created a group of indigenous forest guards to monitor the land-use rules and boundaries. 
The forest guards are a select group of residents who conduct monthly patrols of the 
territorial lands and clean the boundary carriles. Today, they receive technical and 
financial support from the Nicaraguan NGO Centro Humboldt. Enforcement of the rules 
remains largely informal and depends on public shaming, verbal warnings, and 
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negotiations between the territorial indigenous associations and the mestizo political 
associations (Stocks, 2003). 
The discussion above shows clear differences in right-holders and the application and 
invocation of the reserve rules. At the crux of this dissertation is the question, do the 
rights and rules make a difference in the ability to control mestizo encroachment? 
Institutional differences in Río Plátano and Bosawas provide an ideal opportunity to test 
whether property rights do, in fact, matter. 
 
5 STUDY SITES 
 
I compare mestizo settlements, encroachment patterns, and attitudes toward the 
respective land-use rules in the cultural zone of Río Plátano and the two indigenous 
territories, MITK and MSB in Bosawas. Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show the study region, the 
study sites, and the mestizo migratory fronts. Note that the study region of MITK 
includes only the southern half of the Miskito territory. I chose to focus on the southern 
half of MITK because it is the region most threatened by mestizo encroachment. In the 
analyses, I present only the southern half of the territory because I was unable to obtain a 
Landsat image for the northern half of the territory. In both MITK and MSB, I focus 
primarily on communities and land-use activities in the regions that border the mestizo 
buffer.  
In Río Plátano and Bosawas I conducted interviews at the zonal and territorial levels, 
respectively, and within specific communities in each reserve. In Río Plátano, I 
conducted interviews with indigenous leaders, non-government personnel, and reserve 
officials working in the cultural zone to understand the property rights prescribed in 1997 
and their present application.  
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In this analysis, I present fieldwork I conducted in two communities: Banaka and 
Wampusirpe. Both communities are in the path of mestizo migratory fronts. In this 
chapter, however, the land-cover analyses focus primarily on fieldwork and data from 
Banaka. Banaka lies in the western half of the cultural zone, and the region is bound to 
the west by land that is outside the reserve and predominately a mestizo region. It is 
bound to the southwest by the buffer zone designated for mestizos living in Río Plátano 
reserve. Banaka is a predominately Miskito community and, in 2006, had 50 houses. I 
chose to focus on Banaka (over Wampusirpe) because it has a longer history of 
encroachment in the region. Banaka’s history is similar to that of Bosawas. 
Encroachment from the south toward Wampusirpe started after 2000. Wampusirpe has 
260 houses in the region. I show Wampusirpe on the map and discuss the interviews and 
findings from Wampusirpe briefly in the analysis, but the land-cover images that I have 
for Río Plátano are not recent enough to visually capture mestizo activity in the region. 
In Bosawas, I also conducted interviews at the territorial level with indigenous 
leaders and government and non-government personnel working in the region. I 
conducted fieldwork in two indigenous sites: Wina and Pueblo Nuevo. Wina is a 
Mayangna community inside the territory of MSB. In 2005, Wina had 23 houses. Wina is 
the first community just inside the Mayangna territory and at the edge of the mestizo 
migratory front. Similarly, Pueblo Nuevo is a Miskito community in the Miskito territory 
MITK. It is also just inside the territorial borders. There are approximately 20 houses in 
the community. I chose to study Wina and Pueblo Nuevo because they are the 
southernmost communities in each territory. This means that they border the mestizo 
buffer zone and would be the most likely to experience mestizo encroachment from the 
south.  
 
6 DATA AND METHODS 
 
I use three principal data sources to analyze the relationships between mestizo 
encroachment and the different property-rights arrangements: geographic coordinates of 
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mestizo settlements in each reserve, classified Landsat images, and interview responses 
and questionnaire data 
I used GIS analysis in conjunction with coordinates that I took of mestizo settlements 
to locate and compare the physical presence of mestizo settlers in each reserve. In each 
study site I visited mestizo settlements in the region and identified indigenous and 
mestizo land-use practices. I used GPS units to record the coordinates of the mestizo and 
indigenous settlements and farms. I used GIS to map the sites onto classified Landsat 
images of land cover in the reserves to examine where the mestizo sites are relative to the 
specific boundary lines and what the associated land cover is the region.  
Landsat images classified by AFE-COHDEFOR and MARENA complement the 
fieldwork and serve to compare outside encroachment in the respective reserves. For Río 
Plátano, I was able to obtain relatively cloud-free images for 1995 and 2001 to conduct 
an analysis over time. In Bosawas, I obtained one image from 2003.ii Analysis of land 
cover in Bosawas is further supported by an analysis of land-cover change over time 
conducted by Stocks et al. (in press).  
In order to identify whether the specific boundaries make a difference in 
encroachment patterns, I compared land use inside and outside boundaries. In the analysis 
of the cultural zone, Río Plátano, I used GIS to create a 2-km buffer along the edge of the 
border that divides the indigenous cultural zone and the mestizo buffer zone. I then 
calculate land-cover change between 1995 and 2001 to see if designation of the cultural 
zone made a difference in mestizo encroachment across the border. In Bosawas, I used 
GIS to compare land cover and population densities in 2003 within the indigenous 
territories (MITK and MSB) and in the mestizo buffer zone outside the territories. I also 
draw on the analysis by Stocks et al. (in press) of land-cover change inside and outside 
the territories to discern if the territorial boundaries are controlling mestizo 
encroachment.  
In each community, I conducted introductory community and group meetings and in-
depth, semi-structured individual interviews with a purposefully selected sample of 
community residents. The community meetings were held at the beginning of each site 
visit and served to introduce myself to the communities, learn about the principal natural 
resource and development issues in the communities, and gain insights into community 
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dynamics. In addition to the communitywide meetings I also held group meetings, when 
appropriate, with women’s groups, forest management associations, and other relevant 
community organizations. 
The individual semi-structured interviews were aimed at getting information on the 
land-use and forest management rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and 
community governance structures. Participants for the semi-structured interviews were 
selected via a snowball process that started with key informants who had been 
recommended by employees of government and non-government organizations working 
in the respective regions. When asking for key informants I specified that I was interested 
in talking with community leaders, those involved in natural resource management, 
community governance (particularly conflict resolution), and community development. I 
also asked to speak with elders. Each of these leaders and elders was then asked to 
recommend others. In all cases, I tried to create a list of key informants that included both 
men and women with diverse interests. For example, if only certain members of the 
community had cattle or owned a chainsaw I made sure to speak with them and with 
those who did not.  
Land sales are targeted by both the Río Plátano and Bosawas management plans. 
Establishing the link between encroachment patterns and reserve rules depends on 
demonstrating not only that the boundaries are respected and that mestizos are not 
“invading,” but also that indigenous residents are not selling land to mestizos.  
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I use the results from the “Miguel 
questionnaire” (as explained in chapter 1) to compare individuals’ attitudes in Río 
Plátano and Bosawas with respect to whether they believed their communities can 
prevent mestizo encroachment and with respect to opinions on indigenous land sales to 
mestizos. I administered the “Miguel questionnaire” to a purposefully selected sample of 
households that was based on geographic location of the house and gender. 
 In the following analyses I examine the physical presence of mestizos in the cultural 
zone of Río Plátano and the Bosawas indigenous territories, and I compare land use 
inside the indigenous cultural zone/territories and outside in the mestizo-dominated 
buffer zones. If the boundaries matter, I expect to see a difference in land-use patterns on 
each side of the border. Furthermore, I expect that the findings from the semi-structured 
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interviews and “Miguel questionnaire” will further substantiate that differences in 
encroachment are, in fact, associated with property-rights policies. 
 
7 FINDINGS ON MESTIZO EXPANSION 
 
The combined analyses of mestizo encroachment in each reserve find that mestizos 
continue to settle in the cultural zone of Río Plátano. In contrast, in Bosawas, mestizo 
encroachment has virtually halted in the two indigenous territories. Fieldwork in each 
reserve, analyses of remotely sensed images of the contested borders, and interviews with 
residents, forest officials, and non-government personnel working in the reserves 
demonstrate that in Río Plátano, the designation of the cultural zone and its associated 
exclusionary rules by AFE-COHDEFOR are not serving to stop new mestizo settlements. 
In Bosawas, however, the boundary rules created by the indigenous residents are serving 
to control encroachment and reinforce indigenous property rights over their lands.  
 
7.1 Mestizo Encroachment in Río Plátano 
 
7.1.1 Evidence of Mestizos in Cultural Zone 
 
Figure 3.3 shows mestizo settlements to the west of the Plátano River in the cultural 
zone. The green circles are mestizo sites. The black circle is Banaka, the principal 
Miskito study site, and one of the few communities in the region that remains 
predominately Miskito. The outskirts of Banaka are populated with mestizo settlements. 
The image shows ten mestizo settlements; however, it is important to recognize that these 
settlements do not necessarily include all mestizos living in the zone and that the western 
border of the cultural zone is predominately mestizo.  
 In interviews I conducted with mestizos living in Río Plátano, I found that many had 
moved to the reserve since 1997, some as recently as three months previous to my visit 
(2005). While some were hesitant to state when they moved to the region because they 
were aware that they were forbidden to live in the cultural zone, others did not understand 
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the status of the lands they lived on and stated that they had moved to the region because 
they found “unoccupied” land that they could farm. The mestizo households I 
encountered ranged from poor families who came to the region because they did not have 
anywhere else to farm to wealthy ranchers who hired others to maintain their lands as 
they generally lived elsewhere. Some families cleared land so that wealthier cattle 
ranchers would rent pasture from them. In several communities, I found Miskito families 
managing lands for absentee mestizo landowners. 
 Table 3.4 shows the number of houses in each settlement, the predominant ethnicity, 
and, when known, approximate arrival dates. In total, I located ten colonist communities 
in the western region of the cultural zone. I was able to visit six of these communities. 
One community that is unique is site no. 9. This community is predominately Miskito. 
However, these Miskitos are referred to by the Banaka natives as “Miskito colonists” 
because they have reportedly sold their original land in the western edge of the reserve 
and moved inland. Miskito residents of site no. 9 said that they had moved farther into the 
cultural zone because their original communities were now dominated by mestizos. 
However, several noted that they can no longer live among the other Miskito (such as 
those in Banaka) because they have adopted many mestizo land-use practices such as 
large homesteads that include permanent pasture lands and houses that are separated from 
one another.  
The fieldwork and maps show that mestizos have not stopped encroaching on the 
cultural zone since it was formally designated for the indigenous residents and mestizo 
settlements were prohibited in 1997. Based on the approximate population and settlement 
data, the number of mestizo houses and mestizo settlements far outweigh the number of 
Miskito houses and settlements in the western side of the cultural zone.iii
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Figure 3.3. Mestizo Sites in Cultural Zone West of the Plátano River 
 
Table 3.4. Demographics in Western Side of Cultural Zone 
Site # # of Houses Demographicsiv
1 50 Predominately Miskito. 
2 6 Mestizo absentee landowners who arrived after 1997 and hire Miskitos. 
3 17 Mestizo--most settled since 1997. 
4 6 Mestizo. 
5 133 Approximately 1/2 population is mestizo. 
6 36 Mestizo 
7 9 Mestizo 
8 11 Mestizo--approximately 1/2 came before 1997 and 1/2 since. 
9 30 Mostly “Miskito colonists”; some mestizos as well. 
10 5 Mestizo--all arrived since 1997. 
11 NA Mestizo. Growing mestizo community. 
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7.1.2 Land-Cover Change in Cultural Zone 
 
Figures 3.4a and 3.4b present a graphic illustration of the land-cover change from 1995 to 
2001 in relationship to the mestizo settlements. The figures show land-cover change in 
the region west of the Plátano River. The red areas represent crop and pasture lands; 
yellow represents fallow. The white areas are predominately broadleaf tropical forests, 
but the cultural zone includes other ecosystems. All of the land cover in the zone is 
represented in Table 3.5.  
 In Figures 3.4a and 3.4b, the black lines outline where the cultural zone ends and the 
mestizo buffer zone begins. Note, the zone boundaries are shown on Río Plátano 
management maps; they are not, however, physically demarcated within the reserve. As 
shown in Figure 3.3, the Miskito community Banaka is located in the yellow area in the 
center of each map. The surrounding areas are predominately mestizo. 
Table 3.5 shows the GIS land-cover estimates I calculated based on the classified 
images provided by AFE-COHDEFOR. The estimates presented in the table are for the 
region west of the Plátano River in the cultural zone. The table does not present land-
cover calculations for the buffer zone. 
 
Table 3.5. Land Cover 1995–2001 in Western Side of Cultural Zone 
Land Cover—Land Use 
 1995 Cover 
(ha) 
2001 Cover 
(ha) 
1995–2001 Change 
(ha)  
Percent 
Change 
Crops/Pasture 352 1,585 1233 350% 
Fallow 3730 4,768 1038 28% 
Coniferous forest 1268 1,305 37 3% 
Broadleaf forest 52,087 49,729 -2358 -5% 
Othera 1,911 1,983 72 3% 
Not classified 58 0 NA NA 
Totalb 59,419 59,370 49 -0.08% 
a Other includes mangroves, teak plantations, grasslands, and sand.   
b The same polygon is used in 1995 and 2001. Total area varies slightly due to slight differences in 
classification of each image. Both images were classified by AFE-COHDEFOR. 
Land-cover data source: AFE-COHDEFOR; land-cover change calculations by T. Hayes. 
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 The land-cover change from 1995 to 2001 in the western edge of the cultural zone is 
particularly striking when it is compared with land-cover change in the community of 
Banaka. The comparison of land-use change in Banaka shows the distinction between 
mestizo and Miskito land-use practices. Table 3.6 shows the amount of increase from 
1995 to 2001 in crop/pasture and fallow lands within the community of Banaka. Banaka 
boundaries are not formally recognized and were defined by community residents and 
recorded on GPS units during field visits. 
 
Table 3.6. Land-Cover Change in Banaka, 1995–2001  
Land Cover  1995 Cover (ha) 2001 Cover (ha) 1995–2001 Change (ha)  
Crops/Pasture 0 12 12 
Fallow 437 663 226 
Land-cover data source: AFE-COHDEFOR.  
  
 The GIS calculations of land cover show that in Banaka, the total amount of land 
under crop, pasture, and fallow increased by 50%. In the entire western region, the area 
under crop, pasture, and fallow increased by 378%. In contrast to the rest of the western 
region of the cultural zone where the greatest land-use increase was in crop and pasture 
lands, the majority of the land-use increase in Banaka was in fallow lands.  
 The land cover in the community of Banaka is representative of the Miskito land-use 
practices. Miskito do not clear large areas of land for farm or pasture, but rather clear 
plots of approximately 0.5 ha within the broader forest. Therefore, in satellite images it is 
likely that many of their plots will be identified as fallow lands, or not identified at all 
since they are small and mixed in with the forest. In contrast, the land-cover patterns 
outside Banaka, along the western border of the cultural zone, are not representative of 
traditional Miskito land-use practices. Larger patches of farm and pasture lands show that 
these lands are now under permanent cultivation of crop or pasture, land-cover patterns 
that are more representative of mestizo agricultural practices. 
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7.1.3 Is the Border Working? 
 
Figure 3.5 shows agricultural expansion into the cultural zone of Río Plátano from 1995 
to 2001 and further demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the cultural zone “paper 
boundary.”v In order to examine whether the cultural zone boundary is working to 
prevent mestizo encroachment, I compare land cover in a 2-km corridor (buffer) on each 
side of the boundary line between the cultural zone and the mestizo buffer zone. In total, 
the corridor is 4 km wide. Table 3.7 compares land-cover change between 1995 and 2001 
in the 2-km corridor inside the mestizo buffer zone and the 2-km corridor inside the 
indigenous cultural zone. 
 The images and land-cover change show that the cultural zone boundary and scope 
rules are not serving to stop mestizo agricultural expansion. The increase in the amount 
of land under crop, pasture, and fallow was, in fact, greater within the corridor inside the 
cultural zone than within the corridor inside the mestizo buffer zone. In the cultural zone 
corridor along the border, the amount of land under crop or pasture in 1995 was 9 ha (less 
than 0.1 km2). Crop and pasture land along the border inside the cultural zone had 
increased from virtually none to 486 ha—almost 5 km2—by 2001. Crop and pasture land 
inside the mestizo buffer zone increased from 102 ha in 1995 to 422 ha in 2001. 
Interviews with Miskito and mestizo residents and park officials confirm that the 
mestizos continue to cross over from the buffer zone into the cultural zone to farm, ranch, 
and settle.
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Figure 3.5. Comparison of Land-Cover Change along the Cultural Zone Border 
 
The two images above show land cover within a 2-km corridor inside the cultural zone 
and within a 2-km corridor outside of the cultural zone (in the mestizo buffer zone). 
The bright green lines outline a corridor that I created around the official boundary 
that divides the mestizo buffer zone from the indigenous cultural zone. Note that this 
boundary is only identified on paper and not on the ground. The dark green areas 
represent broadleaf forests, the red represents crop and pasture lands, and the yellow 
represents fallow. The land-cover change shows that the mestizos are not respecting 
the boundary of the cultural zone. Since 1995, mestizos have continued to cross the 
border from the buffer zone into the cultural zone. The specific amounts of land under 
crops/pasture, fallow, and forest is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3.7. Land-Cover Change 1995–2001 along the Cultural Zone Border 
2-km Corridor inside Cultural Zone 2-km Corridor inside Buffer Zone   
1995 
(ha) 
2001 
(ha) 
Change Percent 
Change 
1995 
(ha) 
2001 
(ha) 
Change 
(ha) 
Percent 
Change LAND COVER (ha) 
Broadleaf forest 5,966 5,447 -519 -9% 5,567 5,174 -393 -7%
Fallow 293 393 99 34% 311 389 78 25%
Crops/Pasture 9 486 476 5106% 102 422 320 315%
Total area 6,279 6325     5,989 5,985     
Land-cover data source: AFE-COHDEFOR.  
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7.2 Mestizo Encroachment in Bosawas 
 
In Bosawas, indigenous forest guards and residents state that since the property-rights 
accords were agreed on in 1997, the mestizos have stopped encroaching on their lands. 
Remotely sensed images of forest cover in and outside the indigenous territories confirm 
resident statements and show that mestizos are not expanding into the Miskito and 
Mayangna territories.  
 Stocks et al. (in press) find that the territorial boundaries are restraining agricultural 
expansion by mestizo farmers and ranchers. In their analysis of land-cover change in 
Bosawas, Stocks et al. used satellite data on forest cover from 1987, 1995/1996, and 
2001/2002 to compare forest-cover change within and outside the six indigenous 
territories that form the core of Bosawas. They found that forest connectivity is 
statistically greater in the indigenous portion of Bosawas than in the mestizo buffer and 
that the rate of deforestation per capita over the 15-year period is significantly less inside 
the territories than in the mestizo-dominated portions of Bosawas.  
 These findings are consistent with my findings presented below on mestizo 
settlements within MITK and MSB and with my analysis of population density and land-
use patterns in 2003 inside MITK and MSB and in the buffer zone. 
 
7.2.1 Evidence of Mestizos in the Territories 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the boundaries of MITK and MSB and the location of mestizo 
settlements inside the two territories. The community of Lacos (shown by the green dot 
in Figure 3.6) is the only mestizo community inside of the Mayangna territory MSB. 
Residents of Lacos first settled in the region in the early 1990s before the property-rights 
accords were created in 1997. Today, twelve families live inside the MSB borders in 
Lacos. According to the accords, the residents of Lacos are permitted to reside within 
MSB so long as they comply with the Mayangna land-use rules prescribed in their 
territorial land-use plan. During my visit in August 2005 there was some concern that 
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relatives of the current mestizo residents had recently moved to Lacos. At the time of my 
visit, the vice president of the mestizo political organization APDECOMEBO visited 
Lacos to find out if new mestizos had, in fact, moved into the community. Other than the 
residents of Lacos, there are no other mestizos inside MSB. 
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Figure 3.6. Mestizo Sites in Bosawas Territories 
 
  
 According to MITK residents, there are only two mestizo families that remain inside 
MITK. Both settled in the territory before the 1997 accords and both are permitted to stay 
in the territory so long as they comply with the Miskito land-use plan. 
 
7.2.2 Are the Boundaries Working? 
 
Evidence that the territorial boundaries are working is further substantiated by comparing 
land cover and population densities in the territories to land cover and population density 
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in the mestizo buffer zone to the south. Figure 3.7 and Table 3.8 show land-use patterns 
and population pressures in the southern region of MITK, MSB, and the mestizo territory. 
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Figure 3.7. Land Cover in Territories and Mestizo Buffer, Bosawas, 2003 
 
 
 
Table 3.8. Area, Population, and Percent Land Cover in the Bosawas Territories 
  Area  (ha) 
Population 
(2005 est.) 
Density 
(persons/ha) 
Forest 
(%)  
Crops, 
Pasture, 
Fallow (%) 
Othera
(%) 
MITK Miskito 
Territory (half)b 21,097 1,552 0.07 80.90 14.7 4.40 
MSB Mayangna 
Territoryc 102,400 2,360 0.02 97.03 2.34 .63 
Mestizo Territory 56,927 12,525 0.22 48.70 45.90 5.50 
a Includes clouds and rivers 
b Land cover includes only the southern half of MITK (21,097 ha)  
c 4,178 ha not classified for MSB and not included in analysis. 
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  A remarkable distinction between the indigenous territories and the buffer zone is the 
higher population density within the mestizo buffer zone and the distinct land-use 
patterns between the indigenous and mestizo lands. For example, the southern half of 
MITK encompasses 21,097 ha and has a population density of 0.07 persons/ha. This 
means that 86.67 ha of agricultural land are potentially available to each household. The 
Mayangna population density in MSB is even less at 0.02 persons per ha. 
 In contrast, all land in the mestizo territory is occupied (Stocks, 1998). The mestizo 
territory encompasses approximately 56,927 ha and has 0.22 persons/ha. In interviews, 
mestizos noted that they generally need 50 ha of land per family for farming, ranching, 
and obtaining forest products. In the mestizo territory, roughly half that amount of land is 
available per household. Residents claim that new families continue to try to find land in 
the region, but that no land is available unless someone agrees to sell. However, despite 
population pressures in the region, the mestizos do not appear to be moving into MITK or 
MSB.  
 The land-use patterns in 2003 show distinct differences in the amount of land under 
agriculture, pasture, and forest inside the territories compared to outside the territories. In 
2003, 97% of MSB remained covered in forest and less than 3% of the territory was in 
crop, pasture, or fallow. Similarly, 81% of the southern half of the Miskito territory was 
covered with forest and approximately 14% was covered by crops, fallow, or pasture.vi In 
contrast, only half of the mestizo territory was forest covered and the other half was in 
crops, pasture, or fallow.vii The clear distinction in land-use patterns demonstrates that 
although the mestizos face greater land-use pressures due to population density and need 
for land, they do not appear to be crossing over to the indigenous territories in search of 
land.  
  
7.3 Resident Attitudes toward Encroachment and Land Sales  
 
The critical role that property rights have in exacerbating the problem of encroachment in 
Río Plátano and facilitating its resolution in Bosawas is further demonstrated by a 
comparison of individuals’ attitudes with respect to their communities’ ability to stop 
mestizo migration and their attitudes toward land sales to mestizo colonists. In 
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 interviews, Miskito of the cultural zone in Río Plátano consistently complained about 
mestizo encroachment into the region. As one Miskito leader stated “Los ladinos son una 
virus mas peor que la SIDA” [mestizos are a virus worse than AIDS], a statement 
reflecting the severity of the problem (interview with Miskito leader, Belen, Honduras, 
March 2002). In contrast to Río Plátano where residents had numerous stories about the 
ill done to them by mestizos, the indigenous residents in Bosawas appeared to feel fairly 
secure in their territorial holdings. In semi-structured oral interviews, most responded that 
they felt that the community was able to prevent mestizos from settling on their lands. 
 
7.3.1 Ability to Prevent Mestizo Encroachment 
 
Table 3.9 shows the different attitudes that the indigenous residents in Río Plátano have 
about their ability to control mestizo expansion in contrast to indigenous attitudes 
expressed in Bosawas. In the table, “Río Plátano” includes responses to the “Miguel 
questionnaire” I administered to residents in Banaka and Wampusirpe. “Bosawas” 
includes the questionnaire responses in Pueblo Nuevo and Wina.  
 
Table 3.9. Ability to Prevent Mestizo Encroachment 
  Yes Prevent Cannot Prevent Total # Interviews 
Río Plátano 33 45 78 
Bosawas 14 4 18 
Continuity Correction Value = 6.012, p = 0.014   
 
The findings show that the relationship between reserve and resident opinion of the 
ability to control encroachment is statistically significant (p = 0.014). An indigenous 
resident of Río Plátano is more likely to believe that their community cannot control 
encroachment than an indigenous resident from Bosawas. In Bosawas, the majority of 
those interviewed said that the community can prevent encroachment. Bosawas residents 
who disagreed with the ability to prevent mestizo encroachment were primarily 
Mayangna residents in Wina who expressed concern about the continued presence of 
mestizos in Lacos. 
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 7.3.2 Prohibition of Land Sales 
 
One of the principal means by which mestizos gain access to indigenous lands is through 
land purchases from indigenous residents. Table 3.10 compares the responses in Río 
Plátano and Bosawas to the “Miguel questionnaire,” which asked residents whether they 
would sell land to anyone (including a mestizo).  
 
Table 3.10. Indigenous Land Sales to Mestizos 
  Sell to Anyone Sell Only to Native / Never Sell Total # Interviews 
Río Plátano 26 51 77 
Bosawas 2 16 18 
Continuity Value = 2.594, p = 0.107   
 
 The responses show that the indigenous residents living in Río Plátano (Banaka and 
Wampusirpe) are more likely to sell land than those living in the indigenous territories in 
Bosawas (Pueblo Nuevo and Wina). The association between reserve type and 
willingness to sell land is on the borderline of statistical significance (p = 0.107). 
Interviews in Río Plátano and Bosawas with respect to land sales found that residents in 
Río Plátano are more likely to consider selling land to mestizos and, furthermore, are 
more likely to have actually sold land. 
 For example, in Wampusirpe, eight new mestizo families had settled in the 
community in the past year. They settled after buying land from Miskito residents. 
Similarly, leaders in Banaka estimated that approximately ten families had sold land to 
mestizos in recent years. Several Banaka residents commented that the Miskito of Banaka 
started to sell land because they had seen other people do it who had gone unpunished. 
When money is tight, sometimes land is the only source of income. Some criticized the 
land sales, but noted that there was nothing they could do to stop their neighbors from 
selling. Others thought that it was fine to sell land when in need of money.  
In contrast, in Bosawas, land sales were strongly frowned upon by indigenous 
residents in the Mayangna and Miskito territories in Bosawas. It is interesting to note that 
the one respondent in Pueblo Nuevo, MITK, who said that he would sell land, was 
quickly reprimanded by the others listening in to the conversation. In interviews, most 
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 residents stated that they would never sell land and that indigenous people to the south of 
their territories had sold land and now they were left with nothing. In the Miskito 
territory, there was a report of one attempted land sale by a Miskito to a mestizo that 
purportedly occurred several years ago. The Miskito territorial organization, 
ADEPCIMISUJIN, learned about the sale and forfeited the transaction. According to 
mestizo residents in the buffer zone, the mestizo buyer was never permitted to occupy the 
land and lost his money. It was not clear if the Miskito received any sort of sanction (in 
addition to shaming).  
 
8 DISCUSSION: DOES TENURE MATTER? 
 
The findings from the field and the land-cover image clearly show that mestizo 
encroachment has not stopped in Río Plátano whereas it is largely under control in 
Bosawas. The findings also suggest that the specific rule configurations can, in large part, 
be contributed to the different encroachment patterns. The results support my hypothesis 
that property rights matter and that a forest reserve under indigenous management is 
better able to stop mestizo encroachment than a publicly managed forest reserve. The 
findings suggest that, specifically, it is the collective-choice rights that matter and the 
rules that are crafted by the right-holders. In Bosawas, rules that were created by the 
residents are serving to control agricultural expansion, whereas rules defined by AFE-
COHDEFOR are doing little to control mestizo encroachment in Río Plátano.  
 One rule that has been critical to the success of Bosawas was the physical 
demarcation and monitoring of the territorial boundaries. In interviews, Miskito residents 
in the Río Plátano complained that there were no boundary markers to signal to mestizo 
settlers that they were on indigenous lands and that mestizo migrants frequently settle in 
more remote forests not often visited by the residents. The land-cover analysis of the 
border between the mestizo buffer zone and the indigenous cultural zone demonstrated 
that the designation of the cultural zone on paper has done little to restrict mestizo 
migration on the ground. In fact, in order to prevent mestizo occupation, individual 
Miskito residents have begun to cut boundary lines around forest lands to show 
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 ownership. Residents remark that Miskitos generally do not claim ownership over forests; 
however, it is the only way to protect the forests from mestizo occupation.  
 In Bosawas, the physical demarcation of the indigenous territorial boundaries has 
served to thwart agricultural expansion by clearly demonstrating ownership over farm 
and forest lands. The land-cover analysis that compared inside the indigenous territories 
to outside the territories showed clear differences between the two regions. Indigenous 
and mestizo residents frequently mentioned the carril, the strip of land cut to define the 
boundaries of MITK and MSB, as a critical enforcement mechanism. Territorial forest 
guards stated that conflict with mestizos and land invasions significantly declined after 
the demarcation in 1997, and the vice president of the mestizo association 
APDECOMEBO stated that if the demarcation process had not occurred, the mestizos 
would have kept moving into indigenous lands. Now, however, the mestizos consider the 
land to be owned by the Miskito and Mayangna.  
Furthermore, in Bosawas, the boundaries are monitored by a corps of forest guards. 
Unlike AFE-COHDEFOR in Río Plátano, which failed to apply consistent monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms, the residents of Bosawas used their collective-choice 
rights to create and apply a position rule that designated a group of indigenous forest 
guards responsible for monitoring the territories. The forest guards are a select group that 
receives payment and technical support from the Nicaraguan NGO Centro Humboldt. 
Their activities are also supported by an informal enforcement system that relies on 
meetings between the indigenous and mestizo leaders to resolve conflicts and enforce the 
property-rights agreements.  
 Mestizos in Bosawas are very aware of the territorial boundary line and recognize 
that if they cross the border, either through “invasions” or sales, they will most likely be 
caught. In Bosawas, both indigenous and mestizo residents noted that if a mestizo is 
illegally settling in the indigenous territory, it is likely that the forest guards will find out 
and that the indigenous and mestizo political associations will be called. This was the 
case in Lacos, where the mestizo leader was investigating reports of recent settlements. 
Although the sanctioning mechanisms are largely informal, thus far they have been 
successful in resolving disagreements and controlling encroachment. 
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 9 CONCLUSION 
 
The results from Bosawas and Río Plátano demonstrate that acknowledging indigenous 
ancestral rights to forest lands may be more effective in some settings than management 
and enforcement approaches based on public command and control. Several lessons come 
from the experiences in Río Plátano and Bosawas. First, the definition and application of 
boundary and scope rules are crucial in supporting common-property regimes and 
promoting forest conservation. The physical demarcation of common-property rights 
served to protect forest and farm lands from potential squatters.  
 Second, in Bosawas, the creation of a corps of indigenous forest guards and 
enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms that depend on actors living in the 
region meant that many of the property-rights rules are rules-in-use and not merely rules 
on paper. In contrast to the rules developed by government agencies for Río Plátano, the 
land-use rules constructed by the Bosawas residents are generally recognized and 
respected by local residents and by potential in-migrants. The Bosawas process suggests 
that it matters not only what the rules are, but who holds the right to make the rules, 
invoke them, and enforce them. Property rights matter.  
  Finally, the success of Bosawas suggests that it is not necessarily legal designation 
of paper rights, but the process of establishing the rights and their respective rules that 
matters. In order to understand how and why the common-property-rights system is 
working in Bosawas (and perhaps replicate some of those key ingredients), we need a 
deeper understanding of (1) the effect that mestizo encroachment has on traditional 
indigenous property rights and land-use institutions, and (2) how a property-rights 
process can support traditional common-property arrangements so they are robust in the 
face of mestizo encroachment.  
 The following chapters address questions of institutional robustness and longevity. In 
chapter 4, I examine how indigenous residents respond to mestizo encroachment when 
they are not supported by a common-property-rights process, and I use data from three 
Miskito communities in the Río Plátano to test if and how mestizo encroachment disturbs 
Miskito land-use institutions. In chapter 5, I return to the property-rights processes that 
occurred in Bosawas to identify the key components that served to bolster the indigenous 
property rights and governance capacity in the two indigenous territories. Finally, in 
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 chapter 6, I consider some of the long-term prospects for the indigenous territories and 
their management institutions.  
 
Endnotes for Chapter 3 
 
 
i Interviews with Miskito leader, Belen, April 23, 2005; MOPAWI director, Tegucigalpa, July 11, 2003; 
group of Miskito leaders, Brus Laguna, July, 23, 2003; ADEPCOMEBO leaders, Jinotega, August 30 and 
September 12, 2005. 
ii Note in the land-cover analysis of the 2003 Bosawas image that 4,178 ha in MSB are not classified. This 
is presumably due to cloud cover. The non-classified area is located in the northern region of MSB territory 
and does not impact the analysis of mestizo encroachment. 
iii This assessment does not include the Miskito communities on the strip of land along the Caribbean coast.  
iv Sources: (1) population per 2006 census conducted by community group, demographics confirmed by 
site visit; (2) population and demographics per personal count on site visit in 2005; (3) population per 2001 
census and confirmed by 2006 site visit; (4) population and demographics per 2001 census; (5) population 
per 1997 Río Plátano census and demographics confirmed by 2005 site visit and talks with community 
leaders; (6) population and demographics per 2001 census; (7) population and demographics per 2001 
census; (8) population per community mayor in 2005 site visit and demographics according to a long-term 
mestizo resident (2005); (9) population and demographics per community leader and 2005 site visit; (10) 
population and demographics per site visit in 2005; (11) population unknown, reported by residents, 
community leaders, and AFE-COHDEFOR officials to be a growing mestizo site. 
v Mestizos are also crossing into the cultural zone from the east (outside of the reserve) to the west. The 
eastern region outside of the reserve is predominately mestizo and is a region that was opened up for 
colonization in 1995. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain classified images for the area outside of the 
reserve. 
vi Note that there appears to be a patch of pasture/crop/fallow land in the southeastern corner of MITK. It is 
under cloud cover. MITK forest guards report that the pasture lands are from the earlier work of a mestizo 
who previously lived in the territory. The dates were unclear, but the mestizo was asked to leave (and 
reportedly no longer lives in MITK). 
vii The 2003 image classified by MARENA does not distinguish pasture land from fallow land. However, 
fieldwork in both areas found that few of the Miskitos interviewed had pasture while almost all of the 
mestizos did. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROBUSTNESS OF TRADITIONAL LAND-USE INSTITUTIONS:  
MISKITO RESPONSES TO DEMOGRAPHIC AND MARKET CHANGE IN RÍO PLÁTANO 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The mestizo settlements and agricultural expansion occurring in the western region of the 
cultural zone of Río Plátano demonstrate that the reserve management plan and 
regulations have not stopped mestizo colonization of indigenous lands or halted the 
subsequent deforestation. Despite official regulations that prohibit the entry of non-
natives and forbid the destruction of forested lands, mestizo migration persists.  
The indigenous residents of Río Plátano insist that only by receiving eminent domain 
over their homelands will they be able to stop the mestizo migration. Many reserve 
officials and policy makers, however, balk at the thought of granting the indigenous 
residents ownership and management rights over Río Plátano lands. Akin to the opinions 
of several prominent environmentalists regarding the resiliency of indigenous institutions 
(Redford, 1991; Terborgh, 1999, 2000), many Río Plátano reserve officials insist that the 
indigenous residents are incapable of managing Río Plátano lands and that their land-use 
traditions falter when confronted with market pressures and demographic changes 
introduced by the mestizo colonists.i  
In fact, we know relatively little about how indigenous institutions change in response 
to exogenous pressures, and what this means for resource management (Berkes and 
Folke, 2000; Richards, 1997). Richards notes that in Latin America, as in other regions, 
how common-property institutions respond to increasing economic, commercial, and 
demographic pressures is a vital question (1997, p. 95). As new markets expand into 
previously remote forested regions, we need to understand how traditional peoples 
respond to shocks such as major demographic shifts, outside invasion, or technological 
change and the role that broader policy prescriptions have in promoting sustainable 
resource management (Agrawal, 2001; Berkes, 2001; Ensminger and Knight, 1997; 
Ostrom, 1990; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Richards, 1997).  
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The institutional dynamics in frontier forests remain largely ill-defined. In their 
research on tenure policies and conflict in the Brazilian frontier, Alston and colleagues 
(1997, pp. 146–147) state that we understand very little about the institutional changes 
occurring within the frontier and that these changes ultimately underlie the necessary 
modifications to the formal property-rights policies. In order to improve forest 
management, particularly frontier forest policy, we need a more nuanced analysis of the 
robustness of traditional resource management institutions and how traditional resource 
users adapt to change. 
 In Río Plátano, mestizo colonization increases the value of land by increasing 
demands on the resources and introducing an external market for forest and farm land. 
The mestizos also introduce land-use preferences and land-use institutions that differ 
from, and at times conflict with, Miskito customs. Some policy makers and Miskito 
residents worry that the Miskito institutions will collapse in the face of mestizo 
encroachment and that the Miskito will adopt mestizo land-use practices. Many Miskito 
residents also wonder what will happen to their identity as an ethnic group if they lose 
their land and become integrated with mestizos.  
 How are the Miskito addressing mestizo encroachment? The purpose of this chapter 
is to explore, in the context of Río Plátano, if and how Miskito property rights and the 
associated land-use institutions are changing in response to mestizo migration to the 
region. Specifically, I examine how the introductions of an external market for land and 
institutions that support private-property rights disturb the Miskito common-property 
regime. I analyze Miskito decision making and the evolution of their traditional property-
rights systems in three communities with varying degrees of outside encroachment.  
I realize that the effects of mestizo migration on indigenous institutions tap into an 
array of anthropological works that examine the social, economic, political, 
environmental, and philosophical changes that occur when indigenous populations begin 
to participate in a market economy (see Richards, 1997, for review of literature related to 
Latin America). This study is limited in scope in that I only consider how Miskito 
property-rights institutions are changing in response to mestizo land-use pressures. The 
institutional analysis examines only those institutions that relate to the access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights to land within the cultural zone 
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of Río Plátano. As far as the property-rights dynamics tap into indigenous organizations 
and values, I discuss the organizational structure and values present in different 
institutional arrangements. I do not, however, pretend to provide an overarching analysis 
of Miskito culture and cultural change occurring in the region.  
Furthermore, I recognize that a crucial component in this analysis is the broader 
policy environment in which the resource users live and make land-use decisions. A 
central thesis of this dissertation is that the broader policy environment, specifically 
property-rights policies may either bolster or weaken indigenous institutions in the face 
of mestizo encroachment. This chapter is the first step in the analysis of if and how 
indigenous land-use institutions change (or are “stressed”) in response to mestizo 
migration, and the influence of property-rights policies on indigenous institutional 
change. In this chapter, I examine how indigenous institutions change in a policy 
environment that does not recognize their communal rights over their homelands and 
gives minimal recognition to indigenous governing organizations. I focus on changes in 
the traditional land-use institutions. I consider the broader policy environment only in 
that I recognize that the Miskito land-use decisions occur in a context of insecure tenure 
rights. In the following chapter, I take the analysis one step further as I reconsider the 
formal policy context and analyze how the policy processes in Río Plátano and Bosawas 
influenced the ability of indigenous residents to bolster their land-use institutions in 
response to mestizo encroachment.  
 
2 THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
Institutions, specifically property-rights institutions, are a good starting place to examine 
Miskito response to mestizo encroachment. In his work on cultural adaptation, Keesing 
(1975) notes the importance of examining institutions as a source of adaptation and 
cultural change. He states, “Cultures do not respond to pressures. Rather, individual 
human beings cope as best they can, formulate rules, follow and break them; and by their 
statistical patterns of cumulative decision, they set a course of cultural drift” (Keesing, 
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1975). A primary concern in common-pool resource management is how traditional 
management institutions will change or drift.  
 
2.1 Institutional Change 
 
Some scholars suggest that traditional resource systems are fragile (or non-existent) and 
predict that without government regulations, demographic and market pressures will 
cause traditional systems to break down and create an institutional vacuum where 
resources are overexploited as individuals fend for themselves (Hardin, 1968; Redford, 
1991; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Terborgh, 1999, 2000). Redford, Stearman, and 
Terborgh (Redford, 1991; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Terborgh, 1999), in particular, 
emphasize that indigenous residents will adopt market institutions and market values 
when presented with the means to exploit their resource systems.  
 In contrast, other scholars contend that institutions are sticky and resistant to change 
(Ensminger and Knight, 1997; Gluckman, 1968; North, 1990). Knight maintains that 
once an institution is established, change comes slowly and often at considerable cost. He 
predicts that actors will continue to respect existing institutions unless external events 
alter the distributional benefits provided by them and the respective participants can 
resolve the formidable collective-action problems inherent in institutional change 
(Knight, 1992, p.127). Furthermore, some maintain that, even after drastic conditions 
force the institution to change, “institutions are so tough that they often survive into, or 
revive in, the new conditions that eventuate” (Gluckman, 1968, p. 223).  
 It may be that an institutional system neither entirely collapses nor does it remain 
completely unchanged. Recently scholars (Anderies et al., 2004; Berkes, 2001, Berkes et 
al., 2003) have been struggling with how to assess institutional change with respect to the 
overall structure and function of a social-ecological system. One means of analyzing the 
direction of institutional change is to consider how each institution affects the overall 
maintenance and structure of the social system. Berkes (2001) contends that just as 
ecological systems can be characterized by their resilience or ability to withstand 
disturbances to the natural systems, social systems also can be characterized by their 
resilience. Berkes states that the resilience of a social system refers to the ability of the 
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system to absorb disturbances while still retaining its central functions, and the ability of 
a social system to build the capacity to self-organize, learn, and adapt (2001, p. 294). 
 Similarly, in their analysis of social-ecological systems, Anderies et al. (2004) 
consider how institutional arrangements affect the robustness of social-ecological 
systems to internal and external disturbances. The authors define robustness as “the 
maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behavior 
of its component part or its environment” (citing Carlson and Doyle 2002). Anderies et 
al. (2004) explicitly examine how social and ecological systems change in conjunction 
with one another and contend that the collapse of an entire system would require that 
both the social and ecological systems collapse.  
  The concepts of resilience and robustness contribute an important dynamic aspect to 
the analysis of institutions and the relationship that actors have in response to changes in 
their environments. Rather than considering institutions as stagnant entities, the ideas of 
social resilience and social-ecological robustness build flexibility into institutions and 
considers if and how they are able to adapt to address competing demands and exogenous 
shocks while continuing to satisfy their core functions.  
 
2.2 Land-Use Institutions and the Evolution of Property Rights 
 
With respect to the evolution of property rights and the Miskito common-property-rights 
system, the principal issue is whether property rights necessarily become more privatized 
when the resource becomes scarcer or more economically valuable. In “Toward a Theory 
of Property Rights,” Demsetz (1967) traces how private-property rights emerged among 
the Montage Indians of Quebec in response to the fur trade. As more people had an 
interest in hunting and the fur became more valuable, the Montage Indians developed 
more complete property rights over their hunting lands.  
 Demsetz argued that when more people begin to use a resource and the resource 
increases in value, private-property rights would emerge. Others however, challenge the 
assumption that common-property systems necessarily evolve into private-property 
regimes (Ensminger and Rutten, 1991; Ostrom, 1990, 2005; Richards, 1997). Some 
research on the evolution of property rights finds that when the resource is abundant and 
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difficult to monitor, a relatively open property-rights arrangement frequently exists and 
that when demand for the resource increases, the property rights regimes become more 
clearly defined, or complete (Demsetz, 1967; Ensminger & Rutten, 1991; Gibson et al., 
2002; Taylor and Singleton, 1993). 
 In their analysis of property-rights arrangements, Taylor and Singleton (1993, pp. 
199–205) predict that when a group of users is fairly homogenous, share similar 
preferences, and have many different types of interactions (as are the Miskito people of 
Río Plátano), there will not be much institutional development due to the prevalence of a 
shared belief system and the minimal monitoring and enforcement needs. However, as 
the group becomes more heterogeneous, with less frequent interactions, and preferences 
that vary widely, the authors predict that the resource users will have a greater need to 
create more formal institutions and may find it hard to establish, monitor, and enforce 
these rules without some sort of third-party intervention.  
In the context of frontier forest governance, the loosely developed property-rights 
system of the indigenous people may no longer be sufficiently binding when residents are 
faced with mestizo migrants who have their own land-use institutions that are more 
connected to mainland market systems. In response to mestizo colonization, some 
indigenous groups may try to create more formal institutions, or more complete property-
rights regimes to strengthen their land claims over frontier forests.  
A clear distinction, however, needs to be made between more complete property 
rights and private-property rights; more complete rights do not necessarily imply 
individual private-property rights. For example, in Bosawas, the creation of a physically 
demarcated boundary line and rules that prohibited mestizo entry more completely 
defined the indigenous residents’ common-property rights, but these institutional changes 
did not create a private-property system.  
Jean Ensminger and colleagues (Ensminger, 1997; Ensminger and Rutten, 1991) 
emphasize the social and economic functions of property rights and contend that 
ideologies can have a strong impact on the type of property-rights arrangement that 
emerges. Ensminger and Rutten (1991) note that property rights are political institutions 
that shape the relations between people, the values that will be prioritized and satisfied, 
and the distribution of costs and benefits across society. They argue that the perceived 
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value of the resource and ideologies with respect to how the resource should be 
distributed also influence the definition (and presumably evolution) of rights and their 
respective rules. 
   
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SITE CONTEXT  
 
Institutional dynamics in Río Plátano provide a superb fieldwork arena in which to 
examine practical applications of the theories of institutional change in response to an 
external disturbance. This chapter examines change in the property-rights institutions in 
the cultural zone of Río Plátano and, more specifically, in three Miskito communities, 
and their respective satellite settlements.  
 The independent variable in this study is mestizo encroachment and the dependent 
variable is land-use institutions, specifically changes in land-use institutions. In 
examining institutional change, I am interested in changes made by Miskito leaders at the 
collective-choice level and changes in the daily decisions made by Miskito residents.  
 As discussed in chapter 2, the Miskito of Río Plátano are organized into a series of 
indigenous federations that lie within the larger umbrella indigenous federation MASTA. 
The creation of MASTA and its respective federations is in itself an institutional change 
within the traditional Miskito common-property system. As will be discussed, the 
Miskito historically have made land-use decisions primarily at the household level 
(Dodds, 1994). 
 The organizational structure of MASTA generally follows the hierarchy portrayed in 
Figure 4.1. MASTA consists of seven federations that operate at a regional level 
(generally corresponding with the municipal divisions). The umbrella organization 
MASTA and each of its respective regional federations have an elected cabinet. Each 
regional federation may (or may not) have one or more land vigilance committees. The 
land vigilance committees implement the regional federation’s decisions with respect to 
land-use rules by monitoring land use in the Miskito communities.  
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MASTA 
REGIONAL FEDERATIONS OF MASTA 
LAND VIGILANCE COMMITTEES 
 
Figure 4.1. Hierarchical Structure of the Indigenous Federations of MASTA 
  
 If we consider how each subset of MASTA makes decisions within the IAD 
framework, the umbrella federation of MASTA is trying to make constitutional decisions 
by asserting Miskito autonomy over their homelands in the Mosquitia. The regional 
federations make collective-choice decisions about how to create rules to monitor 
mestizo encroachment and Miskito land sales. It is also the responsibility of each regional 
MASTA federation to create one or more land vigilance committees. The purpose of the 
land vigilance committee is to actively monitor the day-to-day activities within the 
Miskito communities. In this study, I focus on (1) the institutional changes occurring at 
the collective-choice level with respect to rule-making and organizational activities of the 
regional MASTA federations and (2) the day-to-day land-use decisions made by 
individuals within the respective Miskito communities.  
 
3.1 Institutional Change within Three Miskito Communities 
 
Are the organizational and institutional changes occurring within MASTA in accordance 
with the decisions individuals are making within their respective communities? Do 
decisions made by the Miskito leaders truly represent the attitudes and actions of the 
broader set of Miskito residents?  
In order to compare whether the decisions made by Miskito leaders are reflective of 
decisions made by individual Miskito residents, I focus on activities in three Miskito 
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communities: Ahuas, Wampusirpe, and Banaka. Each community is associated with a 
regional federation of MASTA. Table 4.1 shows the regional MASTA federation and its 
respective community. BAMIASTA is the regional MASTA federation for the 
municipality of Ahuas and the communities within the municipality. BAKINASTA 
represents residents of the Wampusirpe region, and RAYAKA represents the coastal 
communities along the Caribbean and also extends westward to include Banaka and 
surrounding communities. 
 
Table 4.1. MASTA Federations and their Respective Communities 
MASTA 
Regional Federation Community  
BAMIASTA Ahuas 
BAKINASTA Wampusirpe 
RAYAKA Banaka 
 
  
 Figure 4.2 shows the principal Miskito study communities. The sites were chosen to 
examine the impact of outside encroachment on resident land-use practices and 
institutions. The regions share similar geographies and levels of market integration, but 
each region has a different history of mestizo encroachment. As shown in Figure 4.2, 
colonists have been moving into Río Plátano from the west and, more recently, from the 
south. Colonists have migrated to Banaka since the late 1980s. Another influx of 
colonists began to migrate into the Wampusirpe region in late 2003. As of April 2006, 
Ahuas had not experienced mestizo colonization.  
In all study communities, the residents are primarily subsistence agriculturalists. In 
addition to agriculture, some men harvest timber for small-scale commercial sale, 
primarily within the department of Gracias a Dios. In some communities, young men 
work part of the year as divers for the lobster boats along the Caribbean coast. As the 
regions are only accessible by boat or small plane and are not connected to commercial 
markets, diving is the principal source of income available to residents. The following 
sections discuss some of the principal characteristics of the study sites. I begin with 
Ahuas, the site that has not experienced mestizo encroachment. 
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Figure 4.2. Río Plátano Sites in Relation to Mestizo Migration 
Mestizo Migration (New) 
 
3.2 Ahuas 
 
The study site Ahuas, hereafter referred to as “Ahuas,” is located on the eastern edge of 
Río Plátano reserve in the department of Gracias a Dios. Although the Miskito 
communities in Ahuas are not within the reserve’s boundaries, the residents rely on lands 
inside Río Plátano for agriculture and forest products. Ahuas consists of three 
communities: Ahuas (the municipal seat), Paptalaya, and Wawina. The settlements are on 
the eastern side of the Patuca River on the edge of the savanna Llanos de Ahuas. 
Residents claim that the grasslands on this side of the river are not appropriate for 
agriculture. Instead, they prefer to farm on the western side of the Patuca River, in the 
reserve.  
 All residents in these communities share the same agricultural and forest zone. The 
agriculture-forest zone is in Río Plátano and is bordered on the east by the Patuca River 
and on the west by the grasslands of the Llano de Brus Laguna. The region covers 
roughly 236 km2. The land cover is a mosaic of swidden agricultural systems along the 
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rivers edges and broadleaf rain forests deeper inland that residents claim have never been 
farmed.  
According to the 2001 census, total population for the region is 6,039. There are 
approximately 235 houses in the municipal seat of Ahuas (PBRP, 1997/98). 
Approximately 90% of all residents of Ahuas were born in the community where they 
presently reside, and 97% of the population is Miskito (INE, 2001).  
With respect to outside encroachment, Ahuas has remained relatively sheltered from 
encroachment pressures. As colonists move in from the west and the south, they have 
found lands in other regions before reaching Ahuas. However, this may soon change. 
Residents are aware that outsiders are encroaching on Miskito lands in other parts of the 
department of Gracias a Dios and within Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve. Although many 
express concern that colonists might reach Ahuas, they do not perceive outside 
encroachment to be an immediate threat.  
 
3.3 Wampusirpe 
 
Wampusirpe is located upriver from Ahuas on the Patuca River. Similar to Ahuas, the 
settlements are to the east of the Patuca, but the residents farm and use forest products on 
the western side of the river, in Río Plátano. The study site includes three principal 
communities in the Wampusirpe region, hereafter referred to as “Wampusirpe”: 
Wampusirpe (the municipal seat), Bodega, and Raya. The area that the residents use 
within the reserve is approximately 246 km2. 
 According to census data provided by the community health center, in 2005 there 
were 1,873 people and approximately 260 houses in the three communities. The region 
had been predominately Miskito with only a few mestizo merchants living in the 
settlements. When I visited the region in August 2003, residents reported that mestizo 
colonists had not yet moved into the area. However, since 2004, at least eight new 
colonist families have settled in Wampusirpe, and in discussions with some of the 
recently arrived settlers, they indicated many of their relatives would soon move to the 
region. 
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3.4 Banaka 
 
The region around Banaka has the longest history of encroachment, and today, Banaka 
lies directly in the path of the ever expanding agricultural frontier. The study site of 
Banaka, hereafter referred to as “Banaka”, includes the principal village of Banaka and 
five satellite settlements in the surrounding foothills. Banaka lies in the northern region of 
the cultural zone off of the western edge of the Lagoon of Ibans. The principal village of 
Banaka is on a plain along Banaka Creek that flows down from the surrounding 
mountains. Below the plain is marshland out to the lagoon. The study area encompasses 
roughly 155 km2. 
The principal village Banaka began as an agricultural center for residents in 
communities along the north coast off the Lagoon of Ibans. Originally, the Miskito 
residents retained permanent homes in communities along the coast and farmed in 
Banaka. Over the past twenty years many settled permanently in Banaka and the 
settlement has become a village in itself with its own churches, school, and a nascent 
health center. In 1996, Banaka was officially declared a community. According to a 
community leader, in January 2006 there were 269 people living in 50 houses in the 
immediate community of Banaka. The majority of the residents in the village of Banaka 
are Miskito. 
The mestizo residents populate the hillsides above the central plain of Banaka. In this 
study, four of the five satellite communities are predominately mestizo. In total, there are 
approximately 65 houses in these communities, and the majority of the residents have 
settled in the region since 1998.  
 
3.5 Limitations of the Research Design 
 
I structured the research in Río Plátano to analyze whether mestizo colonization produces 
changes in both the collective-choice land-use decisions and the decisions made by the 
individual actors at the operational level. Banaka and Wampusirpe are both experiencing 
colonization pressures as mestizos migrate to those regions, and Ahuas is not. 
Nevertheless, there are two limitations in this design. First is mestizo influence in Ahuas. 
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Ideally, Ahuas would be a pure “control,” isolated from all mestizo influences and 
following customary Miskito land-use practices. However, this is not the case in Ahuas, 
or to my knowledge, anywhere in Río Plátano. As compared to Banaka and Wampusirpe 
there is less mestizo influence in Ahuas. Nevertheless, there are a few mestizo men in 
Ahuas. The men came with the Honduran military in the 1950s, married Miskito women, 
and stayed. Although they are recognized by the Miskito as mestizos, they are not 
considered colonists and they have generally adopted Miskito land-use customs. At the 
time of my visit there was only one new mestizo family living in Ahuas. The head of the 
household was a traveling merchant that decided to move his family to Ahuas in 2002. 
Ahuas residents stated that mestizos have not begun to colonize their region, 
nevertheless, they are aware of mestizo pressures elsewhere, particularly in Wampusirpe.  
The second limitation is the introduction of the chainsaw in all communities. 
Residents state that some Miskito people began using chainsaws to cut trees and clear 
land in the mid-1990s. The introduction of the chainsaw may confound some of the 
institutional results. The chainsaw enables individuals to clear more land and harvest 
more trees. Therefore, in all communities, not only are mestizos producing greater 
scarcity of forested lands, so too are the Miskito destroying forests with chainsaws. In 
order to take into account the difference between institutions aimed at controlling 
mestizos and institutions aimed at controlling the chainsaw, I asked interviewees to 
specify why they preferred a particular land-use institution (Was it to prevent mestizo 
encroachment or a Miskito neighbor from cutting forested land, or possibly some other 
reason?). In interviews, chainsaw use was more of a concern in Ahuas than in 
Wampusirpe or Banaka.  
 
4 METHODS 
 
The data that I gathered and the subsequent analyses I present in this chapter draw 
heavily on definitions developed by Ostrom and colleagues (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; 
Ostrom, 2005) to identify institutional change. I use the concepts of institutional 
robustness and resilience (Anderies et al., 2004; Berkes, 2001; Berkes et al., 2003) to 
understand the impacts and directions of these changes. In the following, I highlight some 
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of the key concepts I use to define and categorize institutional change, and the data-
gathering methods.  
 
4.1 Explanation of Concepts Used in Analyses 
 
4.1.1 Identifying Institutional Change 
 
The analysis of land-use dynamics in Río Plátano depends on the ability to identify 
institutional change. According to Ostrom (1990, p. 140), “a change in any rule affecting 
the set of participants, the set of strategies available to the participants, the control they 
have over outcomes, the information they have, or the payoffs is an institutional change.” 
She also suggests that one theory can be used to describe both the creation of, and change 
in, institutions because the absence of a rule is a rule itself (if nothing is forbidden then 
everything is permitted).  
 In Río Plátano, I focus on changes in the participants, their permitted activities, and 
the payoffs or sanctions. I identify the changes by looking at the different clusters of rules 
that specify a particular property right. Recall that Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define 
five different rights that make up the complete bundle of property rights (access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation). In chapter 3, I looked at how right-
holders in each reserve further defined these rights through the creation of specific rule 
clusters—boundary, scope, choice, pay-off, and position rules.  
 The analysis of institutions presented in this chapter differs from that in chapter 3 in 
that I distinguish between different types of institutional statements. In chapter 3, all 
institutions were rules (either in-use or in-form). In order to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the institutional dynamics occurring in the Miskito communities, in this 
chapter I distinguish between rules, norms, and strategies.  
 Following the work by Crawford and Ostrom (1995), in this study, a rule is 
differentiated from a norm by the level of collective decision making required and a 
formal sanctioning process. A rule requires some degree of collective action and 
collective-level decision making where participants consciously craft what an individual 
must, may, or may not do, and expressly stipulate what will happen if an individual does 
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not comply with the ordinance. In contrast, a norm is more informal. A norm is often a 
tacit understanding of customs that guide an individual’s behavior by stating what an 
individual should or should not do. A norm is not consciously crafted and does not have a 
formal mechanism for monitoring and sanctioning non-compliance. However, norms are 
supported by informal monitoring and sanctions such as community gossip, shunning, 
and other communal incentives. A strategy is the most informal institutional statement. It 
specifies what is customary, but it is not enforced by either formal or informal 
sanctioning. It could be considered to be followed because others have generally found 
that the institution “works,” but it is not necessarily the only acceptable behavior or 
decision. 
 For example, in the Miskito communities I consider migratory farming to be a land-
use strategy not a land-use norm. The land-use strategy supports the Miskito management 
rights by creating a shared understanding that residents farm small plots spread out in the 
forest. Most residents comply with the strategy; however, farmers who choose to 
maintain farms in one area are not criticized or shunned. It is simply understood that they 
have made a land-use decision that differs from what is considered by many as 
customary. In contrast, I consider the prohibition of Miskito land sales to be a traditional 
land-use norm that defines Miskito alienation rights. Historically, no formal sanctioning 
mechanism has been prescribed for those who sell land. Nevertheless, those Miskito who 
do sell land are frequently subjected to community criticism and negative gossip.  
 The distinction between a norm and a rule is particularly telling. When something that 
was once a norm, such as the prohibition of land sales, becomes a rule, it suggests that 
tacit understanding between community members is no longer sufficient and that the 
particular resource now holds enough value that it warrants the costs associated with 
collective action to define a rule and its respective sanctions. Similarly, a norm shifting to 
a strategy may mean that the values and attitudes that once supported the norm are no 
longer prevalent in the community and that the institution is now merely a custom to be 
practiced if one so desires. 
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4.1.2 Assessing the Robustness of the Miskito Common-Property System 
 
What do changes in the land-use institutions mean with respect to the overall stability of 
the Miskito common-property system? Chapter 3 showed how different institutional 
arrangements impact agricultural expansion and forest cover. In this analysis, I focus 
primarily on how individual institutional changes with respect to land use impact the 
structure and function of the overall common-property institutional system. I am 
explicitly interested in changes that can be considered to contribute to the maintenance or 
collapse of the common-property system.  
 In the context of Río Plátano, where the private-property institutions promoted by the 
mestizos conflict with the common-property institutions of the Miskito residents, the 
theories of institutional change suggest four outcomes in response to the mestizo 
disturbance: (1) institutional collapse; (2) institutional change toward private property; 
(3) no institutional change; or (4) institutional change that sustains robust common-
property rights. In my analysis of institutional change, I categorize changes that 
contribute to a “robust” institutional system or to institutional “collapse.” I have decided 
to use the word “robust” to refer to changes that enable the mestizo common-property 
system to maintain its core structure and function. According to Berkes (2001, p. 313), 
resilience (robustness) is the measure of: (1) the amount of change the system can 
undergo and still retain its function and structure; (2) self-organization capabilities; and 
(3) the ability to learn and adapt. Thus, I categorize organizational and institutional 
changes that support the structure and function of Miskito common-property customs, 
even in the face of mestizo encroachment, to be part of a robust common-property 
system.  
 Figure 4.3 illustrates how I envision Miskito responses to mestizo migration with 
respect to their overall impact on the robustness of their traditional common-property 
system. There are two changes that I consider signal institutional collapse: the creation of 
an institutional vacuum and Miskito adoption of private-property rights. The ultimate in 
institutional collapse would be an institutional vacuum. This scenario would be 
something like Hardin’s (1968) hypothesized tragedy of the commons. In this situation, 
there are no institutions and everything is permitted, nothing is forbidden. Although the 
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Mosquitia is frequently referred to as a lawless region, I cannot envision a complete 
institutional meltdown and absolute tenure insecurity. In this scenario, no one would 
plant or have cattle, for there would be no way of keeping one’s neighbors from one’s 
harvests or one’s livestock.  
 
ROBUSTNESS: 
Institutional and 
organizational changes 
strengthen common-
property land rights
STAGNANCY: 
No institutional 
change 
COLLAPSE: 
Institutional change 
strengthens individual 
property rights 
COLLAPSE: 
Institutional vacuum 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Spectrum of Changes in Miskito Common-Property Institutions in 
Response to Mestizo Migration 
  
  I consider it more likely that rather than complete collapse, the Miskito begin to 
adopt mestizo institutions. Despite rumors that the mestizos are ruthless, they are not 
without institutions; their land-use norms and rules simply differ from those of the 
Miskito. These differences will be discussed in greater detail, but broadly speaking, the 
mestizo institutions serve to establish and defend private-property rights. For example, 
whereas the Miskito does not restrict access to his/her cultivated fields, the mestizo puts a 
fence around his/her crops and prohibits trespassing. It may be that some Miskito also 
begin fencing their lands. In this case, I would code this institutional change as moving 
toward institutional collapse. It is not, however, an institutional vacuum.  
 I recognize that some land-use institutions may not change or will remain unaffected 
by mestizo migration. In this analysis, I am principally concerned with institutional 
developments that either serve to sustain the function and structure of the common-
property system or serve to promote the function and structure of private- property rights.  
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4.2 Data-Gathering Methods 
 
4.2.1 Determining the Structure and Function of the Traditional Miskito Common-
Property-Rights System  
 
The first section of the analysis provides the context for understanding the structure and 
function of traditional Miskito land-use institutions and the overarching common-
property customs. Data on customary Miskito property rights and land-use institutions 
were gathered through semi-structured interviews with Miskito leaders and elders in 
Ahuas, Wampusirpe, and Banaka. In interviews I asked respondents, historically 
speaking, how they decided on the distribution of land and forest products. I paid 
particular attention to how residents defined access rights to the land, management 
institutions, and institutions regulating the ability to loan, bequest, and sell land. I also 
noted the types of benefits the respondents said they derived from different natural 
resources and how the property-rights system served to sustain those benefits. In addition, 
I asked elders whether property-rights institutions or land-use practices had changed in 
their lifetimes, and if so, why and how they had changed.  
 The customary land rights defined by the residents were compared to land-use studies 
in the region conducted by Dodds (1994) and Tillman (2004). The customary rights 
described by Río Plátano Miskito residents were similar to other accounts of Amerindian 
land-use systems in Nicaragua and other parts of Honduras (Godoy et al., 1997; House, 
1997; Nietschmann, 1973; Stocks, 1996). 
 The description of the disturbance (mestizo land-use practices and institutions) is 
based on structured and semi-structured interviews I conducted with long-standing 
mestizo residents as well as with those who had moved into the cultural zone within the 
past ten years. The description is also based on the mestizo responses to the “Miguel 
questionnaire” with respect to preferred land-use practices (see appendices A and B). I 
compared the mestizo responses to research by Carr (2004) on mestizo colonization in 
eastern Guatemala and Stocks’ (1998) work on mestizo land-use patterns in Bosawas, 
Nicaragua.  
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4.2.2 Assessing Institutional Change, Preferences, and Practices 
 
(1) Institutional Changes and Decisions Made by MASTA 
At the collective-choice (and to some degree the constitutional-choice) levels, I examine 
changes in the land-use and property-rights institutions by looking at rule development on 
the part of MASTA and its respective regional federations. I collected data through semi-
structured interviews with leaders from the MASTA federations in Río Plátano. I also 
attended a Biosphere Project meeting where the president of MASTA discussed 
MASTA’s position with respect to property rights in the cultural zone of Río Plátano 
reserve. Semi-structured interviews were held with Miskito leaders and community 
groups within the study sites. These interviews aimed at understanding not only rule 
creation, but also rule application. In addition to the semi-structured interviews with 
community leaders, I asked individual residents about their attitudes toward rules at the 
collective-choice level.  
 In analyzing the results, I categorize three possible outcomes: rules to support private-
property rights, rules to support common-property rights, or no rules. If the Miskito 
property-rights system is robust, I expect that in response to mestizo encroachment, the 
regional federations of MASTA will have created rules to support the Miskito people’s 
communal rights to the Mosquitia. For example, if MASTA demands private-property 
rights, this would be considered to detract from the robustness of the Miskito customary 
property-rights. A third option is no change—no rule creation. If MASTA has done 
nothing with respect to property-rights and mestizo encroachment, I consider their 
inactivity to detract from the robustness of the Miskito common-property system.  
(2) Land-Use Preferences and Practices of the Miskito People 
I chose four different variables to examine property-rights preferences and land-use 
institutions in each community. The four variables include: (1) land tenure preferences, 
(2) property-rights preferences specifically over forest lands, (3) use of fences, and (4) 
attitudes toward land sales. I chose each of these variables because they represent key 
differences in the Miskito and mestizo property-rights arrangements. For each variable I 
consider if preferences are in accordance with Miskito common-property customs or 
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mestizo private-property institutions, and whether the different experiences with mestizo 
encroachment are associated with different institutional preferences and practices.  
 In order to gather information on how individual residents are responding to mestizo 
encroachment, I conducted semi-structured interviews, walked through the forests and 
fields in each study site, and worked with residents in their agricultural fields to observe 
present land-use practices. I also administered the “Miguel questionnaire” to a 
purposefully selected sample of residents in each study site (see appendices A and B).  
 In each community, I sampled at least 10% of the houses, and in many, I interviewed 
residents in 25–50% of the houses. In order to get a representative sample of residents, I 
divided each community into geographic regions and sampled the Miskito households 
and residents based on the geographic location of the house and gender. I chose to sample 
based on house location in order to ensure that not only the wealthiest or the closest to the 
community center were sampled. In each house, either a male or female head of 
household was asked to speak for household(s) in the house.  
 If Miskito common-property rights are robust, I expect that institutional outcomes 
will be independent of encroachment and that in each study site: 
1. Miskito residents will prefer common-property tenure rights over individual 
tenure rights.  
2. Miskito residents will prefer shared ownership and access rights (for all the 
Miskito people) to the forest lands. 
3. Miskito residents will not use fences. 
4. Miskito residents will not sell land. 
 
 
5 CUSTOMARY MISKITO PROPERTY-RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND THE MESTIZO 
DISTURBANCE 
 
I begin the analysis of institutional change with a description of the customary Miskito 
property-rights system, and an overview of how the mestizo property-rights institutions 
disturb the Miskito system. This is followed by an analysis of the findings of how 
MASTA and its respective federations are responding to mestizo migration and how the 
individual Miskito residents are addressing mestizo migration and the introduction of a 
Tanya M. Hayes 108
land market and private-property institutions. I conclude with a discussion of whether the 
changes can be considered part of a robust common-property system. 
 
5.1 Miskito Property Rights and Land-Use Institutions 
 
In his work on forestry institutions in Mexico, Klooster (2000) highlights the important 
role that institutions serve in forming community identity (p. 14). Similarly, my own 
work in the Río Plátano and work by other researchers (Dodds, 1994; Herlihy, 2001) 
found that Miskito land-use institutions serve to maintain key values and practices that 
identify what makes a person Miskito. Residents express Miskito land uses not in terms 
of rules and laws, but rather by what is customary and what differentiates a Miskito from 
another ethnic group, such as the mestizos.  
 The Miskito property rights are founded on a set of commonly understood land-use 
norms. Customarily, Miskito land-use decisions are made at the household level, and few, 
if any, decisions are decided by the community at the collective-choice level. 
Historically, the Miskito did not have traditional tribal councils that crafted land-use rules 
and property-rights institutions (Dodds, 1994). Rather, property rights evolved over time 
into tacit norms and land-use strategies. No one monitored the forests and there was no 
collectively decided-upon enforcement mechanism. I categorize all customary institutions 
as either strategies or norms and do not consider any of them to be collectively decided-
upon rules. Table 4.2 presents a broad categorization of the principal property rights that 
many Miskito consider to be their customary practices. 
 Broadly speaking, the Miskito property-rights institutions can be characterized as a 
common-property-rights regime by which all Miskito residents share access and 
withdrawal rights to the lands of the Mosquitia. The Miskito of Río Plátano have not 
created scope rules or physically demarcated their lands, however, elders and leaders 
claim that their ancestral rights include the entire department of Gracias a Dios. As one of 
the first groups to occupy the land, they believe that they, and the other natives in the 
region, are the rightful owners of the Mosquitia. The customary property-rights 
institutions did not include any boundary rules to forbid non-natives from settling in the 
region. As one Miskito leader stated, they never created any rules prohibiting outsiders or 
Tanya M. Hayes 109
clearly demarcated their lands because many assumed that the lands naturally belonged to 
the Miskito peoples. 
 
Table 4.2. Miskito Customary Property Rights 
Institutional Statement Configuration of Property Right  
  Access
NORM All natives (loosely defined) may access all lands. 
  Withdrawal
NORM All natives (loosely defined) may withdraw forest products. 
  Exclusion
NORM First to farm may exclude others from withdrawing from plot. 
NORM No one may exclude Miskito from forested lands. 
  Management
NORM First to farm retain management rights to plot. 
NORM Miskito farm small plots of less than 1 ha. 
STRATEGY Miskito do not clear forest for pasture. 
  Alienation
NORM First to farm retains right to bequeath and loan previously cultivated land. 
NORM Miskito do not sell land. 
  
   
 The most prominent feature of the Miskito property-rights arrangement is their shared 
access and withdrawal rights to the land and its resources. A common perception, one 
frequently expressed in interviews, is that God created the land for the Miskito to use for 
their livelihood needs. In interviews, Miskito residents frequently emphasized that their 
property-rights system gives the Miskito people access to all the Mosquitia lands and that 
it goes against their customs to restrict access to the land. In particular, elders and 
Miskito leaders noted that the Miskito are accustomed to sharing forests with one another 
so that all can benefit from the forest resources. Many noted that certain trees or forest 
products are only available in certain regions and that all Miskito must have access and 
withdrawal rights to these regions. Similarly, many residents refuted the notion of 
government sovereignty over the land. Several stated that the government did not make 
the trees or the land. An individual may lay claim to his work, but no government or 
individual has the right to restrict Miskito access to otherwise unoccupied lands.  
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 Cultivated land is distinguished from virgin forest land as the former has more 
complete property rights attached to it. However, any forest that has not been previously 
cultivated is available to be claimed. Agricultural lands are claimed using the first–in-
time rule (Ostrom, 2005). Both men and women may own agricultural lands. The first 
person to clear a piece of forest and cultivate the land retains permanent use rights to the 
land. The land remains in the family and ensures that future generations will have land to 
farm. The original cultivator has withdrawal, management, and restricted-alienation 
rights.  
It is up to the owner to monitor and enforce his or her property rights to cultivated 
land. The boundaries are not usually physically demarcated, and once the plot returns to 
fallow it can be difficult for an outside eye to recognize the specific boundaries defining 
ownership. Permanent crops such as fruit trees or cacao are frequently planted as a sign 
of ownership, and elders have a remarkable ability to recall who cut what tree and planted 
where. If someone violates another’s property rights he or she may be sanctioned by the 
property owner. Sanctions include community gossip, vandalism, or the threat of black 
magic. For example, if someone plants on another’s land, the plot owner may destroy the 
perpetrator’s crops. In some instances, an elder may be called to resolve boundary 
disputes. In some communities, the position of a community mediator has been created 
by the municipality, however many residents state that conflicts are often settled 
informally. Residents assert that disagreements generally get worked out because a 
Miskito does not want trouble with his neighbor. 
 Land and forests are not managed for substantive commercial profits through cattle, 
agriculture, or forestry. People do not cut pasture or fence their lands, and cattle are 
customarily kept in the village living spaces. Given the relatively low population 
densities and Miskito preference for farming small plots (less than 100 yd by 100 yd) 
along the rivers, there is minimal competition over forest lands and the forests have been 
left largely intact (Dodds, 1994).    
With respect to alienation rights, the Miskito residents emphasize that, traditionally, 
land is not sold. In conversations, Miskito elders noted that unlike the mestizos, Miskito 
do not sell land. Although many will loan land to a neighbor in need, the loan is only 
temporary. All cultivated land is to be held in the family for future generations.  
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5.2 The Disturbance: Colonist Land-Use Institutions 
 
The mestizo colonists disturb the Miskito land-use system in three important ways. First, 
the mestizos are a heterogeneous group that do not necessarily share Miskito values 
toward the land and are not incorporated into the complex web of interactions within 
Miskito society. Furthermore, the central functions of the mestizo property-rights system 
differ from those of the Miskito. Instead of operating under a common-property system 
that serves to meet subsistence needs and provide a certain degree of social equity, the 
mestizos depend on private-property rights to secure not only subsistence benefits, but 
also the economic profits that can be derived from the land and its resource base, namely 
from crops, cattle, and timber. The mestizo land-use institutions do not protect shared 
access rights to the forests and shared benefits from the forest products. In accordance 
with research findings of Taylor and Singleton (1993), the loosely developed property-
rights system of the Miskito people may no longer be sufficiently binding when residents 
are faced with mestizo migrants who have their own land-use institutions that are more 
connected to mainland market systems.  
 Second, the mestizos increase the demand for land resources and contribute to 
resource scarcity. Mestizos tend to farm in the foothills and claim (and clear) areas of 
forested land that the Miskito residents have historically shared in common. This means 
that all of the forest resources that were located in that forest are no longer available to 
the Miskito people.  
 Third, the mestizos introduce an external source of money into the region via the land 
market. Mestizos create economic incentives to owning land and forest by offering 
money for pastures and forested lands.ii Although mestizos are commonly accused of 
invading forest lands, many buy at least some of their landholdings from Miskito 
residents. The offer of money for land presents a new economic value for land other than 
purely subsistence benefits. Table 4.3 shows the institutional structure that supports the 
mestizo colonists’ property-rights system. 
 Mestizo farmers and ranchers place utmost importance on the establishment of 
individual land rights. The colonists perceive all lands to be open for appropriation unless 
they are otherwise physically demarcated. Upon arriving in the frontier, mestizos 
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immediately demarcate their landholdings with markings on trees and clearings in order 
to establish ownership rights. The first person to demarcate a piece of land is then 
considered to hold all property rights to the land, including the right to sell. Unlike the 
fluid boundaries and overlapping rights found in the Miskito property-rights 
arrangements, the mestizo property-rights institutions clearly demarcate access and 
withdrawal rights, and facilitate the buying and selling of land.  
 
Table 4.3. Colonist Property Rights 
 
Institutional Statement Configuration of Property Right  
  Access
NORM All Hondurans may access all unclaimed lands. 
  Withdrawal
NORM All Hondurans may withdraw products from unclaimed lands. 
  Exclusion
NORM First to physically demarcate land may exclude all others from land. 
NORM All unclaimed land may be appropriated. 
  Management
STRATEGY Manage large permanent plots for crop, pasture, and forest products. 
  Alienation
NORM First to physically demarcate has right to sell, bequeath, rent, or loan land. 
 
Mestizo lands are monitored and enforced by the respective owners. Fences are 
commonly used to demonstrate ownership and deter trespassers. It is understood among 
colonists that no one else may enter or use another person’s land without his/her 
permission. If someone is found entering another’s land he or she will be asked to leave 
and the threat of violence (usually the use of a firearm) is an accepted means of 
enforcement. 
In addition to their property-rights institutions, the mestizo land-use strategies also 
tend to prioritize the wealth-generating benefits of the Mosquitia lands over the benefits 
that can be derived from subsistence living and forest conservation. Mestizo settlers often 
claim relatively large expanses of land (50–60 ha) in which they keep roughly half in 
forest and the rest for crops and pasture (Carr, 2004; Stocks, 1998). And, unlike the 
indigenous residents that tend to farm along the riversides and keep large areas of forest 
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intact for communal use, mestizo land-use strategies often produce fragmented forests. 
This is not to say that the mestizos do not value the environmental benefits that forests 
provide. Many mestizos recognize that forests are vital for watershed protection and 
some settlers discourage clearing land in the watersheds. However, all other forests are 
viewed as potentially cultivable. 
 
6 THE RESULTS: EVOLUTION OF MISKITO PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RÍO PLÁTANO 
 
The institutional findings are divided between collective-choice decisions that are being 
made by Miskito leaders and the operational-level activities and attitudes of the residents 
in the Miskito communities. Findings show that while at the collective-choice level the 
Miskito are developing rules to strengthen their common-property rights to the 
Mosquitia, individual actions and attitudes at the operational level are less cohesive. 
Individuals support the creation of an autonomous territory for the Miskito people, but 
they have little faith in the ability of their communities to prevent mestizo encroachment. 
Many individuals prefer to adopt land-use institutions that are recognized by the mestizos 
and serve to protect each person’s individual rights to their agricultural and forest lands.  
 
6.1 Institutional Dynamics at the Collective-Choice Level 
 
The Miskito political organization MASTA demands formal legal recognition of their 
common-property rights over the Mosquitia, including the ability to exclude, manage, 
and determine alienation rights over their homelands. The MASTA members consistently 
call on the International Labor Organization Indigenous Rights Treaty 169 signed by 
Honduras in 1989 and insist that the Honduran government recognize their autonomous 
rights over the Honduran Mosquitia. However, thus far, their claims have fallen on deaf 
ears. 
 Nevertheless, in response to continued mestizo migration and in an effort to assert 
their dominion over their homelands, the regional federations of MASTA have defined, 
and are trying to establish, a set of de facto land-use rules with respect to access and use 
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rights to their communal lands in the Mosquitia. The regional federations have 
collectively established two rules to prohibit mestizo occupation of their lands:iii
 
1. Exclusion: No mestizo settlers are permitted to settle in the cultural zone of Río 
Plátano. 
2. Alienation: Miskito are prohibited from selling land to mestizos.  
 
 In order to enforce these rules, each MASTA federation is responsible for creating a 
land vigilance committee to monitor mestizo encroachment and Miskito land sales. Any 
illicit activities are to be reported to the MASTA federation which, in turn, is expected to 
coordinate with AFE-COHDEFOR and/or municipal governments to further investigate 
and enforce the rules. In practice, however, the rules are only sporadically applied in the 
Miskito communities.  
 Findings on the regional MASTA activities in the three study sites are that the 
regional federations do not create a committee to monitor mestizos until the mestizos 
have actually entered. BAMIASTA, the regional federation of MASTA for Ahuas, has 
not created any type of land vigilance committee and is not actively organizing residents 
to consider how they might address the problem of mestizo encroachment. BAMIASTA 
leaders say that they are concerned with the possibility that mestizos might invade their 
communal lands, but to date, that has not happened.  
 In contrast, in Wampusirpe and Banaka, the communities’ respective regional 
federations BAKINASTA and RAYAKA have individually organized land vigilance 
committees to monitor encroachment activities. In both cases, however, these committees 
were organized after mestizos began moving into their respective regions. Furthermore, 
the land vigilance committees’ activities vary in effectiveness and consistency over time.  
 Wampusirpe’s land vigilance committee is the most recent. The committee formed 
circa 2003 in response to an increase in colonist activities in the region. Committee 
members state that the group has been relatively successful in getting colonists to leave 
forested lands that they had appropriated. Committee members recounted one occasion in 
the past year when the group encountered several mestizo settlers demarcating land in 
Río Plátano. The land vigilance committee called on its federation, BAKINASTA, and 
AFE-COHDEFOR personnel to tell the settlers to leave (and they did). However, group 
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members stated that thus far they have been less successful in prohibiting land sales to 
mestizos.  
 Of the three study sites, Banaka has the longest history of encroachment and the 
longest history of attempts to control mestizo migration. In the early 1990s, the regional 
organization that is now RAYAKA organized residents of the Miskito communities in the 
western region of the cultural zone into land vigilance committees to monitor their lands 
from mestizo encroachment. Banaka residents report that monitoring and enforcement 
activities of their land vigilance committee thrived in the early 1990s. While all vigilance 
activities were voluntary, the Honduran NGO MOPAWI supported the organizational 
development of the committee. Although the land vigilance committees did not hold any 
official rights to sanction the colonists, when group members encountered colonists they 
asked the settlers to leave and if the colonists refused, they called on neighboring land 
vigilance committees, and at times the employees of AFE-COHDEFOR, to expel the 
colonists. Banka residents reported that until the mid-1990s, the group was relatively 
successful.  
 In 1995, however, the Honduran government encouraged thousands of farmers to 
colonize a region along the northwestern edge of Río Plátano, close to the western border 
of the cultural zone. According to residents, many of these farmers pressed farther into 
the cultural zone and into the foothills surrounding Banaka. In interviews, the original 
members of the Banaka land vigilance committee reported that, at that time, they felt they 
needed greater support in order to control the onslaught of colonists. Ultimately, 
RAYAKA demanded that the government either give the indigenous peoples their own 
territory to manage or provide greater government support to control the colonization 
process.iv Banaka residents said they felt discouraged by the lack of support on the part of 
the Honduran government. In the late 1990s, AFE-COHDEFOR began to assert its 
jurisdictional rights over Río Plátano lands through the creation of the Río Plátano 
management plan. At this time, RAYAKA underwent administrative difficulties and the 
Banaka land vigilance committee dissolved. 
 In June 2004, MOPAWI and RAYAKA began to try to reinvigorate the Banaka land 
vigilance committee and encourage members to monitor and enforce the rules to prohibit 
land sales as well as regulate their own agricultural expansion. However, community 
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residents and several members of the new committee are pessimistic about the actual 
application of said rules. Banaka residents’ state that the community is divided over land 
sales and that many families have since sold land to colonists. The land vigilance 
committee members also complain that their work is voluntary and that they still lack a 
means to sanction colonists or community members who illegally sell land.  
 
6.2 Deterioration of Community Confidence in Collective-Choice Capabilities 
 
The results of the land vigilance committee activities in Wampusirpe and Banaka 
demonstrate that land-use rules made at the collective-choice level have had mixed 
results. At times, the rules prohibiting mestizo settlements have been enforced and have 
apparently served to thwart mestizo encroachment. The findings also suggest that the 
longer colonists have been in the region, the less likely residents will believe that they 
can effectively control mestizo migration. This is reflected not only in reports by the 
respective land vigilance committees, but also in residents’ attitudes about whether the 
community can control mestizo encroachment.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the results from the “Miguel questionnaire” statement with respect 
to whether the community can prevent mestizo encroachment. Some residents responded 
that the community can sometimes prevent mestizo encroachment or that the community 
can but are not preventing encroachment. I coded all such responses to signify that the 
community cannot prevent mestizo colonization. Furthermore, some residents did not 
know whether the community could or should control encroachment. Table 4.4 shows the 
cross-tabulation results and demonstrates the relationship between history of 
encroachment and perceptions of whether the community can prevent mestizo 
encroachment. In the table and cross-tabulation analysis, I chose to exclude the five 
“don’t know” cases in Ahuas. 
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of Attitudes on Ability to Control Encroachment by 
Community Encroachment History 
 
 
Table 4.4. Cross-Tabulation Results of Ability to Prevent Mestizo Encroachment 
 
    
 Can Prevent 
Mestizos 
Cannot Prevent 
Mestizos Total 
Count 50 5 55 No Encroachment 
(Ahuas) Expected count 34.58 20.42 55 
Count 27 27 54 Recent Encroachment 
(Wampusirpe) Expected count 33.95 20.04 54 
Count 6 17 23 Long-Standing 
Encroachment (Banaka) Expected count 14.46 8.54 23 
Likelihood ratio 39.362, p = 0.000 
 
 The results suggest that the longer a community is exposed to mestizo encroachment, 
the less likely it is that community residents will believe that the community can prevent 
mestizo colonization of the region. The likelihood ratio value from the chi-square test of 
independence shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between a 
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community’s experience with encroachment and residents’ attitudes with respect to their 
ability to prevent mestizo settlements. Ahuas residents, who have yet to experience 
mestizo migration, are most confident in their ability to control mestizo settlements. 
However, several residents in Ahuas were not sure whether they, in fact, needed to keep 
out mestizos. It is also important to note that many Ahuas residents responded to the 
question as more of a hypothetical situation of whether they wanted mestizos in the 
region. Ahuas residents frequently stated in response that no, they did not want mestizo 
residents and that yes, they would prevent them from moving to the region.  
 In contrast, Wampusirpe residents who began experiencing mestizo migration within 
the last five years are divided over whether they are able to prevent mestizos from 
settling in their communities. In Wampusirpe, several residents stated that the community 
can prevent mestizo encroachment, but they are choosing not to. These residents 
expressed frustration over recent land sales by Miskito residents to mestizo settlers and 
noted that although he or she does not want mestizos living in the region, there is nothing 
to prevent a neighbor from selling land.  
 Finally, Banaka residents, with the longest history of encroachment, were the most 
likely to state that the community is incapable of preventing mestizo migration. In 
Banaka, 14 of the 23 respondents stated that they could not prevent mestizo migration to 
the region. 
 
6.3 Individual Attitudes and Land-Use Practices: Defense of Miskito Common-
Property Rights or Adoption of Mestizo Land Uses? 
  
Mestizos continue to migrate to Banaka and Wampusirpe. How are the Miskito residents 
responding to this migration? Do they continue to support the collective-choice rules 
created by MASTA and its respective federations? Or, are they turning to other 
institutional mechanisms to protect their lands? Do their institutional choices vary 
depending on their experiences with mestizo encroachment? 
 The analyses of individual land-use preferences demonstrate that within the Miskito 
communities, the Miskito residents are not unified with respect to (1) their property-
rights preferences or (2) deference to the prohibition of land sales to outsiders. Findings 
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show that this dissonance between the collective goals expressed by the Miskito leaders 
and individual Miskito land-use preferences becomes more pronounced the longer that a 
community is exposed to mestizo colonists. The following highlights the results from 
questions with respect to tenure preferences and the defense of land rights, institutions to 
protect forested land, fences, and attitudes toward land sales. 
 
6.3.1 Property-Rights Preferences 
 
The semi-structured interviews with reserve residents found that the majority of Miskito 
residents agree with MASTA that the Mosquitia should belong collectively to the Miskito 
people. In informal individual and group interviews, the majority of residents rejected 
any tenure arrangement that would restrict their rights over all of the Mosquitia lands and 
expressed support for MASTA’s demand for an autonomous indigenous territory. This 
support did not vary by community.  
 However, when residents were asked explicitly about the type of tenure right they 
would prefer to hold, the responses varied and did not necessarily cohere with MASTA’s 
demand for a communal title to the Miskito lands. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5 compare the 
land-title preferences of residents in the three study sites of varying levels of 
encroachment. 
 Approximately half (75/138) of the total respondents in the three communities stated 
that they wanted communal titles to the lands, and the responses, once again, varied by 
community. In Ahuas, where residents have not experienced encroachment, residents 
were less likely than in the other two sites to have a firm grasp of different titling options. 
In interviews, approximately 40% of those in Ahuas did not understand the concept of 
land titles. Furthermore, the Ahuas residents did not express title preferences with respect 
to their ability to protect their lands from outsiders, but rather with respect to maintaining 
rights to their agricultural plots and the forest lands within the reserve. 
 In contrast, in Wampusirpe, where mestizo colonists recently began to settle, 
communal title had the strongest support with 76% of the households interviewed stating 
that they wanted a communal title. In interviews, many were concerned about mestizo 
invasions, illegal land sales, and the division of communal lands. Many stated that they 
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preferred common property because those rights corresponded with Miskito traditional 
land-use systems that do not have clearly defined boundaries and where everyone is 
entitled to use the land. Several commented that communal titles also serve to 
demonstrate Miskito ownership over the lands and prevent land sales to outsiders.  
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Figure 4.5. Comparison of Land-Title Preferences by Community Encroachment 
History 
 
 
 
Table 4.5. Land-Titling Preferences 
 
  Individual Communal Don't Know Total 
No Encroachment (Ahuas)  14 22 25 61 
Recent Encroachment 
(Wampusirpe)  
13 41 0 54 
Long-Standing 
Encroachment (Banaka)  
10 12 1 23 
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 Finally, in Banaka, where colonists have been settling in the region for over a decade, 
almost half of the respondents, 10 out of 23 households, stated that they wanted 
individual titles to their lands. Banaka residents frequently stated that with individual 
titles one could secure one’s own land and work.  
 
6.3.2 Privatization of Forest Reserves 
 
As stated, the Miskito generally share access to the forests and withdrawal of forest 
products. Families do not own forest land, and the community residents at times travel to 
forests lying near neighboring communities to look for specific timber or other forest 
products. In contrast, among mestizo colonists, clearing a strip of land around a forest 
area is a commonly accepted practice that denotes ownership.  
 In response to a questionnaire statement about use rights to the Mosquitia forests, 131 
out of the 138 total respondents interviewed in the three study sites stated that the forests 
are only for the Miskito or native peoples. Less than 5% believed that the forests are for 
all Hondurans. But, once again, in their decisions at the operational level, many Miskito 
are straying from the customary shared access rights to the forest and adopting the 
mestizo institutions that demonstrate individual property rights to forest resources.  
 The “Miguel questionnaire” asked residents whether they agreed with having a 
private family forest that was physically demarcated. According to the scenario, the forest 
would be only for that particular family and the owner could prohibit other Miskito from 
using the forest resources within the family’s private reserve. Figure 4.6 graphically 
illustrates the results, and Table 4.6 presents the cross-tabulation and chi-square test 
findings. The results show that encroachment and the preference for a privatized 
individual forest are positively associated. The number of respondents in Banaka and 
Wampusirpe who said that they agreed with (and in some cases had) private forests is 
greater than what would be expected if encroachment and forest preference were 
independent. In contrast, in Ahuas, those in favor of private forests are far less than the 
expected count.  
 In all communities, the privatization of forest lands is becoming more acceptable; 
however, it is more likely that a resident in Banaka prefers privatized forest lands than a 
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resident in Ahuas or Wampusirpe. In Banaka, 21 of the 23 households interviewed stated 
that they had their own forest that was physically demarcated and specifically designated 
for their own family’s use. In contrast, in Wampusirpe just under half of the residents 
interviewed stated that they had or wanted a private forest for their families. And in 
Ahuas, only 18 of the 60 respondents supported owning a private forest. 
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of Forest-Ownership Preferences by Community 
Encroachment History 
 
 
Table 4.6. Cross-Tabulation of Encroachment and Forest Preference 
    
Individual 
Forest 
Communal 
Forest 
Total 
Count 18 41 59 
No Encroachment (Ahuas) Expected count 31.03 27.97 59 
Count 32 21 53 
Recent Encroachment (Wampusirpe) Expected count 27.87 25.13 53 
Count 21 2 23 Long-Standing Encroachment 
(Banaka) Expected count 12.10 10.90 23 
Likelihood ratio = 29.439, p = 0.000 
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 Those respondents in favor of individual forests frequently stated that any land that is 
not clearly occupied may be taken by another. Whereas residents in Ahuas expressed 
concern over timber harvesting, Wampusirpe and Banaka residents who supported 
private forests said that by physically demarcating a forest they could ensure that no 
mestizo would invade and that a Miskito neighbor would not sell the land. In Banaka, 
several residents recounted earlier times when they had gone up into the hillsides to cut 
mahogany for boats and found mestizo settlers restricting their access to the residents’ 
prime forest lands. Banaka respondents stated that they have created their own forest 
reserves so that their families and their children will have places to hunt and gather 
timber products.  
In all communities, those respondents who did not prefer individual forests were 
adamant that it violated Miskito traditions to restrict access to forested land. Many 
emphasized that different forest products grow in different regions and that all Miskito 
deserve equal access to these products.  
 
6.3.3 Propagation of Fences 
 
Another trend toward more restrictive property rights regimes is through the use of 
fences. Fences may appear fairly innocuous, yet many Miskito residents note that 
traditionally the Miskito do not fence their lands because anyone may access all lands. 
Fences are a visible demonstration of property rights and a mechanism for enforcing 
boundary rules. In interviews, many Miskito residents complained that the mestizos 
restrict Miskito access by fencing their lands (and actively monitoring their property). 
However, more Miskito families are beginning to fence their lands. 
 Table 4.7 shows a statistically significant relationship between encroachment and the 
use of fences. As with the other institutions that support greater privatization of the land 
and its resources, fencing is most popular in Banaka, where 20 of the 22 respondents 
agreed with fencing one’s land. This response may be due, in part, to the geographic 
layout of Banaka and the fact that the agricultural plots are planted closer to the 
communal living areas than they are in Wampusirpe or Ahuas. Many Banaka residents, 
however, have also begun to adopt the mestizo practice of permanent pasture lands. In 
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addition to keeping their cows out of the crop lands, some residents noted that part of the 
reason to fence is to define ownership over one’s land.  
 
Table 4.7. Cross-Tabulation of Encroachment and Use of Fences 
 
    No fences Yes fences Total 
Count 30 25 55 
No Encroachment (Ahuas) Expected count 24.54 30.46 55 
Count 26 27 53 Recent Encroachment 
(Wampusirpe) Expected count 23.65 29.35 53 
Count 2 20 22 Long-Standing Encroachment 
(Banaka) Expected count 9.81 12.18 22 
Likelihood ratio 6.058, p = 0.000    
 
   
Fencing land and maintaining permanent plots is not as prominent in Wampusirpe 
and Ahuas. In Wampusirpe and Ahuas, opinions are evenly split over whether to fence 
agricultural lands. In both regions, residents expressed concern that fencing would restrict 
resident access to community lands, and community leaders and elders, in particular, 
worried that fencing would allow a few wealthy residents to claim all of the prime land. 
Nevertheless, many also noted that with the acquisition of cattle, fencing is becoming 
more important in order to protect crop lands. 
 
6.3.4 Alienation Rights: Land as a Market Commodity 
 
Given the chance to gain immediate access to money from land sales, have the Miskito 
become integrated into the mestizo land market? In questionnaire responses, the majority 
of the residents (125/140 total respondents) stated that land sales to non-natives causes 
problems for the entire community. Many Miskito stated that, in their opinion, mestizos 
generally do not make good neighbors. The attitude of general distrust of mestizos did 
not vary much by community.  
 Nevertheless, land sales to mestizos persist. Community leaders and land vigilance 
committee members frequently commented that one of the greatest difficulties in 
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controlling mestizo encroachment is in convincing their own community members not to 
sell land to the colonists.  
 
Table 4.8. Comparison of Willingness to Sell across Communities 
 
  Sell to Anyone Sell Only to Native 
Never 
Sell Total 
No Encroachment (Ahuas) 20 24 14 58 
 Recent Encroachment 
(Wampusirpe) 17 17 20 54 
Long-Standing 
Encroachment (Banaka) 9 8 6 23 
 
 
 When asked whether they would sell land to (1) anyone, (2) only to natives, or (3) 
never sell their land, in all regions, approximately one-third of the respondents in each 
site stated that they would sell land to anyone. Table 4.8 shows a comparison of the 
willingness to sell across communities. The willingness to sell land clearly facilitates 
encroachment and defies MASTA land-use rules. There is not a statistically significant 
relationship between willingness to sell and encroachment. However, Banaka and 
Wampusirpe residents are more likely to have actually sold land to a mestizo than 
residents in Ahaus. A community leader and former forest guard in Banaka reported that 
approximately 25% of the community landholders had sold land to mestizos over the past 
ten years. Similarly, almost half the residents in the one community in the Wampusirpe 
region reportedly sold land to mestizos in the past year. 
 The prohibition of land sales to mestizos forms the crux of the Miskito common-
property system. The continual problem of Miskito land sales to mestizos demonstrates 
the difficulties the Miskito face in uniting their communities in the protection of Miskito 
common-property rights. Attitudes and activities in three communities in the 
Wampusirpe region characterize the division and tension among residents due to land 
sales. The graph and table below illustrate the willingness to sell land to outsiders in each 
of these communities. In terms of stopping mestizo migration, the crucial decision is 
whether a Miskito would sell to a mestizo (not to another Miskito). Therefore, I have 
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combined the “sell only to natives” and “never sell” categories, and focus on whether a 
resident would sell to anyone (including mestizos) or never sell to a mestizo. 
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Figure 4.7. Conflict over Land Sales in Wampusirpe 
 
 
Table 4.9. Willingness to Sell to Mestizo in Wampusirpe 
 
  Sell to Anyone 
Never Sell to 
Mestizo 
# Households 
Interviewed 
Total # Houses in 
Community 
Bodega  9 3 12 15 Miskito (8 mestizo) 
Raya 0 10 10 25 
Wampusirpe 8 24 32 210 
 Likelihood ratio 17.788, p. = 0.000 
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 In Bodega, roughly half of the households sold their land between 2004 and 2005 to 
mestizos and eight new colonist families have since moved in. In this community, nine of 
the 12 households interviewed said they would sell land to anyone. In contrast, residents 
in the neighboring community, Raya, were adamant about prohibiting land sales. In Raya, 
residents expressed particular concern about the recent arrival of colonists and none of 
the households interviewed stated that they would sell land to anyone.  
 The conflict over land sales is largely due to the immediate need for money versus the 
long-term costs of lost lands and mestizo neighbors. Many of those who said they would 
sell land stated that they have no other source of income and that land sales are a quick 
way to make money, particularly when there is a familial crisis such as illness. They 
stated that they would sell land to mestizos because Miskito do not have money and that 
mestizos pay better prices. Other community members, however, were quick to criticize 
those who sell land. Many noted that the sales are only temporary solutions and that, 
ultimately, the family is left worse off because they have lost at least some of their 
agricultural lands. Some residents commented that they thought that those Miskito who 
sell land should have to leave the Mosquitia and wished that there were stronger 
punishments for land sales.  
  
7 DISCUSSION 
 
Can the Miskito property-rights arrangement and their respective institutional adaptations 
to mestizo migration be considered part of a robust common-property system? The 
findings from this study contradict the assumption made by some that indigenous 
institutions will necessarily collapse or completely succumb to market pressures. The 
findings, however, point to the frailties in the Miskito common-property system and 
highlight the conflict and tension that mestizo migration produces with respect to land 
use in the region. Figure 4.8 shows an overview of the institutional dynamics occurring at 
the collective-choice and operational decision-making levels in the three Miskito sites in 
Río Plátano. 
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The figure above maps out the general institutional findings at the collective-choice and 
operational decision-making levels with respect to their contribution to the overall robustness 
of the Miskito property-rights system and the institutional changes in response to mestizo 
migration. Moving toward the top of the arrow are institutional and organizational changes 
that further substantiate the Miskito common-property rights in response to mestizo colonists. 
Toward the bottom of the arrow are institutional changes and activities that detract from the 
robustness of the common-property system, namely the adoption of private-property 
institutions and weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. On the left side of the arrow 
are the activities at the collective-choice level. On the right side of the arrow are the 
preferences and practices of individual Miskito residents. 
Figure 4.8 Miskito Institutional Responses to Mestizo Migration 
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 7.1 Overall Robustness of the Miskito Property-Rights System in Response to 
Mestizo Encroachment 
 
The spectrum shown in Figure 4.8 focuses on institutional preferences and practices that 
support or thwart the Miskito common-property regime. The Miskito property-rights 
regime has neither collapsed nor remained completely robust in response to mestizo 
encroachment. Institutional developments in the Miskito property-rights system fall 
across the spectrum. Within the regional federations of MASTA, there is some self-
organization and adaptation of rules to strengthen the Miskito system, but many of the 
collective-choice rules have not been fully applied or respected within the communities.  
 The finding from Río Plátano portray the struggle Miskito residents face in deciding 
how to balance individual interests such as land security and livelihood needs with the 
broader Miskito functions of their traditional property-rights system that promotes 
equitable access to land and forest resources and respect for Miskito ancestral rights and 
land-use practices. The creation of property-rights rules to restrict mestizo encroachment 
and prohibit land sales support the core functions of the common-property system by 
attempting to ensure continued communal access to Miskito homelands. The individuals 
living in the Miskito communities, however, are less united in their support for these new 
land-use rules, and some individual residents are adopting mestizo institutions such as 
private forest reserves and fences and express a willingness to participate in the mestizo 
land market. Still others, advocate for stronger legal support for Miskito communal rights 
to their lands and actively monitor their community’s forests and farm lands for mestizo 
settlers. 
 
7.2 Evolution of Property Rights as Encroachment Persists 
The community-level studies suggest that a community’s first response is to create 
institutions to maintain Miskito common-property customs in the face of mestizo 
encroachment. This initial self-organization and activity gradually fades, however, as the 
land vigilance committees fail to protect Miskito common-property rights and Miskito 
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residents begin to adopt mestizo institutions to protect their subsistence needs and 
provide for their families.  
 If we envision a graph with investment in institutions and activities to bolster Miskito 
common-property institutions and control outside encroachment along the y-axis and 
encroachment over time on the x-axis, it should appear that as encroachment continues, 
investment in activities to support the Miskito common-property system initially 
increases and then decreases as encroachment persists. The resulting graph might look 
something like an inverted U.  
 This inverted U is demonstrated in the comparison of activities and attitudes with 
respect to land use and encroachment in Ahuas, Wampusirpe, and Banaka. At time zero 
(no encroachment), the Miskito common-property institutions are functioning. But, the 
traditional institutions require minimal investment because, for the most part, they are 
understood and complied with by the Miskito population. They have not been challenged. 
Ahuas could be considered to be at time zero with respect to encroachment. Although 
Ahuas residents are optimistic about their ability to prevent mestizo migration, to date in 
Ahuas, there is no committee organized to monitor and enforce land-use rules, and 
residents have very little understanding about their formal tenure standing.  
Following along the timeline of mestizo encroachment, when the common-property 
institutions are first challenged by mestizos, the Miskito organize land vigilance 
committees and create boundary rules, thereby contributing to the robustness of their 
property-rights system. Wampusirpe could be considered to be at this point of 
encroachment and at the height of the organizational and institutional actions to prevent 
outside encroachment. But, the success of these new organizations and institutions is, in 
part, hindered by decisions by Miskito residents, namely the decision to sell lands.  
Land vigilance committee members in Wampusirpe can recall cases where they 
prevented colonists from moving in, but they also point to plenty of examples of new 
colonist settlements and incidents of Miskito land sales to mestizos. Although the 
majority of Wampusirpe residents were adamant about receiving communal tenure rights 
to protect their land and their customs from mestizo settlers, only half of the respondents 
believed they could control mestizo encroachment. The conflicting attitudes toward land 
sales in the different communities within Wampusirpe (Bodega, Raya, and Wampusirpe) 
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demonstrate the disagreement over sales, the tension brewing in the region, and the 
fragility of the efforts to defend Miskito common-property rights.   
 Finally, Banaka lies farther along the encroachment timeline. Investment in common-
property institutions to thwart mestizo migration begins to decrease as mestizos continue 
to migrate into the region and as residents lose faith in the effectiveness of collective-
choice activities in stopping encroachment. Miskito residents stop participating in the 
land vigilance committees and some adopt mestizo property-rights institutions to defend 
their lands.  
 If Banaka represents the future, the maintenance of the Miskito property-rights 
regime appears unpromising. Its land vigilance committee dissolved in the mid-1990s. 
The group has since revived, but members themselves are uncertain of their own abilities 
to control mestizo migration to the region and cite the difficulties of controlling their 
neighbor’s land sales and the challenges of trying to enforce rules that have minimal 
judicial or community backing.  
 Residents of Banaka were the least likely to think that the community could control 
mestizo encroachment. Banaka residents are also the most likely to have adopted mestizo 
property-rights institutions to define their landholdings. Twenty-one of the 23 
respondents approved of having private forest holdings and many of those said that they 
currently maintain private forests. Similarly, Banaka residents were the most likely to 
approve of the use of fences and the most likely of the three sites to prefer individual land 
titles. Furthermore, approximately 40% of the Banaka respondents stated that they would 
sell land if there were dire need, and many pointed out a neighbor that had in fact, 
recently sold land.  
 Banaka traditional land-use institutions appear to be in decline. Although they have 
some level of organization, their land vigilance committee is not particularly effective, 
and many residents are choosing to support private property instead of supporting 
common-property rights over their lands. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
The Miskito of Río Plátano are struggling to maintain their customary property rights that 
support not only their subsistence needs, but also their identity as an ethnic community. 
Mestizo encroachment in Río Plátano has not produced an institutional vacuum. The 
activities of the Miskito leaders at the collective-choice level demonstrate that some 
Miskito are trying to make adaptations to sustain the Miskito land-use system and resist 
mestizo encroachment. However, they have been unable to control mestizo migration, 
and the longer a community and its respective vigilance committees struggle with the 
settlers, the weaker their traditional systems become. Residents slowly begin to adopt 
private-property institutions to protect their subsistence needs while sacrificing some of 
the communal benefits that the common-property system provides. 
 Many of the Miskito leaders complain that government ownership of reserve lands 
and the absence of clearly demarcated and established indigenous land rights thwart their 
ability to sustain their customary land practices. They call for the creation of an 
indigenous territory as a means of stopping outside encroachment, protecting the Miskito 
culture, and promoting environmental conservation. 
 The results presented in chapter 3 suggest that the territorial property rights 
established in Bosawas bolster indigenous customary land-use practices and prevent 
mestizo encroachment. The findings from Bosawas suggest that the decline of indigenous 
common-property institutions is not necessarily an inevitable or a desirable response to 
mestizo migration and that the broader policy environment may play a pivotal role in 
supporting or thwarting indigenous customary land-use practices. In the following 
chapter, I revisit the property-rights processes enacted in each reserve and examine how 
the respective property-rights processes influenced the ability of the indigenous residents 
to respond to mestizo migration and maintain robust common-property systems when 
confronted with colonization. 
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Endnotes for Chapter 4 
 
i Interview with Biosphere Project official Tegucigalpa, March, 29, 2005; Biosphere Project meeting, 
Ahuas, April 1, 2005; informal conversations with Biosphere Project officials and GTZ officers 2005-2006. 
ii Some mestizos are also connected to the timber market. However, these mestizo colonists, who are the 
focus of this study, are primarily engaged in agriculture and ranching activities. 
iii These rules echo those made by the Biosphere Project. However, attempts to apply the rules are 
completely separate from any Biosphere Project activities. In interviews, several residents were unfamiliar 
with the Biosphere Project and its respective rules. They did, however, know of MASTA’s rules 
prohibiting mestizo settlements and land sales. 
iv Note, that at this time RAYAKA was operating under a different name (Comité de Vigilancia de Tierras, 
or CVT). However, to avoid confusion, with the community land vigilance committees, I am consistently 
referring to the regional federation of MASTA for Banaka as RAYAKA. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING THE POLICY CONTEXT OF ROBUST COMMON-PROPERTY SYSTEMS:  
A COMPARISON OF THE IMPACT OF POLICY PROCESSES ON RULE MAKING AND 
COMPLIANCE IN BOSAWAS AND RÍO PLÁTANO  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the conservation arena, some conservationists, scholars, and indigenous activists have 
joined forces to push for policies that support environmental conservation and indigenous 
rights. Many point to the ecological and social benefits of common-property institutions 
to advocate for indigenous land rights and the devolution of resource management to 
indigenous populations (Grosvenor et al., 1992; Schwartzman and Zimmerman, 2005; 
Stevens, 1997; Stocks, 2003; Stocks et al., in press; Worah, 2002). The findings from 
Bosawas support their arguments. The indigenously managed territories of MITK and 
MSB have been more successful in defending their borders from mestizo encroachment 
and promoting land-use management plans than the publicly managed cultural zone of 
Río Plátano. The indigenous residents living in MITK and MSB are more likely to 
believe that they can control mestizo encroachment and conserve forest lands for future 
generations than their indigenous neighbors living in Río Plátano to the north or the 
Bosawas buffer zone to the south. The findings from Bosawas suggest that indigenous 
reserves may, in certain cases, be more effective at maintaining forest cover and 
sustaining indigenous land-use practices than government-managed forest reserves.  
The purported benefits of indigenous resource management, however, should not 
mask the difficulties in creating and sustaining common-property governance 
arrangements. Resource management is almost always a struggle, for governments or 
indigenous peoples. Over the years, government and non-government policy makers and 
program officers have devised collaborative and community-based management 
arrangements with the goal of promoting environmental conservation through support for 
indigenous resource management. In recent years, these cases have come under heavy 
scrutiny, and the numerous examples of partnership failures have been critiqued by both 
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indigenous-rights advocates and protected-area traditionalists (Barrett et al., 2000; 
Brandon and Wells, 1992; Chapin, 2004; Larson et al., 1998).  
Barrett and colleagues (2000) contend that one of the greatest challenges for tropical 
conservation is weak institutions at all societal levels (i.e., government institutions and 
local institutions). Although there is no doubt that indigenous and local people can make 
appropriate resource management rules (Gibson et al., 2005; Hayes, 2006), Barrett and 
colleagues caution that we should not naively assume that resource users always have the 
organizational and institutional capabilities to devise effective management 
arrangements. This is particularly true when the resource to be managed extends beyond 
the scope that traditional users have customarily managed, or when there are changes in 
the resource system or the community of appropriators. In some cases, communities may 
have the knowledge, breadth of organizational experience, and collective capacity to 
manage the resource systems, even when threatened by exogenous shocks. In other cases, 
they may not.  
In any case, communal property rights do not guarantee successful rule making and 
management. In his review of mapping projects in support of indigenous property rights, 
Stocks (2003) argues that, although the demarcation of indigenous lands is an important 
component in establishing ownership over their land and resources, mapping is not 
enough. He states that, particularly in cases where indigenous customary practices are 
challenged by mestizo encroachment, the process must include technical, political and 
institutional support for indigenous governance organizations and their resource rights. 
Barrett and colleagues emphasize the need for more scholarship to identify when central 
governments or communities have the comparative advantage in promoting conservation 
and when some form of nested management would best meet conservation demands. 
Similarly, Worah (2002) notes that we lack scientific and methodological studies that 
document the factors that support successful community-based conservation.  
One way to further our understanding of the factors that make community 
conservation successful is through careful analysis of how specific protected-area policies 
impact the resource users’ abilities to make, monitor, and enforce rules. This chapter 
examines how external actors and the respective policy processes in Bosawas and Río 
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Plátano influenced the indigenous residents’ abilities to sustain their customary land-use 
institutions in the face of mestizo encroachment. 
The central thesis of this study is that mestizo encroachment disturbs traditional 
indigenous land-use institutions, and that property-rights processes and policies can serve 
a pivotal role in bolstering traditional land-use systems and thereby contribute to 
indigenous residents’ abilities to prevent mestizo expansion and promote forest 
conservation. Thus far, I have shown that (1) mestizo encroachment does weaken 
traditional common-property arrangements, and that (2) tenure policies do make a 
difference in mestizo encroachment. The tenure policies, however, were the results of 
external actors that initiated protected-area resource management processes and thereby 
greatly influenced the resultant policy environment. In this chapter, I analyze how the 
external actors and the respective policy processes either supported or thwarted 
indigenous common-property institutions and thereby influenced the indigenous 
residents’ abilities to control encroachment. 
 
2 CHALLENGES TO COMMON-PROPERTY RULE MAKING: SUPPLY, CREDIBLE 
COMMITMENT, AND MUTUAL MONITORING 
 
Scholarship on resource management, both in the laboratory and in the field, highlights 
some of the key components that have been found in successful common-property 
arrangements (Barrett et al., 2000; Cardenas et al., 2000; Gibson et al., 2000; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). In Governing the Commons, Ostrom identifies eight design 
principles that she found consistently characterized long-enduring common-pool resource 
arrangements (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). In brief, the design principles include: (1) clearly 
defined boundaries; (2) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions; (3) user participation in collective-choice decisions; (4) monitoring; (5) 
graduated sanctions; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7) recognition of rights to 
organize; and, in the case of larger resource systems, (8) nested enterprises. Other 
scholars have found similar attributes in successful common-pool resource systems, and 
emphasize the importance of boundaries, participation in collective-choice rules, 
monitoring, and enforcement (Agrawal, 2001; Gibson et al., 2000; McKean, 1992).  
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The design principles serve as a guide to the institutional attributes we seek in 
resource management. Nevertheless, the question remains How do we (or the specific 
appropriators) get there? What factors promote rule making, mutual monitoring, and 
compliance on the part of common-pool resource users? Can public policies create an 
environment that bolsters self-governance and sustainable resource management?  
Rule making is not easy. In her work on institutional change, Ostrom (1990, pp. 42–
44) emphasizes the problems of supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring. 
The dilemma is a delicate catch-22 in that rule making entails significant costs to the 
participants who must organize, negotiate, create, and ultimately apply a rule. 
Unfortunately, these costs are often incurred in an environment of great uncertainty over 
whether the rules produced will be recognized or whether individuals will shirk on their 
commitments to the agreed arrangement. Individuals do not necessarily want to make 
rules and commit to monitoring those rules unless they are certain that they will be 
respected. Unfortunately, a rule will not be respected until it is made.  
Knight (1992) suggests that actors will continue to respect existing institutions unless 
external events alter bargaining powers or the distribution of benefits under the current 
institutional system. He notes however, that new institutions will not emerge unless the 
actors are able to resolve the formidable problems of collective action and that central to 
this process of institution building is finding a way to ensure that the institution is 
recognized as the expected behavior for the community as a whole (Knight, 1992, pp. 
126–127).  
 
2.1 Costs of Collective Decision Making  
 
Key to understanding how the broader policy environment influences rule making and 
compliance is through careful analysis of its impact on the transaction costs involved in 
institutional change and the incentives it provides to comply with agreed-upon 
commitments. In their analysis of the evolution of traditional property-rights systems in 
Africa, Ensminger and colleagues point to transaction costs, specifically the difficulties in 
gathering information about the users and developing mechanisms to monitor vast 
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expanses of land, as a determining factor of the types of property-rights regimes that 
evolved over time (Ensminger, 1997; Ensminger and Knight, 1997).  
For example, Ensminger (1997) finds that for the traditional migratory Galole Orma 
herders in Kenya, it was particularly costly to craft institutions to monitor property rights 
to grazing lands. It was much easier to assign rights to watering holes and rely on access 
to the holes to manage the grazing lands. She reports, however, that as the Orma became 
more sedentary and associated with market centers, the value of the land near the markets 
increased and the costs involved in monitoring these lands decreased. In response to 
market and demographic pressures, the Orma have adopted more exclusive private-
property arrangements. Ensminger notes that the newer private-property institutions have 
increased inequality in the Orma communities and eroded community characteristics that 
in the past, promoted communal cooperation.  
 
2.2 The Influence of the Policy Environment on Collective Decision Making  
 
The literature suggests that the broader policy environment can influence the costs and 
benefits that individuals perceive with respect to rule making and compliance and that 
this influence can be beneficial or detrimental to local governance arrangements 
(Cardenas et al., 2000; Ensminger, 1997; Ostrom et al., 1993). In the case of the Galole 
Orma, Ensminger argues that the current property-rights policies in Kenya weaken the 
abilities of the Orma to collectively organize and maintain some of the core social 
functions of their traditional property-rights institutions. She contends that property-rights 
policies should be reconfigured so they reduce the costs of collective action, support the 
attributes that contribute to community collaboration, and, in the case of land 
management, promote the maintenance of indigenous production and distributional 
norms (Ensminger, 1997, p. 192).  
In her analysis of common-pool resource arrangements, Ostrom (1990, pp. 190–191) 
found that external political regimes served to either support or thwart collective decision 
making. She notes that greater attention needs to be paid to information and transaction 
costs and how the broader political environment influences levels of collective decision 
making on the part of resource appropriators.  
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 2.3 The Influence of the Policy Environment on the Decision to Comply 
 
The theories and findings on compliance also suggest that external intervention and the 
broader policy environment may also play a vital role in promoting compliance. The 
traditional theory of compliance uses the deterrence model that assumes that if the 
sanctions outweigh the benefits derived from illegal activities, individuals will comply. In 
contrast to conventional assumptions of compliance, however, recent literature suggests 
that external actors and formal policies do not necessarily induce compliance through the 
traditional means of third-party monitoring and sanctions. Rather, they promote 
compliance through the establishment of legitimate rule-making processes and sets of 
rules that resource users feel that they ought to comply with (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; 
Tyler, 1990). In a similar vein of thought, research on governance and natural resource 
management also suggests that, in some cases, community participation in rule making 
and monitoring may be more effective at obtaining credible commitments to conservation 
goals than the deterrence model (Berkes et al., 2003; Cardenas et al., 2000; Lebel et al., 
2006).  
The conventional protected-area paradigm follows the tenets of the deterrence model 
and presumes that only with heavy monitoring and costly sanctions will resource users 
comply with conservation regulations (Brockington, 2001; Bruner et al., 2001; Terborgh, 
1999, 2000). If sanctions are stringent enough and the likelihood of getting caught is 
high, it seems reasonable to believe that most resource users will obey conservation rules. 
If for example, AFE-COHDEFOR were to demarcate and monitor Río Plátano reserve 
boundaries, it seems likely that encroachment would diminish. The catch in the 
deterrence model is, however, that some party must incur the costs of monitoring and 
sanctions. In Río Plátano, as in many protected areas, these costs may be politically and 
economically exorbitant, particularly when the rules are contested. This is particularly 
true in frontier forests where residents are resistant to government intervention and the 
institutional infrastructure to monitor rules and apply sanctions is lacking.  
When residents do not believe that regulations are legitimate, they will often find 
ways to sabotage them. Conflict between park residents and park personnel is well 
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documented and a consistent theme (Igoe, 2004; IUCN, 2003; MacFarland et al., 1984; 
Brandon and Wells, 1992; Western, 1997). The conservation community estimates that 
an additional U.S. $27 to $30 billion dollars is needed annually to adequately manage 
protected areas (Molnar et al., 2004). This is particularly troubling for developing 
countries that often lack these funds. For example, the average budget per protected 
forest area in Europe is eight times that in Latin America (WWF 2004). In many cases, 
minimal funds and lack of political support translate into a deterrence model that consists 
of rules-in-form that are never, or only sporadically, applied. 
Unfortunately, sporadic third-party monitoring may be more detrimental than no 
monitoring at all. An experiment conducted by Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) 
shows that sporadic third-party management and enforcement may deter compliance. In 
the experiment, Cardenas and colleagues test the decisions made by Colombian farmers 
in two resource management scenarios that require collective action to sustain the 
resource. In the first scenario, there are no government regulations on resource use or 
third-party enforcement mechanisms, and the farmers are allowed to communicate (i.e., 
engage in collective-choice decisions). In the second scenario, farmers are placed under 
government regulations with sporadic third-party monitoring of those regulations and are 
not permitted to communicate. Cardenas et al. found that the third-party regulations 
“crowded out” individuals’ interests in how their actions impacted others and caused 
individuals to act with more self-interest. In contrast, communication promoted decisions 
that were more beneficial to the entire group. 
Some scholarship in compliance studies (He, 2005; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; 
Tyler, 1990, 1994) complements the findings by Cardenas and colleagues and offers an 
alternative to costly sanctioning mechanisms. The studies demonstrate that perceived 
legitimacy of the decision-making process and regulations, and ideas of moral obligation, 
may determine the decision to comply, irrespective of the sanctions. He (2005) found that 
Chinese rural-to-urban migrants choose not to comply with licensing regulations in part 
because they do not respect the officials and perceive the laws to be styled on a Western 
model that is not applicable to their circumstances. They do not recognize the regulations 
as legitimate.  
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Similarly, Tyler (1990, 1994) links legitimacy to the decision-making process and 
emphasizes that from the citizen’s perspective, a legitimate process matters more than the 
decision outcome. Tyler’s work found that individuals often decide to comply because 
they believe that the rule was derived from a just process, not because they are worried 
about costly sanctions. Likewise, findings from studies of forest management show that 
when resource users engage in collective-choice decisions, they are more likely to 
comply with resource regulations (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe, 2000; Batistella, 
2001; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005). This further reinforces the importance of resource-user 
participation in the collective-choice decisions. 
  
3 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COLLECTIVE RULE MAKING, MONITORING, AND 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE MOSQUITIA 
  
 
In frontier forests such as the Mosquitia, the development of common-property rules is a 
risky activity given the contentious attitudes toward land use in the region and the dearth 
of enforcement mechanisms. As in the case of the Galole Orma, some indigenous 
residents in the Mosquitia are turning to private-property arrangements in response to the 
disturbances created by mestizo encroachment. In doing so they risk losing some of the 
benefits derived from their common-property traditions such as greater equity in access to 
land and forest resources and community cohesion. Nevertheless, private-property 
arrangements have their benefits.  
 
3.1 Costs and Benefits of Common Property vs. Private Property in the Mosquitia 
 
Table 5.1 shows some of the benefits and costs that a Mosquitia resident might consider 
in deciding whether to support common-property traditions or adopt mestizo private-
property practices. The benefits and costs are based on residents’ testimonies in Río 
Plátano and Bosawas and presume minimal third-party monitoring and enforcement.i  
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Table 5.1. Benefits and Costs of Common Property versus Private Property 
 
COMMON PROPERTY PRIVATE PROPERTY 
Benefits 
Maintain ethnic unity Rights do not depend on collective cooperation 
Political power and communal wealth Generation of individual wealth 
Maintain forest access rights Avoid conflict with neighbors 
Maintain migratory land-use customs    
Costs 
Time to Organize and Meet Potential loss of language and ethnic identity 
Money to go to meetings Communal lands and migratory agriculture 
Establish boundaries Loss of rights to some forest resources 
Monitoring  Monitoring 
Enforcement  Enforcement 
 
In the context of the Mosquitia, rule making and enforcement are formidable 
challenges for indigenous residents who are not accustomed to making collective-choice 
land-use decisions at a communal or regional level. In order to change their customary 
common-property norms to more cogent common-property rights, the indigenous 
residents must self-organize and engage in collective-choice decisions to produce more 
stringent land-use rules. This can be costly, as participants must first identify and inform 
the other relevant parties, attend meetings, work through conflict-ridden debates, and 
continually monitor the agreed-upon rules. Partaking in collective-choice decision 
making is not only time consuming and costly, it can be risky. In frontier conditions 
where enforcement mechanisms are minimal, the odds are against a credible commitment 
to the land-use rules. Thus, even if the indigenous peoples are able overcome the 
challenges to create rules and monitor those rules, there is still a high probability that the 
rules will not be respected. 
On the other hand, private-property institutions require less collective organization 
and are more likely to be recognized by mestizo settlers. Private-property claims over 
agricultural and forest lands provide the individual with greater livelihood security from 
both crops and forest products. The cost to the individual in physically defining and 
monitoring agricultural and forest claims is minimal when compared to the costs involved 
in organizing, defining, and monitoring communal land claims. Miskito residents have 
traditionally respected individual rights to crop lands, and the physical demarcation of 
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crop and forest lands creates a boundary rule that mestizos recognize and generally 
respect. Although the privatization of forest lands goes against traditional indigenous 
customs, the repercussions of community gossip or disapproval are relatively minimal 
when contrasted with the benefits of having greater security over access and withdrawal 
rights to specified forest lands. Furthermore, private-property arrangements create greater 
possibilities for generating individual wealth through land and timber markets.  
 
3.2 Closer Examination of the Costs of Collective Action in the Mosquitia 
 
The literature suggests that the Bosawas property-rights process may have been pivotal to 
the indigenous residents’ success in stopping mestizo encroachment and crafting a land-
use management plan for their territories. According to the literature, if the property-
rights process lowers the costs involved in collective rule making, it is more likely that 
common-property rules will be created and monitored. Furthermore, if the process 
produces a set of rules that the users perceive as legitimate, it is more likely that resource 
users will comply with management regulations, even under relatively weak enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The costs of collective action and, specifically, transaction costs, are often cited as 
crucial determinants in decision-making outcomes (North, 1990; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1994); however, it remains difficult to measure and assess 
transaction costs in the field. In this chapter, I draw on work by Ostrom, Schroeder, and 
Wynne (1993) to assess and compare the transaction costs involved in creating common-
property rules in Bosawas and Río Plátano. In their review of international development 
projects, Ostrom and colleagues divide transaction costs into three categories: 
coordination, information, and strategic costs. Coordination costs include the time, 
capital, and personnel needed for negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements 
among actors. Information costs include the cost of obtaining information and the 
possible errors in that information. Strategic costs are those produced by information 
asymmetries with respect to the activities of other actors that may enable some members 
to shirk responsibilities or receive unauthorized benefits from the agreements.  
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In the analysis of land-use decisions in Bosawas and Río Plátano, I focus specifically 
on coordination and strategic costs (although some information costs must be considered 
in the coordination of land-use agreements). In discussing coordination costs I examine 
both start-up transaction costs and maintenance transaction costs. It takes a certain 
amount of time and resources to craft an institutional system; however, the costs do not 
stop once an institutional system is created. Part of the difficulty in creating institutions 
involves sustaining investments in the system so it continues to operate over time.  
In my discussion of strategic costs, I aim to examine how the specific property-rights 
process worked to ensure that all residents will comply with the land-use rules. In the 
context of the frontier, strategic costs can be particularly high because the regions are so 
remote and expansive, external monitoring and enforcement is sporadic at best, and 
informal enforcement mechanisms are often challenged by outside groups that do not 
necessarily recognize community land-use institutions and sanctions.  
Table 5.2 categorizes the coordination, information, and strategic costs of crafting, 
monitoring and enforcing common-property rules in the Mosquitia. These costs include 
money, personnel, time and work losses, resources, and technology. Table 5.2 presents 
the transaction costs in a hypothetical situation without external intervention.  
 In addition to the transaction costs, I also consider how the policy environment 
impacts the costs of collective rule making in the Mosquitia by examining how specific 
policies and external actors promote or deter from compliance. Specific policies or 
processes that create conditions where an individual feels he or she might be sanctioned 
for non-compliance, or conditions where an individual feels obligated because of a moral 
duty to do “what’s right,” may reduce monitoring and enforcement costs and leave the 
system less vulnerable to strategic costs. 
In my analysis, I consider how the different protected-area processes and policies 
influenced the costs and benefits associated with collective-choice decision making to 
sustain the indigenous common-property management regimes in the face of mestizo 
encroachment. Specifically, I examine how the policy processes enacted in each reserve 
impacted (1) the supply of rules to prevent mestizo encroachment and promote 
indigenous common-property rights and (2) compliance with those rules. Given the 
relative success in Bosawas in contrast to Río Plátano, I expect to find that in Bosawas, 
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the indigenous property-rights regimes are supported by a process that reduced the costs 
of collective decision making and contributed to the overall perceived legitimacy of the 
indigenous property rights. In contrast, I expect that in Río Plátano, the policy process did 
not reduce the costs of rule making and monitoring, and that the present rules are not 
perceived as legitimate. 
 
Table 5.2. Transaction Costs in Common-Property Rule Making in the Mosquitia 
 
 
Coordination 
Negotiation  
• Arrange and attend meetings with mestizos, indigenous residents, and government 
personnel. 
• Negotiate agreement with mestizos, indigenous residents, and government personnel with 
respect to territorial rights and land-use rules. Note that this may involve a substantial 
amount of conflict and risk due to volatile attitudes with respect to land rights. 
• Create and maintain conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve disputes of application of 
agreements. 
• Attend government meetings to lobby for rights. 
Monitoring 
• Organize forest guards and actively monitor boundaries and land-use rules. 
Enforcement 
• Physically demarcate boundaries. 
• Organize meetings to decide sanctions 
• Apply sanctions. 
Information 
• Gather information to define location of territorial/community boundaries and census of 
people living within them. 
• Gather information on current land-use practices and monitor land-use changes. 
Strategic Costs 
 Shirking 
• Lack of information on actors’ activities may result in indigenous land sales, sale of 
forest products, mestizo invasions. 
Corruption 
• Lack of information on leaders’ activities may result in personal gains for leaders from 
misuse of external assistance, land/resource sales. 
 
 
  
4 STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section is a comparison across the two 
reserves of indigenous and mestizo residents’ attitudes toward the creation and 
maintenance of indigenous common-property rights and land-use rules. It is difficult to 
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measure and assess individual perceptions of transaction costs in the field. In order to 
portray decision making in Bosawas and Río Plátano, I use a series of vignettes based on 
conversations with reserve residents that highlight how the residents themselves perceive 
rule making and the decision to comply, given the broader policy environment they live in.  
I present four vignettes of indigenous and mestizo residents from each reserve. The 
indigenous vignettes demonstrate commonly expressed attitudes toward the indigenous 
common-property institutions and governance organizations. The mestizo vignettes 
highlight mestizo attitudes toward the indigenous homelands and property rights as well 
as their opinions with respect to the land-use regulations they live under. The vignettes 
are not the specific testimony of any particular resident, but rather a collective summary 
of the most common interview responses and residents’ comments with respect to 
property rights, encroachment, and organizational capacity in the cultural zone of Río 
Plátano and the indigenous territories in Bosawas. The vignettes are intended to 
demonstrate the common themes and differences in opinions among reserve residents. It 
is important to note, however, that the vignettes are a composite of responses and 
therefore do not represent the particular view of any one resident, nor do they represent 
the views of all residents. 
The second section of the analysis is more of a discussion based on findings from the 
vignettes and interviews with government and non-government personnel involved in the 
reserves. I tease out specific factors in the policy process and link them to decisions made 
by reserve residents with respect to rule making, monitoring, and enforcement, 
specifically focusing on how the respective policy processes impacted the costs of 
negotiation and strategic costs. I also discuss how the overall processes promoted or 
deterred the creation of credible commitments between residents and the propensity to 
comply with those commitments. In a region where sanctions are rarely applied, I 
contend that land-use rules will not be respected unless they are considered legitimate.  
I use two sources of data in the analysis: (1) data on residents’ perspectives on rule-
making and land-use decisions to create resident vignettes and (2) data on the 
implementation and application of the distinct property-rights and land-management 
policies. The vignettes are based on oral semi-structured interviews of indigenous 
residents living in the cultural zone of Río Plátano and in MITK and MSB in Bosawas. 
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The interviews were based on the IFRI protocols. The questions were adapted to focus on 
land-use practices (not specifically forest use). The purpose of the interviews was to 
gather information on rule making, monitoring, and land-use practices the residents 
engaged in. I asked residents whether they thought the community could prevent 
encroachment, whether they participated in the organizational activities of their 
respective communities and their overall attitudes toward the governance of their regions. 
I was particularly interested in why the resident chose to participate in a specific activity. 
For example, if a resident said he/she had once worked with the vigilance committee, I 
would probe why he/she began to work with the committee and why he/she stopped.  
The Río Plátano indigenous vignette is based on interviews conducted in Banaka and 
Wampusirpe. These sites were chosen because they are both struggling with 
encroachment. In total, I interviewed approximately 44 Miskito households in Banaka 
and 54 Miskito households in Wampusirpe and held group interviews with members of 
the land vigilance committees in each community. The mestizo vignette is based on 
interviews I conducted with 23 mestizo households living in and around Banaka and 
Wampusirpe. 
The Bosawas indigenous vignette is based on interviews I conducted with 11 Miskito 
households in Pueblo Nuevo, MITK, and 11 Mayangna households in Wina, MSB. I also 
held group interviews with elders and community leaders in each community. The 
mestizo vignette is based on interviews with 13 mestizo households living in the buffer 
zone of Bosawas and a group interview with members (approximately seven) of 
APDECOMEBO.  
Data on the implementation and outcomes of the different policy processes are based 
on interviews with reserve residents, indigenous leaders, and the directors and employees 
of the key government and non-government organizations working in the reserves. In 
addition to interviews with the residents and territorial leaders, I conducted interviews 
and collected unpublished materials from the following organizations: the Río Plátano 
Biosphere Project, MOPAWI, the Managua and Tegucigalpa offices of TNC, Centro 
Humboldt, Saint Louis Zoo, Alistar, Center for Environmental Rights and the Promotion 
of Development, Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute, AFE-COHDEFOR, MARENA, and the 
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World Bank. I also spoke with lead consultants Peter Herlihy and Anthony Stocks about 
the policy processes enacted in each reserve in the mid-1990s 
  
5 MOSQUITIA RESIDENTS WEIGH THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE WITH 
INDIGENOUS COMMON-PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
The vignettes illustrate that MITK and MSB residents feel secure in their common-
property rights and their ability to control mestizo encroachment and prohibit native land 
sales. In Bosawas, residents support common-property institutions and believe that the 
monitoring mechanisms work to ensure that indigenous and mestizo residents comply 
with territorial land-use rules. In contrast, in Río Plátano, residents base many of their 
decisions on tenure insecurity and the failed ability of the government or the communities 
to defend their lands from mestizos. As a result, decision making in Río Plátano is more 
oriented toward private-property institutions.  
 
5.1 Weighing the Decision to Comply in Bosawas 
 
(1) Vignette 1. Bosawas Indigenous Resident 
 
Pablo says that when he first returned to his community after the Nicaraguan civil 
war, he couldn’t believe the number of mestizos who had moved to the area. 
Shortly thereafter, some of the leaders from the Miskito and Mayangna 
communities began to organize and created ADEPCIMISUJIN to demand 
territorial rights over their lands and prohibit mestizo encroachment.  
 
Pablo says that in the early 1990s, ADEPCIMISUJIN gained support from two 
NGOs, Centro Humboldt and TNC, to establish territorial rights over their lands. 
TNC worked with residents to map out and physically demarcate their territories. 
Pablo says that there was quite a bit of conflict between the Miskito and 
Mayangna and the mestizos when they first began to demarcate their lands. 
However, after a series of meetings facilitated by Centro Humboldt and TNC, the 
indigenous peoples and the mestizos signed a property-rights agreement in 1997. 
Pablo says that since 1997, mestizo encroachment has pretty much stopped. The 
mestizos don’t cross the indigenous territorial boundary lines. 
 
Pablo says that part of the agreement with TNC was that the Conservancy would 
help them defend their rights to the land and, in exchange, the Miskito and 
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Mayangna would conserve their forests. TNC worked with the communities to 
create a territorial land-use plan. He agrees with the land-use rules that they 
created, although he wouldn’t mind being able to sell a few trees every once in a 
while so he could earn a bit of money. Nevertheless, the rules say that the 
residents cannot sell timber, and Pablo worries that if he tried to make a sale, he 
might get caught. 
 
Pablo emphasizes that he would never sell land to anyone, not even a fellow 
indigenous resident. He says that all native residents should have land and if a 
native person doesn’t have land, he or she must have sold it. Pablo did hear of one 
person who tried to sell land to a mestizo a couple of years ago. However, 
ADEPCIMISUJIN never let the mestizo occupy the land. He says that others 
outside the territory have sold their land and now they have none. Pablo says that 
the land is for his kids and that the community has plenty of land. 
 
Pablo doesn’t participate in many of the community meetings, but he was a forest 
guard for a couple of years. Pablo says that working as a forest guard is hard 
work, but it’s also a source of income for his family. He believes that the 
boundaries and guards work to protect indigenous lands, but he would like to see 
some of the earlier mestizo settlers removed from the territories.  
 
Pablo notes that before the territorial demarcation and the creation of their 
territorial land-use management plan, the Miskito of Jinotega never really 
considered themselves part of a territory. He said that before they organized, the 
communities all worked independently. Now they’ve established their own 
governing body and have rights to their land. He’s proud of what 
ADEPCIMISUJIN has accomplished.  
 
(2) Vignette 2. Bosawas Mestizo Resident 
 
Jorge is a mestizo who lives in the buffer zone of Bosawas alongside the border of 
MITK and MSB. Jorge came to the area after the war. Jorge said that when he 
came there was barely anyone in the region; there were just a few indigenous 
settlements alongside the River Coco, but the forests were completely open. Jorge 
claims that the indigenous people don’t like to farm in the hillsides, but that the 
mestizos are accustomed to hillside farming.  
 
Jorge has about 50 ha of land, and at least half of it is in forest and the rest in 
crops or pasture. Jorge doesn’t have many cattle, only four. He is trying to raise 
pigs, so he keeps much of his land planted in corn for the pigs. Jorge says that 
pigs are cheaper than cattle and you can make a quicker profit from them. Jorge 
does not have a title to his land, but would like one. He said that there is no land 
left and that the only way anyone can occupy land is if someone sells it. However, 
he also notes that if a family member were to come to him in need, he’d have to 
find a spot for the family member to farm. 
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Jorge states that the indigenous people have lots of land and forest that they 
haven’t touched. However, that land is off limits to the mestizos. Jorge 
participated in the negotiations and demarcation process in 1997, and he explains 
that, at first, the mestizos protested the indigenous territory because the Miskito 
and Mayangna tried to claim land that was heavily occupied by mestizos. Jorge 
doesn’t have a problem with the current boundaries because the majority of the 
mestizos live outside the territories and those who were included in the territorial 
boundaries were allowed to stay. Jorge repeats the story of the mestizo who tried 
to buy land from an indigenous resident and how ADEPCIMISUJIN never let the 
mestizo occupy the land and the mestizo lost all his money.  
 
Jorge has heard rumors that some of the indigenous communities left outside the 
territories are trying to create a new territory that would include many mestizo 
settlements. Jorge says the mestizos will fight back if that happens. He says that 
the indigenous people are not like the mestizos. When the indigenous people 
decide to make boundaries around their lands they don’t consult with their 
neighbors and often take mestizo lands. Jorge emphasizes that before a mestizo 
demarcates his land, he always checks with his neighbors first to make sure 
everyone agrees about the boundary lines. 
 
Although not all of his neighbors participate in the mestizo association 
ADEPCOMEBO, Jorge says the he supports the organization and its demands for 
land titles and greater support from government and NGOs for farming and 
conservation. He notes that the mestizos are always portrayed as the destroyers of 
the forest, but that this is not fair. He says that the mestizo people need 
technological help to learn how to farm better and use less land; all of the 
development money always goes to the indigenous peoples. Jorge says that it’s 
fine that the indigenous peoples have their titles, but he also wants to know that he 
has security over his lands and help to develop them. 
 
5.2 Weighing the Decision to Comply in Río Plátano 
 
(3) Vignette 3. Río Plátano Indigenous Resident 
 
Juan is a middle-aged Miskito farmer who lives in the western region of the 
cultural zone of Río Plátano reserve. In the early 1990s, Juan began noticing 
mestizo settlements in the region. He first came across a mestizo settlement when 
he was out in the forest looking for a tree to make a new boat. He found part of 
the forest fenced off and cleared with dogs barking at the house. Today, Juan says 
that his community is surrounded by mestizo settlements and more mestizo 
families arrive each year. On walks around the community, Juan points out forests 
and land that he can no longer access because mestizos have claimed the area. He 
objects to the amount of land that mestizos clear and emphasizes that the Miskito 
are naturally conservationists because they only farm small plots of land and do 
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not destroy large areas of forest. Juan says he worries where his children will farm 
in the future. 
 
Juan says that in the early 1990s he participated in the land vigilance committee 
and helped monitor his community’s lands for mestizo encroachment. Although 
they prevented mestizos from settling within the community, the committee was 
unable to prevent mestizos from colonizing the surrounding hills. Juan says that 
he eventually dropped out of the committee because it took a lot of time away 
from his fields and he didn’t feel like they had any support from the government. 
Juan complains that the work was dangerous and that they had nothing other than 
their words to convince the mestizos not to settle in the region. Juan notes that not 
even the community residents know where the community boundaries lie and that 
without official documents or support, it was difficult to make the mestizos leave. 
Today, the committee still patrols every once in awhile and they tell community 
members not to sell their lands, but Juan doesn’t think the community can stop 
mestizo encroachment. 
 
Juan says that encroachment has worsened since 1997, when AFE-COHDEFOR 
took over management activities. He had hoped that with government support, the 
situation would improve, but land sales and mestizo settlements have only 
increased. Juan says that some Miskito have begun to sell their lands to mestizos, 
and while he doesn’t approve, he understands that sometimes it’s the only option. 
His own father sold land a couple of months ago. His mother was sick and they 
needed money to take her to the clinic. Juan’s father only sold 1 ha of land, but 
the mestizo occupied twenty. Juan reported the mestizo invasions on his father’s 
land to the land vigilance committee, but they did nothing. 
 
Juan has heard that MASTA is trying to establish a territory for the native 
residents. He thinks that all lands of the Mosquitia should belong to the native 
peoples, but he doesn’t completely trust MASTA. Although MASTA leaders talk 
a lot about defending their homelands, in his experience with his local land 
vigilance committee, he wished they had more support from MASTA. Juan has 
also heard rumors that some of the federation leaders have been negotiating with 
mestizos and have made illicit land sales to powerful mestizo settlers. 
 
In order to protect his family’s land, Juan has begun to keep his agricultural plots 
in one place and has fenced in some of his land. He also has cut a clearing around 
a piece of forest land to show that the forest is his. Juan says that you can’t count 
on your neighbors not selling your land, or a mestizo not occupying the forests. 
He’s noticed that the mestizos cut a strip of land around their forests and fence 
their farms and he figures that’s a pretty good way to make sure he’ll have forest 
and farm land in the future.  
 
Tanya M. Hayes 152
(4) Vignette 4. Río Plátano Mestizo 
 
Jose is a mestizo who moved into Río Plátano reserve several months ago. He 
decided to move his family into Río Plátano because he had heard from relatives 
that there was plenty of land in the region whereas in his hometown, wealthy 
ranchers and farmers have occupied all the land. Jose says that the poor can’t live 
among the rich. 
 
Jose bought 20 ha of land from a Miskito man, and he points to the surrounding 
forested hillsides as evidence that there is still plenty of land available. Jose has 
heard something about living in a forest reserve, but he doesn’t really know where 
the reserve starts. Some of his neighbors say that they’re worried that they will be 
kicked off the land, but most say it’s not a problem. The majority of his mestizo 
neighbors have lived in the area for about five years, and nothing has happened to 
them. Jose says the land is Honduran and any Honduran citizen should be able to 
use it.  
 
Jose doesn’t associate much with the Miskito. He says that they have a different 
way of living and that he thinks that mestizos and indigenous peoples should live 
apart. He’s heard that some of the Miskito people are demanding an indigenous 
territory. Jose says that they can have their land, so long as they don’t take land 
away from other Honduran citizens. 
 
5.3 Summary of Propensity to Support Common-Property Rights in Bosawas and 
Río Plátano 
 
The vignettes point to how individuals in Bosawas and Río Plátano make their land-use 
decisions and property-rights preferences by weighing their perceptions of whether 
individuals will comply with a particular land-use institution and the transaction costs 
involved in negotiating and monitoring against the social and individual benefits 
provided by a particular tenure arrangement or land-use practice. Indigenous residents in 
Bosawas are proud of their governing capabilities and express confidence in their ability 
to control mestizo encroachment. They are clear where their territorial boundaries are and 
do not worry that fellow neighbors will sell land to a mestizo or that a mestizo will 
invade. This is further supported by the mestizo residents’ emphasis on respect for the 
indigenous territorial boundaries. Thus, while the indigenous residents do have 
monitoring mechanisms in place, the mestizo inclination toward compliance reduces the 
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costs of enforcement and also the sense of insecurity that the common-property rights 
might not be respected.  
In contrast, indigenous residents in Río Plátano have expended resources in crafting 
and monitoring land-use rules, but they have been relatively unsuccessful in protecting 
their homelands. Miskito residents in Río Plátano fear that their neighbors will sell land 
to mestizos and/or that settlers will invade their traditional homelands. Many mestizos are 
either ignorant or derisive of the indigenous rights in the region. Mestizos continue to 
move to the region, and as a result, some indigenous residents are turning to mestizo 
property-rights practices that require less investment in coordination costs and provide 
greater tenure security. 
 
6 IMPACT OF THE PROCESSES AND PARTICIPANTS ON INSTITUTIONAL SUPPLY, 
MONITORING, AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS IN THE MOSQUITIA 
 
In Bosawas, the residents and leaders of MITK and MSB expressed great pride in their 
ability to defend their territory from mestizo settlers, their governing association and their 
recent acquisition of their territorial title. In each territory, the indigenous leaders 
emphasized that they self-organized before gaining outside assistance and, in large part, 
they credited themselves with the establishment of their territorial rights, the creation of 
monitoring mechanisms, and the defense and conservation of their forest lands. The 
indigenous peoples’ ownership of their rules, rights, and governance associations points 
to a key ingredient in the success of Bosawas: residents believe that the land-use rules, 
forest guards, and territorial association are their own creation and that they are legitimate 
governing mechanisms. While the initiative and success of the Miskito people is 
significant, we cannot overlook the influence that the policy processes and, more 
specifically, the work of external government and non-government organizations, on the 
establishment of the common-property rules and compliance. The analysis below 
compares how the Bosawas and Río Plátano policy processes impacted coordination, 
information, and strategic costs and the overall propensity to comply with indigenous 
property-rights rules. 
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6.1 Bosawas: Impacts of the Non-Government Community on the Costs of 
Collective Action and the Supply of Common-Property Rules  
 
In Bosawas, the community of NGOs played (and continues to play) a crucial role in 
reducing the costs of collective rule making and monitoring, thereby making the 
establishment and continued enforcement of indigenous common-property rules feasible. 
Specifically, processes enacted and supported by TNC and Centro Humboldt have 
bolstered the collective-choice and operational-level activities within the indigenous 
territories and fortified indigenous demands at the constitutional level.  
 
6.1.1 Coordination Costs: Negotiation, Monitoring, and Enforcement 
 
In Bosawas, TNC and Centro Humboldt covered the initial start-up costs required to 
negotiate the territorial boundaries and agree on property-rights and land-management 
rules. For example, TNC began the rule-making process by covering the costs of 
meetings and the activities required to map out and physically demarcate the territorial 
boundaries. This was no small endeavor. The initial property-rights process required a 
series of meetings with the indigenous and mestizo residents in order to agree on the 
boundaries and property rights. TNC consultants taught the residents how to use 
geographic positioning system units to map out the territorial boundary markers. In 
contrast to the process in Río Plátano, TNC provided Bosawas residents with cement 
markers and signs, and TNC organized teams to clear a strip of land along the contested 
borders. TNC also worked with the governing association ADEPCIMISUJIN and 
residents in each indigenous community to develop a land-management plan.  
In order to further reinforce and monitor the boundaries, TNC worked with 
ADEPCIMISUJIN and the communities to create a group of forest guards. Each 
community selected two guards to work on the monthly patrols. The guards were 
originally paid a monthly stipend by TNC. Although the military is reportedly on hand to 
deal with major infractions, the enforcement of the boundaries is through negotiations 
with the indigenous association ADEPCIMISUJIN and the mestizo association 
ADEPCOMEBO. Enforcement of the territorial land management plans is primarily via 
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warnings from the forest guards and, if necessary, community meetings to address the 
problem. 
One of the remarkable aspects of the Bosawas process, and one that differentiates it 
from the process in Río Plátano, is that support for coordination costs including 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement of the property-rights and land-management 
agreements did not stop after the plans were agreed upon on paper. Centro Humboldt 
played a pivotal role in the original negotiations by providing lawyers to facilitate the 
discussions, and it continues to maintain the institutional agreements it assisted by 
serving as a facilitator when conflicts emerge between the indigenous residents and the 
mestizos with respect to the application of the property-rights agreement. Furthermore, 
Centro Humboldt continues to cover monitoring and enforcement costs. The Bosawas 
forest guards are not voluntary. TNC originally paid the guards a small stipend; today, 
Centro Humboldt provides technical and financial support for the guards. Several forest 
guards commented that at times they have been without a source of funds. As one forest 
guard emphasized, when the guards are without pay, they do not work. Likewise, the 
Nicaraguan military does not come to enforce the boundaries unless the territorial 
associations pay for their transportation and daily expenditures are covered. It is not clear 
whether the military has actually been called in recent years; nevertheless, Centro 
Humboldt is there to cover those costs. 
Finally, Centro Humboldt has been instrumental in pushing for greater legal 
recognition of the indigenous territorial associations and the residents’ territorial rights. 
Centro Humboldt, in conjunction with funds from a Danish aid organization, covered the 
travel costs so that ADEPCIMISUJIN could attend government meetings to lobby for 
legal recognition of their common-property rights. Centro Humboldt also provided 
lawyers to help produce the necessary information required for a territorial title. In May 
2005, the organization paid for the leaders from MITK and MSB to attend the 
government ceremony where they received their territorial titles. 
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6.1.2 Strategic Costs: Susceptibility to Shirking and Corruption 
 
If residents refuse to recognize the property-rights rules or if leaders look for ways to 
obtain personal gains from their public service positions, the institutional system can 
quickly unravel, or never take hold. The Bosawas vignettes made no mention of shirking 
or corruption on the part of reserve residents or officials. In Bosawas, most residents did 
not express fear that their neighbors were secretly benefiting from illegal land sales, nor 
did they accuse public agencies of illicit activities in the region, although some mestizos 
did express disdain for MARENA.  
The confidence that residents have that their neighbors are also complying with the 
property-rights agreements speaks well for the process and suggests that the rules are 
embedded in the region and that the residents recognize the rules as legitimate and feel 
compelled to respect them. Further analysis of the propensity to comply will be discussed 
in the following section. 
With respect to the problems of corruption, public agencies have very little presence 
in the indigenous territories. Rather than invest in MARENA or other government 
agencies (such as the German development organizations did in Honduras), TNC decided 
to work directly with the indigenous association ADEPCIMISUJIN and the respective 
communities. By investing authority and resources in ADEPCIMISUJIN and directly in 
the communities, financial resources passed through fewer hands, and more residents 
were aware of the projects initiated in their regions. Similarly, I would argue that Centro 
Humboldt’s close relationship with the territorial associations (the associations are 
housed in Centro Humboldt’s office in Managua) has helped retain some oversight over 
how funds are spent. 
The territorial associations are not, however, completely absent of corruption. Some 
Mayangna residents in MSB did complain that the benefits received from the NGO 
community were primarily spent in the territorial seat and in the territorial president’s 
community. There were fewer reports of corruption in MITK. One concern with respect 
to corruption is that the territorial associations do not have a sustainable source of 
funding and therefore must look for other ways to support themselves and their work in 
their territories. Although external organizations provide some support, the support is not 
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always enough nor is it consistent. In search of funds, indigenous leaders are known to 
prey (at times unscrupulously) on individual researchers and research organizations for 
extra money.  
 
6.2 Río Plátano: Impacts of the Biosphere Project on the Costs of Collective 
Action and the Supply of Common-Property Rules  
 
The Río Plátano vignettes emphasize the debilitating costs involved in negotiating and, 
particularly, monitoring and enforcing the indigenous property-rights rules. Miskito land 
vigilance committee members repeatedly complained that they did not have any physical 
boundaries to monitor and that the costs of monitoring and enforcement were prohibitive 
given that compliance remained problematic. 
 
6.2.1  Coordination Costs: Negotiation, Monitoring, and Enforcement  
 
In the beginning, the Río Plátano Biosphere Project covered some of the negotiation and 
information costs incurred in community rule making by organizing and paying for 
community meetings. The meetings were facilitated by consultants for the Biosphere 
Project and engaged residents in discussions about problems in the reserve and their land-
use customs and preferences. In the meetings the residents created regional land-use 
maps and norms and organized community-level and zonal-level committees to monitor 
the norms.  
After the initial phase of community meetings, however, external support decreased. 
Unlike the Bosawas process that continued to strengthen the territories’ and 
communities’ capacities to govern their resources, the Biosphere Project did not 
recognize the community conservation committees. In the first few years of the 
collaborative management program, the Biosphere Project provided the zonal committees 
with some funding for infrastructure projects, but none of the committees received 
technical or financial support to monitor and enforce the land-use rules. Support for 
monitoring and enforcement, either resident or third-party, is virtually non-existent inside 
the cultural zone of Río Plátano. 
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In 2004, the NGO MOPAWI began to work with the residents of Banaka to 
reinvigorate their land vigilance committee, but MOPAWI’s financial and technical 
support is minimal. An extension agent periodically visits the community to meet with 
the committee members and discuss how they will monitor their lands. At the time of my 
visit, MOPAWI was trying to get boots and basic equipment for the members. 
Nonetheless, many vigilance committee members feel that they are ineffective in 
preventing land sales and mestizo encroachment. The president of the new vigilance 
committee expressed little confidence in the committee’s ability to control mestizo 
encroachment, and the committee members listed a string of problems in monitoring. 
Similar to complaints expressed in the Río Plátano indigenous vignette, many stated that 
they were unpaid and ill-equipped and that they could not afford to lose days in their 
fields to conduct monitoring expeditions. Others complained that without physical 
boundary markers and communal land titles, it was difficult to patrol the boundaries and 
hard to tell the mestizos they were invading indigenous lands.  
As a further example of the weak enforcement mechanisms, on a visit I made to a 
mestizo farmer’s ranch, one of my guides told the mestizo farmer that he had been 
reported to AFE-COHDEFOR for clearing old-growth forests. The mestizo farmer 
merely laughed and said that they wouldn’t do anything. When I returned to the 
community ten months later, AFE-COHDEFOR had never visited the mestizo farmer.  
One land vigilance committee member said that he didn’t think the committee could 
protect the communal forests. He (like many others) had demarcated his own forest lands, 
and breaking from Miskito tradition, he had built his house away from the others, but 
close to his crops so that he could watch over them. He said he’d fight to the death to 
protect his lands. 
 
6.2.2 Strategic Costs: Susceptibility to Shirking and Corruption 
 
Reports of corruption in Río Plátano include illegal timber sales on the part of AFE-
COHDEFOR, illicit land sales to mestizo migrants by mayors and indigenous leaders, 
suspicions that community leaders gain personal benefits from public projects. 
Newspaper reports, consultant reports, and Mosquitia residents frequently accuse AFE-
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COHDEFOR of illicit timber sales (Del Gatto, 2002; Fiallos, 2003). Del Gatto, a lead 
researcher on Honduran forest policy, documented illegal timber harvesting in the region, 
and found that powerful timber barons force AFE-COHDEFOR personnel to falsify 
logging records and doctor permits in order to extract timber (cited in Fiallos, 2003). 
Similarly, some residents and NGO staff accuse municipal mayors of selling lands to 
mestizos as a source of income for their municipalities.ii In one community in the cultural 
zone, resident gossip was that the land vigilance committee president sold land to 
mestizos and kept committee resources (specifically baseball hats) for himself and his 
family.  
It is unrealistic to expect a property-rights or protected-area process to resolve all of 
the complex issues associated with corruption. Nevertheless, the Biosphere Project has 
done nothing to address the causes of corruption or to hamper it. While not excusable, the 
corruption is understandable if one considers the underlying incentives to cheat the 
system: AFE-COHDEFOR engineers are poorly paid, the municipal governments must 
survive off a virtually non-existent tax base, and people in community leadership 
positions receive no monetary remuneration for their work.  
Nevertheless, by placing management responsibilities in the hands of AFE-
COHDEFOR, an organization with a renowned reputation for corruption and poor 
management, the Biosphere Project only further exacerbated the problem. Residents do 
not trust AFE-COHDEFOR to apply the laws fairly and equitably, nor do they believe 
that AFE-COHDEFOR has legitimate rule-making and enforcement rights over the 
Mosquitia. Reports of wrongdoings by AFE-COHDEFOR only further exacerbate the 
insecurities that residents perceive with respect to their rights to their lands and forest 
resources. 
Furthermore, in failing to support or invest authority in the indigenous and municipal 
organizations, the Biosphere Project did not implement enforcement mechanisms that are 
present in the reserve. Given AFE-COHDEFOR’s general absence in the reserve and the 
community’s distrust of the agency, Río Plátano residents have limited recourse for 
reporting and controlling illicit activities.  
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7 THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE PROPERTY-RIGHTS PROCESSES IN INDUCING 
COMPLIANCE: PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF THE RIGHTS AND RULES 
 
7.1 Perceived Legitimacy and Compliance in Bosawas 
 
In Bosawas, the definition and demarcation of the territorial boundaries and monitoring 
obviously facilitated rule making and provided key mechanisms to monitor and control 
outside encroachment. In the remote forests of Bosawas where the mestizos are well-
armed ex-combatants and third-party monitoring and enforcement is rare, the traditional 
deterrence model fails to explain why indigenous and mestizo residents are following the 
rules. Some might argue that the physical demarcation alone sufficed to stop mestizo 
migration. However, given the violent reaction of the mestizos to the original 
demarcation process, a process from which they were originally excluded, the findings 
from Bosawas suggest that participation in the rule-making process was vital to mestizo 
compliance. For the past 10 years, both indigenous and mestizos have complied with a de 
facto property regime they created in 1997. Why? 
 The compliance literature suggests that sanctions, perceived legitimacy of the rules, 
and moral duty all influence an individual’s decision to follow the rules. Richard Tyler’s 
work on compliance emphasizes the importance of perceived legitimacy of the decision-
making process. As illustrated in the Bosawas indigenous vignette, the indigenous 
residents in Bosawas frequently responded that they respect the forest conservation 
policies and would never sell land because during the demarcation process they agreed to 
respect their ancestral homelands and follow a set of rules to protect those lands. 
Similarly, Bosawas mestizos frequently commented that they respect the indigenous 
territories because they signed “the law” that decided who would have rights to which 
lands. As one group of mestizo men commented, the Miskito have tons of land. However, 
their forest is off limits to the mestizos because they agreed that the other side of 
territorial boundaries is otro pais (another world). This respect for the property rights 
agreements bolsters relatively weak enforcement mechanisms and promotes social 
pressure to comply.  
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Several factors in the Bosawas process contributed to the creation of a set of property 
rights that were viewed as legitimate in the eyes of both the indigenous and mestizo 
residents of Bosawas. First, TNC appealed to the indigenous residents by placing 
indigenous land rights and their constitutional decision-making rights at the forefront of 
the process. Indigenous residents in the Mosquitia demand recognition of their ancestral 
rights to the land and a principal concern is tenure security. In defining the territorial 
titles in Bosawas, the Miskito and Mayangna rejected any reference to collaborative 
management with MARENA. They argued that the government does not have any rights 
to their land and they wanted the security of permanent ownership rights. In contrast to 
the process in Río Plátano, the Bosawas process acknowledged these demands. 
The Bosawas property-rights and land-management processes initiated by TNC 
established a credible commitment to the indigenous people that TNC would support 
their territorial demands, and in turn, the indigenous residents committed themselves to 
the land-use rules. As shown in the Bosawas indigenous vignette, the indigenous 
residents feel responsible for monitoring their lands and complying with the land-use 
rules. This commitment was fortified by the participation on the part of the indigenous 
residents and their governing association in the creation of the land-management plan. 
Unlike the Biosphere Project in Río Plátano, TNC did not create its own conservation 
committees. Instead, it worked with community coordinators and ADEPCIMISUJIN to 
strengthen their roles as legitimate governing bodies. 
In many respects, the decision by the Bosawas mestizos to comply with the 
indigenous property rights is astounding. As stated, there are few enforcement 
mechanisms that the indigenous residents can apply to ensure mestizo compliance. 
Nevertheless, the mestizos are not invading the indigenous lands. The Bosawas mestizo 
vignette highlighted the importance of including mestizo participation in defining the 
territorial boundaries. Mestizos stated that they respect property rights (communal or 
individual) so long as all agree to the boundaries. Thus, the inclusion of the mestizos in 
the constitutional-choice decision that established indigenous ownership of their 
territorial lands and mestizo participation in the collective-choice decisions of exactly 
where the boundaries would be drawn and who would have access and withdrawal rights 
to the land was a pivotal juncture in the process and greatly increased their propensity to 
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comply. The indigenous residents originally demarcated a territory much larger than their 
current limits. However, the mestizos protested (violently) and ultimately the mestizos 
defined where the territorial boundaries would run along the southern edges of MITK and 
MSB.  
In addition to contributing to the legitimacy of the rules, the NGO community has 
also provided a legitimate process for resolving conflicts. The mestizo activities are 
formally monitored by the corps of indigenous forest guards. Nevertheless, the mestizos 
also recognize that the boundary rules are further substantiated by Centro Humboldt. If 
conflicts between the mestizos and indigenous peoples cannot be resolved, Centro 
Humboldt is on hand to mediate and resolve the land disputes. It is important to recognize 
that the mestizos are organized and are desperately trying to gain official recognition of 
their political association APDECOMEBO. If APDECOMEBO is unable to regulate 
mestizo activities in the region, it is difficult for them to claim governance authority. The 
desire to be recognized as an official political association is an added incentive for 
APDECOMEBO to monitor and enforce the commitments that they made with their 
indigenous neighbors.  
 
7.2 Perceived Legitimacy and Compliance in Río Plátano 
 
In contrast to the process in Bosawas, the property-rights and land-management processes 
in Río Plátano did not recognize indigenous demands for rights to their homelands, nor 
did it include the residents or their respective nascent governance institutions in creating 
and maintaining a governance system for the reserve. Although the project began with the 
best intentions of supporting local resource management, its assistance was short-lived 
and it did not even maintain the land-use rules it had created. The Biosphere Project’s 
disregard for the indigenous land vigilance committees and MASTA’s federations, in 
conjunction with sporadic monitoring and enforcement by AFE-COHDEFOR may have 
in fact, detracted from customary land-use institutions and impaired local rule-making 
abilities. 
Unlike the Bosawas process that established right-holders and rules that were 
perceived to be legitimate by indigenous residents and the mestizos, the Río Plátano 
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process left a void in place of a legitimate and effective governing body for the region. 
The failure was twofold in that neither AFE-COHDEFOR nor the indigenous federations 
have been able to establish governing authority in the region. Residents in Río Plátano 
repeatedly stated that AFE-COHDEFOR had no rights to govern the region. Miskito 
leaders and land vigilance committee members stated that when AFE-COHDEFOR took 
over under the new management plan, the local vigilance committee members began to 
slack off because they thought AFE-COHDEFOR would work to prevent mestizos from 
encroaching. Unfortunately, many Miskito residents believe that the situation with 
respect to mestizo colonization has gotten worse under AFE-COHDEFOR. Although 
there may be numerous factors contributing to the mestizo migration to the region, 
including the colonization project initiated in 1995 but later squelched, in the Miskito 
mind, the failure is due to AFE-COHDEFOR.  
A byproduct of the interference from the Biosphere Project and AFE-COHDEFOR 
may be that the external rules squelched local institutions. In interviews, MOPAWI staff 
and Miskito leaders criticized the Biosphere Project for failing to work with MASTA and 
support the residents’ land vigilance committees. They accused the Biosphere Project of 
destroying community initiatives by setting up their own conservation committees and 
making empty promises of assistance for monitoring and enforcement from AFE-
COHDEFOR. While many residents express support for MASTA, others perceive 
MASTA and its respective land vigilance committees to be relatively weak and often 
incapable of achieving or enforcing any of their demands. As shown in chapter 4, as a 
result, many Miskito residents choose not to comply with or trust in the federation’s land-
use rules.  
Today, the Biosphere Project continues to sideline Miskito organizations. Although 
the Project has at times included MASTA leaders in its program plans, Project staff and 
directors express frustration in trying to work with indigenous federations and 
communities. They complain that they are argumentative, unorganized, and difficult to 
work with. However, Miskito leaders state that given their previous experiences with the 
Biosphere Project and their unfulfilled promises, the leaders and residents distrust the 
Project and many believe that the only way they can survive is by fighting against Project 
initiatives. In recent discussions about land tenure reform in Río Plátano, the Miskito 
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people rejected any reference to usufruct rights in the reform. They maintained that they 
hold eminent domain over their lands and will not sign any agreement that does not 
recognize their entitlements to the land and its resources. 
 
8 CONCLUSION: GOVERNANCE OF INDIGENOUS RESERVES 
 
The Bosawas process and its respective NGO community have contributed to a robust 
indigenous common-property system by covering many of the costs involved in 
collective rule making and monitoring and contributing to the perceived legitimacy of 
indigenous land rights in the region. This system has provided indigenous residents with 
a sense of tenure security and the obligation to comply with land-use rules that prevent 
land sales and regulate forest use. It has also served to stop mestizo colonization of the 
indigenous territories. The results demonstrate how external actors can support and 
strengthen the adaptive management capabilities of indigenous institutions.  
Several fundamental lessons come from Bosawas and Río Plátano, the first of which 
is that indigenous land-use institutions may remain robust and adequately address 
mestizo encroachment given a supportive policy environment. Indigenous common-
property systems do not necessarily collapse or become privatized in response to 
increased land-use pressures and land values produced by mestizo migration. A 
supportive policy environment includes one in which the actors and institutions engaged 
in the region recognize indigenous common-property rights to their lands and work to 
establish their constitutional decision-making rights over their homelands in the region.  
Second, indigenous residents’ abilities to demand constitutional rights and craft 
collective-choice rules in support of their common-property traditions may require 
financial and technical support to organize and negotiate new rules and establish the 
legitimacy of their demands for ownership rights to their lands. The need for support, 
however, does not stop after the initial negotiations. In remote frontier forests, many of 
the institutional changes are not minor alterations; rather they involve diverse 
communities of resource users who are struggling to develop enduring and effective 
governance arrangements. External support may in fact do more harm than good, if it is 
short-term or inconsistent. 
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The dependency on external support also points to the fragility of traditional 
governance systems and raises questions with respect to NGO commitment and 
governance responsibilities in the region. It is questionable whether the indigenous 
territorial associations and monitoring mechanisms would survive if the NGO community 
were to drop its support. As noted, the indigenous forest guards in Bosawas will not work 
without pay. At the moment, the guards’ pay depends on funding from Centro Humboldt, 
which in turn is dependent on their ability to solicit funds and obtain grants from donors.  
It is not unreasonable to expect that governing bodies need some form of monetary 
and technical support. What is concerning is that this support depends on an NGO 
community that has no official ties to the region. The results show the need for continued 
support of indigenous associations and their respective institutions. In the Mosquitia, a 
critical concern for the future is if and how this support will be generated on a sustainable 
basis.  
Finally, the results from Bosawas suggest that perceived legitimacy of the process 
and the rules may be a key incentive to comply. Interviews with the Bosawas mestizos 
and the current agricultural activities in Río Plátano illustrate the need to include all 
relevant parties in decisions with respect to who has the constitutional rights over the 
region and the definition of the collective-choice rules to manage the Mosquitia. TNC 
initiated a legitimate process by working with the indigenous residents in Bosawas, and, 
ultimately, government agencies, the Nicaraguan legislature, and the mestizos recognized 
the indigenous residents’ rights to their lands. In contrast to Río Plátano, where the 
indigenous residents rights to govern their homelands are not recognized by AFE-
COHDEFOR or the Honduran government, TNC started with the assumption that the 
indigenous residents have decision-making rights with respect to the management and 
use of their lands. The Miskito and Mayangna’s rights were further validated by Centro 
Humboldt’s continued support for the territorial associations and insistence that they are 
the principal governing body in the region. This has given the indigenous territorial 
associations greater recognition with government and international agencies working in 
the reserve, and it has contributed to the residents’ perceptions that their governing bodies 
are, in fact, effective and legitimate. 
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 In the Mosquitia, and other frontier regions, where third-party rule making and 
enforcement is financially costly, and often politically questionable, resident rule making 
appears to be a viable option for frontier forest governance. Given a supportive political 
environment, the indigenous land-use institutions in Bosawas remain robust, even when 
confronted with mestizo migration. In contrast to Río Plátano, where the forest systems 
and social systems are threatened by mestizo encroachment, in Bosawas the forests and 
the indigenous property-rights systems appear to be relatively secure. 
 
Endnotes for Chapter 5 
 
i The table of benefits and costs is based on interviews with Miskito and Mayangna residents in Bosawas 
and Miskito residents in the cultural zone of Río Plátano. The interviews asked questions about property-
rights preferences and the benefits associated with different property-rights institutions. The costs and 
benefits are not intended to be all-inclusive, but rather are intended to provide an overview of the factors 
that influence individual decisions with respect to whether to invest time to support and to respect 
common-property traditions or adopt mestizo private-property-institutions. For more information on the 
number of residents interviewed, please see section 4, Structure of Analysis and Data Sources. 
ii Interview, World Bank staff, Tegucigalpa, March 24, 2006; interview, land vigilance committee member, 
April 29, 2006. 
 
 
Tanya M. Hayes 167
 CHAPTER 6 
INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CONSERVATION: 
A MEANS TO SUSTAINED FOREST MANAGEMENT OR A BAND-AID SOLUTION?i
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The comparison of mestizo expansion into Bosawas and Río Plátano reserves 
demonstrates that the Miskito and Mayangna of Bosawas are better able to control 
mestizo encroachment than is AFE-COHDEFOR in Río Plátano. The findings suggest 
that, in some cases, forest reserves may be better protected if indigenous residents 
establish common-property rights over the forest land than if public agencies govern the 
reserves. 
Nevertheless, the ability of the indigenous residents to prevent mestizo encroachment 
does not necessarily equate with their ability to mange their forests over the long term. 
Some conservationists worry that if in recognizing indigenous property rights, the 
conservation community is simply trading the rapid threat of outside encroachment for a 
slower, but inevitable threat of indigenous resource exploitation. Many fear that 
recognition of indigenous property rights is only a band-aid solution that is unable to 
sustain forest conservation (Chapman, 2003; Redford, 1991; Redford & Stearman, 1993; 
Terborgh, 1999, 2000; personal communication, St Louis Zoo, Managua, September 
2005). They argue for continued use of the traditional protected-area paradigm that places 
forest land in the hands of the government and contend that only government jurisdiction 
over protected areas will ensure sustained environmental protection. 
In Bosawas, the common-property institutions of the Miskito and Mayangna appear 
relatively resistant to mestizo land-use institutions and effective in controlling mestizo 
encroachment. Mestizo encroachment is, however, not the only source of agricultural 
expansion. The indigenous peoples also use forest lands for crops and pasture and 
contribute to deforestation in the region. In this chapter I examine some concerns about 
the fortitude of indigenous land-use institutions and forest conservation in Bosawas. Has 
the establishment of indigenous property rights meant that we simply traded the fast 
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 threat of mestizo encroachment for the slower threat of indigenous agricultural 
expansion? 
 
2 QUESTIONING CONSERVATIONISTS’ CRITIQUES OF INDIGENOUS FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
 
In discussing the sustainability of indigenous forest reserves, Redford (1991, p. 47) 
argues that “to believe that when confronted with market pressures, higher population 
densities, and increased sedentism most indigenous peoples will maintain the integrity of 
their traditional methods is not only to argue against the available evidence, but worse, to 
fall into the ideological trap that produced the ecologically noble savage.” Likewise, it is 
naive to believe that governments and public managers will necessarily thwart the 
environmental costs of modernization and consistently defend forests and promote 
biodiversity conservation. 
In this dissertation, findings from chapters 4 and 5 showed that when challenged by 
new market pressures and demographic change, the integrity of indigenous common-
property institutions may falter, but that this is not necessarily so. The results of 
institutional change in three Miskito communities in Río Plátano showed that when 
confronted with mestizo encroachment and land markets, some indigenous residents 
chose to adopt mestizo land-use customs, and that the overall robustness of the traditional 
common-property system had deteriorated after being repeatedly challenged by mestizo 
encroachment. In chapter 5, however, I highlighted how the different policy 
environments in each reserve influenced the robustness of the indigenous common-
property systems and the ability of indigenous residents to adapt their institutions to 
better control mestizo agricultural expansion. In contrast to the institutional decline 
occurring in Río Plátano, indigenous residents in Bosawas have made institutional 
changes that bolstered their common-property traditions in response to mestizo 
expansion. 
I agree that it is dangerous to fall into the trap of the noble savage. Nevertheless, it is 
equally hazardous to presume that traditional peoples are naive and defenseless victims, 
easily overcome by changes in their environments. One of the difficulties I have with 
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 conservationists’ critiques of traditional resource management is that they frequently 
compare traditional systems to an idealized public management structure (Chapman, 
2003; Putz et al., 2001; Terborgh, 1999, 2000). For example, in expressing his concerns 
over granting indigenous residents land rights in forest reserves, Terborgh (2000) 
contends that indigenous residents are not able to conserve forest resources when they are 
confronted with market pressures. He points to the dearth of wildlife on indigenous 
reservations in the United States, and contrasts that to the survival of biodiversity on 
public lands. He states that “first and foremost, it is our public-lands legislation that 
preserve biodiversity in the United States” (p. 1360), and he argues that the rest of the 
world should legislate more forests under public protection. The use of indigenous 
reservations in the United States as a measure of whether indigenous peoples can 
preserve biodiversity is highly questionable and blatantly ignores important historical and 
political conditions. But, what is particularly worrisome is Terborgh’s (and others’) 
insistence that public legislation of protection necessarily equates with on-the-ground 
conservation (Putz et al., 2001; Redford and Richter, 1999). 
Forests that are legally designated as protected are not necessarily any better 
conserved than forests that are not legally protected (Hayes, 2006; Hayes and Ostrom, 
2005). Communities and governments may both fail (or succeed) in forest management. 
The future of forest conservation does not depend on discovering whether a public-
property, common-property, or private-property regime is always best for sustaining 
forest conservation. What is critical is discovering in which contexts which property-
rights system is more suited to the particular ecological, social, political, and economic 
conditions. As this dissertation has shown, respect of forest regulations and the 
subsequent forest protection depend heavily on the context of the region, how the land-
management rules are made, and if and how they are applied. 
In considering whether indigenous residents with common-property rights are able to 
control mestizo encroachment, I did not compare the territorial management activities 
and encroachment outcomes to some idealized publicly managed protected area with 
guards consistently patrolling the borders and enforcing reserve restrictions. That would 
have been impractical; those conditions do not exist in the Mosquitia (nor in many 
protected areas around the world). The comparison of mestizo encroachment in Bosawas 
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 to Río Plátano demonstrates how indigenous and public management compare given the 
political, ecological, and socioeconomic realities of the Mosquitia. The results suggest 
that, in the Mosquitia, indigenous residents who share common-property rights to their 
lands are better able to control mestizo agricultural expansion than is a public agency. A 
consequential concern is what are the future prospects for forest conservation in 
Bosawas? 
 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SITE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the ability of the Miskito of MITK to regulate current 
agricultural expansion (both mestizo and Miskito), and I consider some of the prospects 
and challenges for future forest conservation in the territory. Just as it is impractical to 
compare the indigenous residents’ ability to control outside encroachment to some 
hypothetical public management system, it would be unfair and unrealistic to compare 
their ability to manage the forests in Bosawas to some idealized management system of 
an omnipotent public agency. What is more reasonable is to examine how Bosawas 
residents are presently managing their forests and then try and envision (1) what the 
Bosawas indigenous territories might look like had they not established their territorial 
boundaries and instead remained under public management and (2) consider predictions 
for agricultural expansion given their present land-use practices as well as predictions of 
agricultural expansion given possible challenges to their land-use rules. 
In this study, I focus on activities in the southwest corner of Bosawas, where the 
Miskito territory MITK borders the mestizo buffer zone that is under the jurisdiction of 
MARENA. In the final territorial demarcation of MITK, three Miskito communities were 
left out of the territory due to conflicts with mestizos living in the area. These 
communities remain within an area dominated by mestizos and are on public lands in the 
Bosawas buffer zone. 
In order to understand how the territorial rights influenced current forest management 
and future management prospects, I focus on the land-use governance arrangements and 
resultant land-use practices of the Miskito living inside MITK and compare them to the 
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 Miskito and mestizo people living in the Bosawas buffer zone just outside of MITK. 
Specifically, I compare land-use institutions and land cover in two communities, Pueblo 
Nuevo and Plis, and within the southern half of MITK territory.ii
The communities of Pueblo Nuevo and Plis share similar characteristics with respect 
to population, demographics, livelihoods, geographical location, and access to markets. 
The communities are located within a few kilometers of one another along the edge of the 
Coco River in a remote region of Bosawas that is accessible only by boat or by foot. 
Pueblo Nuevo is, however, located just inside the border of MITK. In contrast, Plis is 
located just outside MITK in the mestizo buffer. The study of Miskito communities on 
both sides of MITK’s border enables me to consider what Pueblo Nuevo and, more 
broadly, MITK might look like had the Miskito not established their territorial rights. 
The gray areas in Figure 6.1 show the geographic locations of the principal study sites 
(Pueblo Nuevo and Plis) along the Coco River and the boundary between MITK and the 
mestizo territory. Table 6.1 presents the relevant characteristics of each site. Please note 
that for the sake of the analysis, I have divided the MITK territory into north and south. 
This division is not recognized by the Miskito people, but rather demonstrates the area 
for which I have satellite imagery. Due to limitations in land-coverage data, my analyses 
of land cover and population densities in MITK refer only to the southern half of the 
territory (as shown in Figure 1). 
The southern half of MITK covers 21,097 ha and had a population of 1,100 in 1995, 
according to a census taken by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in that year. Using the 
TNC (1997b) census data and population growth rates provided by Stocks (1998), I 
estimate total population for the southern half of MITK in 2005 was 1,552 people 
(Stocks, 1998; TNC, 1997b). 
Pueblo Nuevo is the southernmost community inside the boundaries of MITK. Pueblo 
Nuevo borders the mestizo-occupied territory, and was a region that experienced conflict 
in the 1990s as mestizos migrated to Miskito homelands. Pueblo Nuevo was founded by 
one family in the mid-1900s and today has approximately 20 families. Two mestizo 
families from before the demarcation process continue to live and farm in the region. 
Today, Pueblo Nuevo is governed locally by an elected community coordinator and the 
territorial governing body ADEPCIMISUJIN. Residents in the community participated in 
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 the TNC territorial process in which the community created a land-use plan and 
demarcated lands for agricultural use, minimal forest use, and strict forest conservation. 
Today, two forest guards from the community participate in quarterly patrols of the 
territorial boundaries and help monitor Miskito resource use. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Study Sites 
 
 
Table 6.1. Site Specifics 
Community 
Area 
(ha) 
Population 
(est. 2005) 
Density 
(pers/km2) 
Available landa 
(ha/household) Land title Ethnicity
Pueblo Nuevo 3,057  121  4 161.08  YES Miskito 
Miskito territory  21,097  1,552  7 86.67  YES Miskito 
Plis 244  125  51 12.45  NO Miskito 
‘Mestizo territory’b  56,927   12,525  22  25.70  NO mestizo 
a Eight percent of the area is assumed to be uncultivable and is not included in total area (per interviews and 
Wilkie et al., 1998). iii Household data: Miskito 6.93 pers/household and mestizo 6.2 pers/household 
(Stocks, 1998). 
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 b Population estimates do not include two small Miskito communities. 
 
Plis is one of three Miskito communities that were not included in the MITK. It is in 
the mestizo territory between Coco and Bocay rivers, where approximately 2,000 mestizo 
families live in 32 communities (personal communication, mestizo leader, Bosawas, 30 
August 2005). 
Plis was founded in the mid-1900s by one man and his family. Today Plis has 25 
households that are governed by an elected community coordinator. It is not officially 
part of ADEPCIMISUJIN, as it currently lies outside of MITK, was not included in the 
demarcation process, and did not create a community land-use plan. Nevertheless, the 
residents did cut a boundary around the community in 2002–2003 in an effort to keep 
mestizos from encroaching on their lands. Land-use decisions about where to farm and 
locations of forest conservation areas are largely determined by the community founder. 
 
4 DATA AND METHODS 
 
I had three objectives in conducting this study: (1) to estimate what land cover and land-
use pressures might be like had the community of Pueblo Nuevo not been included in the 
MITK boundary; (2) to determine if and how MITK residents are presently managing 
their forests; and (3) to consider possible long-term threats to forest conservation due to 
continued agricultural expansion (both Miskito and mestizo). If in the context of the 
Mosquitia, indigenous forest management is a viable management option, then I expect to 
find stronger management institutions and better forest conditions in Pueblo Nuevo than 
in Plis. Furthermore, I expect that residents of Pueblo Nuevo and MITK are in a position 
to better address future land-use challenges than are Miskito residents in Plis. 
 
4.1 Data 
 
In order to compare how the different communities are controlling agricultural expansion 
and maintaining forest cover, I use qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze data 
gathered on the current land-use institutions and governance arrangements, resident land-
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 use practices, population growth and densities, and land-cover patterns. Data on land-use 
institutions and land-use practices were gathered using ethnographic methods based on 
IFRI data protocols. IFRI is a validated framework that consists of a series of questions 
and fieldwork activities that enable scholars to examine the impacts of diverse types of 
ownership and governance of forests on protection and management activities and their 
consequences on forest conditions (CIPEC, 2004). In July 2004 and August–September 
2005, I conducted in-depth individual and group interviews with a purposefully selected 
sample of community residents and interviewed territorial leaders, public officials, and 
non-government personnel. Interview questions gathered information on the de jure land-
use rules and the de facto rules that govern Bosawas and respondents’ attitudes toward 
agricultural expansion and forest conservation in the region.   
 
4.1.1 Comparison of Land Cover 
 
I examine the importance of territorial rights in Miskito community forest conservation 
by first comparing forest cover and land-use pressures in Pueblo Nuevo and Plis. The 
ability to control outside encroachment and current forest-cover status is based on my 
assessment of a 2003 Landsat image classified by MARENA in conjunction with 
fieldwork that established the community boundaries for Pueblo Nuevo and Plis. The 
MARENA land-cover image shows land under fallow, crops, or pasture, and land that is 
forest covered. The MARENA classification differentiates between the broadleaf tropical 
forest and ralo forest. Ralo refers to a thinner forest, which may be due to human 
disturbance or naturally occurring variation in the terrain. A ralo forest is defined as an 
ecosystem dominated by shrubs and trees in which the proportion of tree coverage is 
between 33.33% and 66.67%, the coverage of shrubs is no more than 33.33%, and the 
total coverage is always greater than 66.67% (INB, 2006). In their classification, 
MARENA did not distinguish between pasture and recently fallowed lands. However, in 
our interviews we found that while the majority of mestizos kept pasture lands, few 
Miskito maintained pasture. 
Residents’ opinions on their ability to control mestizo encroachment and present-day 
land-use pressures are from semi-structured, oral interviews conducted with community 
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 leaders and residents and at community meetings in Pueblo Nuevo and Plis. In the 
interviews, I used the IFRI research protocols to guide the interview questions (CIPEC, 
2004; Gibson, et al. 2000) and asked about current land-use practices, including amount 
of land used each year, fallow time, and productivity estimates. I also administered the 
“Miguel questionnaire” (as discussed in chapter 1) to a sample of residents in Pueblo 
Nuevo and Plis in order to compare how residents perceive their respective abilities to 
control mestizo expansion. 
 
4.1.2 Management of MITK Forests 
 
I examine if Miskito in MITK are complying with the management plan they created in 
the mid-1990s. As discussed in earlier chapters, when TNC began working with the 
indigenous residents of Bosawas, part of the project was to create territorial management 
plans. I assess Miskito forest management by comparing satellite imagery for 2003 forest 
cover to the principal land-use zones specified in their management plan: agriculture; 
minimal forest-product collection; and strict forest conservation. I use GIS to overlay a 
map created by TNC of the management boundaries with the 2003 land-cover image that 
I obtained from MARENA. I then assess for 2003, how much of the agricultural zone 
was occupied by crop or fallow lands and whether the Miskito residents have expanded 
their agricultural lands into the forest collection and forest conservation areas. 
 
4.1.3 Future Threats to MITK Forests 
 
I used data on land-use institutions, agricultural clearing and fallow estimates, and 
population growth to simulate three future land-use scenarios and predict their respective 
land-use outcomes based on two distinct models of land use and population growth. The 
models for the simulations are discussed below. 
Data on the land-use institutions and the amount of land that households in each 
group hold in agriculture and fallow are based on interviews conducted in 2005 with 
Miskito and mestizo residents. According to resident responses, the average Miskito 
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 household in the study uses 3.57 ha for crops and 0.25 ha for pastures (usually in 
communal holdings). The average mestizo household uses less land for crops (2.57 ha) 
and more land for pasture (6 ha). Thus, in total, mestizo land uses are roughly double 
those of the Miskito. Both mestizo and Miskito cultivate an agricultural plot for 
approximately two years before leaving the plot. The average fallow time is five years. 
These findings are similar to findings from other Miskito and mestizo land-use studies 
(Dodds, 1994; Stocks, 1998; TNC, 1997b). 
Population density estimates were based on a simple calculation of the number of 
people predicted to live in the region in 2005 and the amount of available land in the 
study site or territory. In their simulation of agriculture-based deforestation, Wilkie and 
colleagues (1998, p. 141) assume that 10% of the total area is uncultivable because it is 
too swampy, hilly, or sandy. In interviews, residents stated that approximately 8% of the 
land is unsuitable for cultivation, primarily due to slope. Therefore, in my estimations of 
population density and the amount of land available for future use, I subtracted 8% from 
the total area under consideration. 
Estimates of the level of outside encroachment and internal population growth are 
based on findings from a study conducted by TNC as cited in work by Hurtado de 
Mendoza (2001) of rates of mestizo migration to the region, resident interviews, and 
work by Stocks (1998). I estimate that after 1995, the mestizo annual growth rate in 
Bosawas (including in-migration and natural fertility) was 12.8% and that Miskito natural 
fertility growth rate remains at 3.5% (Hurtado de Mendoza, 2001; Stocks, 1998). 
 
4.2 Simulations 
 
From a conservation perspective, one of the principal concerns in recognizing indigenous 
people’s rights to their lands is that they will eventually overexploit the resource system. 
In the context of agricultural expansion in Bosawas, the worry is that through population 
pressures and more extensive farming and ranching practices, the indigenous peoples will 
eventually destroy their forests. In interviews, I identified three scenarios that could 
influence agricultural expansion and threaten future forest conservation in the region. The 
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 changes include increasing population pressures, more extensive land-use practices due 
to an increase in cattle, and the breakdown of the present boundary institutions. 
I propose three scenarios to simulate different possible long-term management 
challenges for the Miskito communities in the region. In each scenario, I consider how 
long it will take to use up all of the forest lands in the agricultural zone, the forest-product 
gathering zone, and finally the conservation zone given the specified land-use conditions. 
The simulations assume that the agricultural zone would be used up first and that 
agricultural lands would progressively expand until the entire territory (including the 
conservation zone) is eventually in use. 
The three scenarios presented in the analysis are: 
1. Miskito Only 
2. Miskito with Cattle (four or five heads of cattle per household) 
3. Miskito and Mestizos (no boundary rules) 
Scenario 1, “Miskito Only,” assumes that the Miskito of MITK continue to keep out 
mestizos and that they maintain their current land-use practices. The only change in this 
scenario is natural population growth. In the simulations, I consider how long it will take 
the Miskito to use up each land-management zone assuming that Miskito maintain the 
status quo in terms of their natural population growth and existing land-use practices. 
In Scenario 2, the land-use practices change because the Miskito now own cattle. In 
interviews, very few Miskito households reported owning cattle; however, in discussing 
their ideal farms almost all said that they would like to have four to five heads of cattle. 
Scenario 2 examines land-use expansion if the Miskito were to obtain this goal. 
Scenario 3 looks at what might happen if the Miskito were unable to defend their 
territorial borders. What would happen if the current monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms failed to prevent mestizos from entering MITK and the territorial boundaries 
dissolved? In examining outside encroachment it is difficult to gauge the relative 
magnitude of mestizo migration and the stress it puts on land-use institutions. 
Furthermore, the land outside MITK is essentially full, and increasing land-use pressures 
may eventually rupture the property-rights agreements signed in 1997. Scenario 3 
considers what happens if the governance system breaks down (i.e., no common-property 
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 tenure). Does it make a difference? What would the region look like 20 to 30 years from 
now? 
The simulations are intended to present a rough diagnostic of possible land uses in the 
future and are limited to a 50-year period. Although the timeline may appear relatively 
short, due to the limitations of the simulated models, it is unrealistic to attempt to predict 
land-use pressures beyond 50 years (Dodds 1994; Wilkie et al., 1998). In a similar study 
that simulated future agricultural and hunting pressures in a reserve in Zaire, Wilkie and 
colleagues limited their predictions to 40 years. 
 
4.3 Models  
 
I ran the simulations with two different models of the relationship between population 
growth and area under agriculture. Model A predicts a 1:1 relationship between 
population growth and land use. In contrast, in model B, I use a compound growth 
equation to estimate a scenario where the land use does not grow at the same rate as 
population (Boserup, 1965; Dodds, 1998, 1999; Turner and Shajaat Ali, 1996; for 
discussion and review see Carr, 2004). In this case, I assume that population grows at a 
higher rate than land use because of two possibilities relevant for this study area: (1) 
other sources of income outside the territory that reduces the needs of subsisting farming, 
and (2) intensification of agricultural production. Appendix C at the end of this 
dissertation shows the data used in the models to simulate each scenario. The model 
specifics are shown below. 
 
Model A 
Model A is based on the work of Dodds (1994) who built upon work by Carneiro in the 
1960s to develop a model of population and land use. It starts with land use in 2003 and 
simulates the different scenarios assuming that population and land use increase at the 
same rate. Model A uses the amount of land required per person and the average time 
land is cultivated and fallowed in swidden systems to estimate the total land used for the 
study area. The total land used U for a given population i (i = Miskito, mestizo) in time t 
would be: 
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where Ci is the average number of years a field is cropped, Fi is the average number of 
years fields are left fallow before being replanted, Pi,t is the total population in time t, and 
Li is the total land needed per individual during a year, including crops and pasture land. 
Using a simple compound growth equation, the total estimated population will be: 
( tiiti rPP += 11995,, ) ,         (eq. 2) 
where Pi,1995 is the initial population estimated in 1995 (TNC, 1997b) and ri is the 
estimated future annual population growth rate for each ethnicity (Hurtado de Mendoza, 
2001; Stocks, 1998). This model gives a more “pessimistic” outcome because it predicts 
a relatively fast growing rate of land use. 
 
Model B 
Model B gives more “optimistic” predictions because it assumes that the rate of land-use 
growth is slower than the rate of population growth. Dodds (1999) shows that for Miskito 
in the Rio Plátano Honduras—for a period between 1961 and 1996—land use grew at a 
lower rate than population. Following his work I estimate that the land-use growing rate 
is 62.47% of the population annual growing rate. I use a compound growing formula to 
estimate the land use U for a given population for time t: 
          (eq. 3) ( tiiti gUU += 11995,, )
where gi is the estimated land-use growing rate for Miskito or mestizo calculated as a 
percentage of the population growing rate as mentioned before. 
 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
The analysis of the current status of agricultural expansion in Bosawas reinforces the 
findings from chapter 3 and shows that the Miskito residents within the territory of MITK 
are better able to control agricultural expansion than the Miskito outside the territory. The 
findings show that the common-property rights and their respective boundary rules and 
monitoring mechanisms established in 1997 are working to stop outside encroachment 
Tanya M. Hayes 180
 and promote forest conservation within Pueblo Nuevo and, more generally, MITK. In 
contrast to those in Pueblo Nuevo, the residents of Plis are struggling to defend their 
communal lands and maintain farmland and forests for future generations. Furthermore, 
simulations of possible future changes and challenges to the land-use system show that 
MITK and Pueblo Nuevo are in a better position to tolerate increasing demands on their 
land and still retain forest cover than is Plis. 
 
5.1 Forest Cover and Land-Use Pressures in Pueblo Nuevo and Plis 
 
Residents of Pueblo Nuevo and forest guards from MITK maintain that no new mestizo 
families have settled in MITK since 1997. Many cited the physical demarcation of their 
boundaries and establishment of territorial rights as crucial factors in stopping mestizo 
invasions and clandestine land sales. In response to the “Miguel questionnaire” statement 
about the ability of the residents to prevent mestizo encroachment, the majority of the 
residents interviewed stated that they could prevent (and are preventing) mestizo 
encroachment (see Table 6.2). 
 In contrast to the optimism expressed by the MITK residents, the Miskito of Plis were 
more pessimistic about their ability to maintain their lands. As shown in Table 6.2, the 
majority of those interviewed in Plis stated that the community is not able to prevent 
mestizo encroachment. Many complained that they have lost much of their communal 
lands to mestizo invasions and previous land sales. Although the community tried to 
demarcate its remaining lands in 2002/2003, the Miskito of Plis and their mestizo 
neighbors disagree over where the community boundaries should be and at least one Plis 
family is currently engaged in a land fight with a mestizo neighbor. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Ability to Control Mestizo Encroachment 
 
 Can Prevent Mestizos Can't Prevent 
Pueblo Nuevo 7 1 
Plis 1 5 
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 The difference in land-use patterns and population density between Pueblo Nuevo 
and Plis illustrates what conditions in Pueblo Nuevo might be like today had they not 
been included inside MITK. In my analysis of the 2003 land-cover image in combination 
with estimates of population densities, I find Plis surrounded by mestizo settlements with 
very little room for growth. Table 6.3 shows the land cover in Pueblo Nuevo and MITK 
and in Plis and the mestizo buffer zone, and Figure 6.2 provides a graphic representation 
of the land coverage in 2003. In Figure 6.2, the dotted black lines show the community 
boundaries for Pueblo Nuevo, MITK, and Plis in the mestizo buffer. The southern 
boundary of Pueblo Nuevo is the southern boundary of the MITK territory. Note that ralo 
forest is specified in Table 6.3 but, for simplicity sake, is not distinguished in Figure 
6.2—all forest is represented in one category. 
The differences in forest cover and population density in Pueblo Nuevo and Plis are 
striking. As previously shown in Table 6.1, land-use pressures outside MITK are far 
greater than those within. Pueblo Nuevo has maintained far larger community boundaries 
and has much lower population densities than Plis. Pueblo Nuevo occupies approximately 
3,057 ha, whereas Plis occupies only 244 ha, less than 0.5% of the total mestizo territory. 
The Miskito living in Plis have the highest population density in the region with 51 
persons per km2. In contrast, in Pueblo Nuevo, the Miskito have on average only four 
persons per km2. Even the mestizos have more land than those living in Plis, as the 
average population density for the rest of the mestizo buffer is approximately 22 persons 
per km2. In other words, this means that the average household in Pueblo Nuevo has 
roughly 161 ha available to work, the average mestizo family has 25 ha available to work 
and the residents of Plis have, on average, only 12 ha of land per household. 
 
Table 6.3. Land-Cover Patterns, 2003 
 
Community Forest Ralo Forest Agriculture Pasture & Fallow Othera Total 
Pueblo Nuevo 14.5% 58.2% 2.3% 15.3% 9.7% 100.0%
  Miskito Territory  34.3% 46.6% 3.5% 11.2% 4.4% 100.0%
Plis 0.0% 62.8% 4.2% 31.0% 1.9% 100.0%
  Mestizo buffer 5.7% 43.0% 9.1% 36.8% 5.5% 100.0%
a Includes clouds and rivers. 
Source: Hayes and Murtinho (under review)  
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Figure 6.2. Comparison of Land Cover in MITK Territory and Bosawas Buffer Zone, 2003 
 
 
The differences in population densities and land-use practices are reflected in the 
amount of land under pasture, agriculture, and forest in the two regions. Although much 
of the region is covered in ralo forest, Pueblo Nuevo, and MITK in general, maintains a 
higher percentage of total forest cover, and has more mature forest than the mestizo 
territory. In 2003, 81% of the southern half of the Miskito territory was covered with 
forest and approximately 14% was covered by crops, fallow, or pasture. In contrast, less 
than half of the mestizo territory was forest covered, the majority of it thin forest cover, 
and the other half was in crops, pasture, or fallow. 
Although Plis does not have as much forest cover as Pueblo Nuevo, its percentage of 
total forest cover surpasses the percentage of total forest cover in the mestizo territory. 
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 Nevertheless, Plis does not have mature forests within the community boundaries; all of 
its forested land is classified as ralo forest. This may be due in part to the geography of 
the region and to the traditional migratory land-use practices of the Miskito people. In an 
interview, the founder of Plis said that only small fragments of forest remain that have 
never been farmed. He said that the quality of harvests have deteriorated because the 
people are no longer able to let the land rest for a number of years and that today, no 
virgin forests remain. 
 
5.2 Miskito Agricultural Expansion in MITK: Miskito Compliance with their 
Management Plan 
 
In MITK, the territorial management plan restricts where residents can cultivate crops 
and where they will conserve forests. In general, residents appear to be complying with 
the land-use zones. As stated, the Miskito communities of MITK designated areas of land 
for agriculture, minimal forest use, and strict forest conservation. Using the 2003 
MARENA land-cover image, I calculated the percent of land cover (forest, agriculture, 
crop and fallow) for each zone of the management plan. 
Figure 6.3 shows the management zones in MITK, and Table 6.4 shows the land 
cover within each zone. Given the current land-use practices, it appears that agricultural 
expansion is not an immediate threat to the forest conservation zones in MITK. Overall, 
the residents are in compliance with the land-management plan. The table shows that, in 
accordance with the rules of the management plan, most of the crops, pasture, and fallow 
are located in the agricultural zone along the river Coco and its subsidiaries. The majority 
of the agricultural fields, pastures, and fallow lands are in the agricultural zone. In the 
forest-product gathering zone and the conservation zone more than 80% of the land is 
covered by forests. This percentage could be higher, if as I expect, some of the clouds are 
obscuring forest cover. However, it does appear that a small percentage of agriculture 
(approximately 1%) and fallow/pasture (6%) is in the conservation zone. Residents state 
that these areas (particularly the southeastern corner of MITK) are known to be the earlier 
work of mestizo farmers. Nevertheless, future research is required to explain these land-
use practices.iv
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Source: Hayes and Murtinho (2005) 
Figure 6.3. Land-Use Zones for MITK 
 
 
Table 6.4. Land-Cover Patterns by Zones in MITK, 2003 
 
 Forest Ralo Forest Agriculture Pasture & Fallow Othera Total 
Agriculture zone 10.4% 60.0% 7.2% 20.3% 2.2% 100.0% 
Forest-product 
gathering zone 47.3% 46.1% 1.1% 4.3% 1.1% 100.0% 
Conservation zone 52.7% 29.9% 1.1% 6.0% 10.2% 100.0% 
a Includes clouds and rivers. 
Source: Hayes and Murtinho (2005) 
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 5.3 Simulations of Future Land-Use Scenarios 
 
The simulations further reinforce the current land shortages in Plis and the mestizo 
territory. As residents state, and both models find, all land is currently occupied in Plis. 
Similarly, all land in the mestizo territory is predicted to be already occupied or occupied 
within the next four years. Future population pressures and more extensive land-use 
needs will only further stress the current system. In contrast to those communities in the 
mestizo buffer, the results from simulations run on land use in MITK show that if the 
residents retain their current land-use practices and population growth rates, forest cover, 
particularly in the regions designated for minimal forest use (forest-product gathering) 
and strict forest conservation, appears relatively secure. Furthermore, the simulations 
show that given the relatively low population densities and secure access to their 
territories, the Miskito of MITK are in a much better position to address changing land 
uses while still maintaining forest cover than are their Miskito and mestizo neighbors to 
the south. 
Table 6.5 shows the predicted outcomes in Pueblo Nuevo and the southern half of 
MITK for three scenarios: (1) Miskito Only, (2) Miskito with Cattle (four to five heads of 
cattle per household), and (3) Miskito and mestizos (no MITK boundaries). In each 
scenario, I calculated the time it would take to fill an area equivalent to the agricultural 
zone, the forest-product gathering zone, and the entire southern half of the territory (an 
area that includes the conservation zone). 
 
Table 6.5. Land-Use Simulations for Pueblo Nuevo and MITK 
Number of Years to 
Fill Agricultural 
Zone 
Number of Years to 
Fill Agricultural & 
Minimal-Use Zone 
Number of Years to 
Fill Total Area 
Scenario Community Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Pueblo Nuevo 50 >50 >50 >50 >50 >50 (1) Miskito Only 
Miskito Territory 28 50 44 >50 >50 >50 
Pueblo Nuevo 35 >50 49 >50 >50 >50 (2) Miskito with 
Cattle Miskito Territory 14 26 29 >50 39 >50 
Pueblo Nuevo 16 32 21 39 24 44 (3) Miskito & Mestizo 
(no boundaries) Miskito Territory 21 39 31 >50 36 >50 
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 The scenario results presented in Table 6.5 are the following: 
 
(1) Miskito Only. According to both model A and model B, if residents in Pueblo Nuevo 
maintain their current land-use practices and population growth rate, they will not use all 
of the lands designated as the agricultural zone in the next 50 years. In considering the 
entire southern region of MITK, model A predicts slightly more pessimistic land-use 
outcomes. Model A estimates that all land in the agricultural zone of MITK will be used 
within the next 28 years; however, model B estimates that given land-intensification 
measures, the agricultural zone will not be completely occupied within the next 50 years. 
If the Miskito maintain their current land-use demands and population growth rates, 
neither model predicts that they will need to cultivate forests in the conservation zone in 
the next 50 years. 
 
(2) Miskito with Four or Five Heads of Cattle per Household. Model A estimates 
more pessimistic outcomes if the Miskito begin to acquire cattle. In the community of 
Pueblo Nuevo, the acquisition of cattle would not drastically change land-use patterns in 
the near future. However, if we consider the broader impacts on the entire southern half 
of MITK, both models predict that if each household had four or five heads of cattle, all 
land in the agricultural zone would be used within the next 50 years. And, furthermore, 
according to model A, all land including the forest conservation zone could be under 
agriculture or pasture in the next 40 years. 
 
(3) Miskito and Mestizo (No MITK Boundaries). Scenario 3 illustrates the importance 
maintaining MITK territorial boundaries and indigenous property rights over their lands. 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the forests is if mestizo respect for the territorial boundaries 
falters and the mestizos were to expand into the Miskito territory. In Pueblo Nuevo, 
model A predicts that if the mestizos were to enter the community, all land in the 
agricultural zone would be used in the next 16 years and the entire community would be 
under agriculture or pasture within the next 25 years. Model B estimates that all land in 
the agricultural zone of Pueblo Nuevo would be occupied within the next 32 years. 
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 Similarly, both models A and B predict that if mestizos were to settle in MITK, the entire 
agricultural zone of the southern half of the territory would be used in 20–40 years. 
Scenario 3 reinforces that the mestizos are in fact a fast threat, and the difference in 
Miskito and mestizo agricultural practices and forest conservation is further exemplified 
if we consider how long it would take a household in each group to completely occupy 
100 ha with crops, pasture, and fallow lands. According to the models it would take at 
least 48 years for the Miskito household to cultivate 100 ha of land using their current 
agricultural practices. In contrast, it would only take 7–10 years for the mestizo 
household to cultivate the same amount of land. Thus far, the boundaries appear to be 
holding the fast threat of mestizo occupation, and the slow threat of Miskito forest 
exploitation does not appear in the immediate future. 
 
6 DISCUSSION: AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION AND FOREST CONSERVATION UNDER 
INDIGENOUS MANAGEMENT 
 
The comparison of population densities and forest cover in Pueblo Nuevo and Plis 
confirms that the territorial rights established by the Miskito of MITK are serving to 
control mestizo agricultural expansion into Pueblo Nuevo and the surrounding lands 
within MITK. This protection from mestizo encroachment does not, however, extend 
beyond the territorial boundaries. The Miskito of Plis do not enjoy the low population 
densities and extensive areas for agriculture and forest protection that the Miskito of 
Pueblo Nuevo do. Given that the mestizos occupy all the land surrounding Plis and lands 
right up to the MITK boundaries, is seems reasonable to predict that if the Miskito 
residents had not established their territorial boundaries and rights over their lands, today, 
Pueblo Nuevo, like Plis, would also be surrounded by mestizo settlements. As of 2003, 
however, those in Pueblo Nuevo had approximately 10 times the amount of land than 
those in Plis. 
The relatively low population densities in MITK enable residents to maintain their 
customary land-use practices while keeping large expanses of inland forests relatively 
intact. The results from my analysis of the 2003 satellite image and an analysis of forest 
connectivity by Stocks and colleagues (in press) found that the forests in Pueblo Nuevo, 
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 and MITK more broadly, are in better condition in terms of connectivity and overall 
forest cover than are forests in Plis and the broader mestizo buffer zone. The analysis of 
land cover with respect to the MITK management plan illustrates that, for the most part, 
the Miskito are cultivating only in the agricultural zone. The percent of forest cover in 
MITK is more than double that of the mestizo territory, and the interior area of MITK is 
largely uninhabited. In contrast, the forests in the mestizo territory are fragmented with 
population centers spread throughout the hills. And, while the Miskito of Plis have 
managed to retain a relatively high percentage of their land in forest, the remaining forest 
cover is thin as the community no longer has mature forests to gather forest products 
from or to farm. Likewise, the land that they do still hold is only a small pocket 
surrounded by mestizo-occupied territory. 
In considering the future sustainability of indigenous forest management with respect 
to agricultural expansion and forest conservation, in the near future the Miskito can 
maintain their traditional land-use practices and sustain their forest conservation zone. It 
is unclear what will happen over time as populations increase and land-use demands 
change. Two of the greatest threats to MITK forests are the acquisition of cattle and the 
dissolution of the territorial boundaries. It is difficult to assess whether an increase in 
mestizo migration will occur and whether mestizos will at some point decide that they no 
longer wish to respect the MITK boundaries. To date, I found no evidence that mestizos 
would encroach on indigenous lands in the near future. Nevertheless, as new mestizos 
arrive and the collective memory of the property-rights process fades into history, 
mestizos may become less willing to comply with land-use restrictions crafted by others. 
With respect to regulating their own agricultural expansion, particularly the threat 
posed by pasturelands, the Miskito in MITK have two advantages that do not emerge in 
the simulations. First, they have a land-management plan that they are currently 
following. Neither the Miskito in Plis, nor their mestizo neighbors have developed a plan 
to manage their lands and therefore have not come to any collectively decided decisions 
about what they want their future environments to be like. Plis does not have a governing 
body that is officially recognized, nor does it have a communitywide land-use plan. Land 
use within Plis is dictated by the founder, an elderly gentleman. In interviews, some 
residents expressed concern that the land may be parceled out or sold when the founder is 
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 no longer alive to lay his claim. In the mestizo buffer, the mestizos are organized, but 
they are not recognized by the Nicaraguan government as the rightful owners or 
managers of their lands. This limits their abilities to address changing conditions and 
participate in decisions that will affect future land use in the region. 
Second, the Miskito of MITK have the organizational experience and structure to 
address new land-management challenges. In any governance scenario—public, private, 
or common property—it is impossible to foresee all future challenges. Increasing Miskito 
population pressures and cattle ranching may stress the land-use institutions. 
Nevertheless, the residents of MITK have the advantage of having participated in 
establishing their common-property rights and a set of rules to restrict land use. The 
Miskito’s success in developing new rules to address mestizo encroachment may 
facilitate their ability to create new rules and additional enforcement mechanisms that 
may become necessary as land-use pressures grow. 
Recent literature in environmental management highlights the importance of creating 
management institutions that enable resource users to monitor and appropriately address 
changes in their resource systems (Berkes et al., 2003; Holling, 1978). A weakness of the 
simulations is that they do not account for the Miskito peoples’ abilities to monitor their 
environment and make appropriate institutional changes as the social-ecological 
dynamics change. 
I have limited information with which to estimate how MITK residents will be able to 
monitor and address new environmental challenges. I can state that they are in a better 
position to do so than they were before they established territorial rights. The Miskito of 
MITK have a governing body that is recognized as having the authority to make 
decisions with respect to land use in MITK. They also have a land-use plan that is, at the 
very least, a first step in governing their lands for the long term. In conversations with the 
Miskito leader responsible for organizing the forest guards and managing the territorial 
lands, he stated that he was concerned that not all residents know where the forest 
conservation zone in MITK begins. He stated that in the future, he hopes to work with the 
forest guards to physically demarcate the conservation zone. This is a very simple 
example of an institutional change to address future forest and land-use demands. 
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 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present situation in MITK looks promising for continued forest conservation. 
Although the future is uncertain, in contrast to the foreseen threats to forest lands in Plis 
and the mestizo territory, in MITK, the simulations do not necessarily predict over-
exploitation. The forests in MITK are not immediately threatened due to mestizo or 
Miskito agricultural expansion, and the residents of MITK are in a better position than 
their Miskito neighbors in Plis to address future land-use challenges. 
However, three important caveats must be examined when considering how the 
results of this study might influence future policy recommendations. First, is the amount 
of land available to those living in MITK. The demarcation process in Bosawas occurred 
before mestizos had occupied vast expanses of Miskito lands. This enabled the Miskito to 
demarcate a territory large enough to sustain current and future land-use needs, and in 
turn, extend the duration of the long-term threat of Miskito land use into the 
unforeseeable future. 
Second, the results from Bosawas concur with other common-pool resource 
management studies that find that clear boundaries, user participation in the management 
rules, and monitoring and enforcement are institutional traits of long-enduring common-
pool resource arrangements (Ostrom, 1999, 2005). It is important to recognize, however, 
that the process, not the simple establishment of indigenous rights, but the actual 
demarcation and rule-making processes are vital to the success MITK has had thus far. 
The demarcation, titling, monitoring, and enforcement activities that have contributed to 
MITK’s success will remain vital components in assisting how MITK residents address 
land-use challenges in the future. 
Finally, as in any management regime, the future remains uncertain. In response to 
the critique made by some conservationists that indigenous institutions are likely to 
change under increasing market pressures and/or acculturation (Redford, 1991; Terborgh, 
2000), I analyzed a series of scenarios that could influence future forest conservation in 
Bosawas. The common-property-rights institutions operating in MITK have the benefit of 
governing a relatively small population that has rights to a large expanse of land, and, 
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 therefore, forests are not immediately threatened by nominal changes in land-use 
practices. 
Nevertheless, the time frame is relatively short, and there are numerous changes that 
could possibly occur in the region. The scenarios presented in this dissertation only 
consider how agricultural expansion might threaten forest conservation in the future. 
Some might argue that other, more prominent threats to the region include timber 
concessions or the establishment of some other extractive industry in the reserve. Others 
might rightfully note that if roads are built in the region, this could drastically change the 
land-use practices of the indigenous residents. It is true that a drastic change in land-use 
practices could completely destroy Bosawas forests, but this threat is not unique to MITK 
or any other common-pool resource management arrangement. Public lands are at least as 
vulnerable to institutional change as common-property lands, as governments around the 
world are known for deciding to open up protected areas for mining, timber harvesting, 
oil exploration, or other extractive ventures. 
In response to the conservationists’ critique that we are only trading a fast threat for a 
slow one, the evidence presented here does not confirm their predictions of 
overexploitation. Neither does it, however, provide assurance that the Miskito will 
necessarily conserve their forests. The simulations present just some of the possible 
challenges the communities in MITK will face in the future. We cannot predict the 
complete array of challenges or the array of possible responses. We can however, 
compare how forests in the same region are faring (and might fare in the future) under 
two different management regimes. 
The forests in the Miskito communities in MITK are in better condition than the 
forests in the Miskito communities in the Bosawas buffer. Furthermore, residents in 
MITK are better equipped to address changes in their environments and land-use 
demands. In contrast to Miskito people living on public lands, the ones living in the 
MITK territory have the advantage of having a locally established and monitored 
management plan that should not change without the consensus of the communities. 
There is no reason to believe that communal consensus is any less capable of sustaining 
forests than legislated protection. Thus far the residents of MITK have demonstrated their 
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 ability to conserve their forests, and it appears reasonable to assume that they will 
continue to do so in the proximate future. 
 
Footnotes for Chapter 6 
 
i This chapter is based on an article that I co-authored with Felipe Murtinho: Hayes, T. and Murtinho, F. 
“Indigenous Forest Reserves: A Means to Sustainable Forest Management or a Band-Aid Solution?” 
submitted to Development and Change in September 2006. 
ii Areas, populations and land cover are only given for the southern half of MITK (as shown in Figure 5.1). 
Satellite imagery was not available for the northern half of MITK. 
iii See discussion of estimations of cultivable land in section 4, Data and Methods 
iv I showed the map of the red regions (areas of agriculture/fallow/pasture) in the southwest corner of MITK 
to several Miskito leaders and forest guards. All assured me that a mestizo previously worked in the region, 
but that presently no one worked there. They could not account for the land-cover shown in the map and 
stated that all along the border is forested. I tried the visit the region, but it was too remote to reach. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMIC INTERPLAY BETWEEN PROPERTY RIGHTS, LAND-USE 
NORMS, AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the world, researchers, policy makers, and citizens are all struggling to devise 
policies that will conserve our natural systems while sustaining our social systems. With 
respect to forest management, one of the most pressing issues is how to protect frontier 
forests from agricultural expansion. In this dissertation I explored if and how we might 
design forest governance regimes that recognize and complement resource user rights and 
rules and achieve our forest conservation goals for a region.  
The examination of how forest governance arrangements can include the institutional 
dynamics and demands of the resource users flies in the face of many traditional notions 
of environmental conservation and forest management. Traditional conceptions of natural 
resource management assume that resource users are incapable of managing natural 
resource systems. Followers of the conventional forest conservation protected-area 
paradigm contend that we cannot meld resource users’ institutions and natural resource 
demands with environmental conservation; that environmental conservation ultimately 
depends on strict regulatory and enforcement mechanisms enacted by a strong central 
government (Hardin 1968; Putz et al., 2001; Redford and Richter, 1999; Terborgh, 1999, 
2000).  
No doubt exists that trying to achieve forest conservation goals while recognizing the 
rights and customs of the forest users is a risky endeavor. Compelling concerns include 
whether resource users can organize to curtail their consumptive forest uses and whether 
their governance systems are robust and capable of addressing varied threats to their 
traditional institutions in order to sustain forest cover (Barrett et al., 2000; Berkes and 
Folke, 2000; Dietz et al., 2003; Terborgh, 1999).  
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The results from this study, however, demonstrate that with respect to efforts to 
conserve frontier forests, resident resource users may be better able to control agricultural 
expansion than government managers. The results suggest that the fortitude of traditional 
residents’ governance systems is critical in sustained forest management and, 
furthermore, that the broader policy environment may have a significant impact in 
determining whether residents’ traditional land-use institutions remain robust when 
confronted with mestizo migration and changing land-use demands.  
 
2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The central thesis I posed in the introduction to this dissertation is that property rights 
that support indigenous peoples’ customary land-use institutions and landholdings will 
serve to bolster the ability of indigenous residents to control mestizo encroachment and 
enhance overall forest conservation in the Mosquitia corridor. I hypothesized that mestizo 
encroachment disturbs indigenous land-use customs, and that control over mestizo 
migration depends on recognition of indigenous peoples’ communal rights to their lands. 
In comparing indigenous and government management of forest reserves, I argue that 
protected-area policies that fail to reinforce indigenous people’s land rights and practices 
will be incapable of stopping mestizo encroachment unless very large investments are 
made in third-party monitoring and enforcement, such as patrol forces, courts, and jails. 
The findings from the empirical analyses support my central thesis. In the case of Río 
Plátano and Bosawas, I find that mestizo migration does disturb indigenous land-use 
institutions. Furthermore, I find that property-rights policies that support indigenous 
common-property rights are more effective at controlling mestizo expansion, and 
sustaining local land-use institutions, than is public management. Indigenous residents in 
Nicaragua who hold territorial rights to their lands are better able to conserve their forests 
than are those living under public management in Honduras. 
In the analyses, by comparing two very similar reserves with respect to location, 
market integration, demographics, and mestizo migration, I was able to tease out the 
impact of different property-rights arrangements on mestizo expansion and indigenous 
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land-use institutions. In chapter 3, I carefully examined how different characteristics of 
the property-rights arrangements in each reserve impacted mestizo migration. 
Institutional analysis combined with field visits and satellite imagery enabled me to 
identify the different property rights and rules operating in each reserve and their 
respective consequences on agricultural expansion. For example, in comparing rights, 
rules, and agricultural expansion in Río Plátano and Bosawas, I found that AFE-
COHDEFOR in Río Plátano and the indigenous residents in Bosawas created similar 
land-management rules on paper. The application of these rules in the two reserves, 
however, differed significantly. Unlike AFE-COHDEFOR, the indigenous residents of 
Bosawas applied their land-use rules by physically demarcating the boundaries of the 
indigenous homelands and employing a group of forest guards to monitor the boundaries. 
The findings in chapter 3 show the importance of clearly defined boundaries and 
monitoring mechanisms to control agricultural expansion, and demonstrated that the 
indigenous residents of Bosawas were more effective at exercising their property rights 
and respective rules and stopping agricultural expansion than was the Honduran 
government. 
In chapter 4, I examined how encroachment disturbs the indigenous land-use 
institutions and compared how individuals responded to mestizo encroachment at 
different decision-making levels. I contrasted the traditional land-use customs with land-
use rules made by the Miskito leaders and with land-use institutions in three Miskito 
communities with different encroachment histories. The findings demonstrated that 
mestizo migration stresses indigenous common-property customs. In the context of Río 
Plátano, where the broader policy environment gave very little recognition or support to 
indigenous governance arrangements, I found that mestizo encroachment gradually 
deteriorated the integrity and robustness of the Miskito land-use customs. 
The findings from Bosawas demonstrate, however, that under a different policy 
context, indigenous institutions remain robust and thrive in response to mestizo 
encroachment. Counter to the institutional deterioration occurring in Río Plátano, 
indigenous residents in Bosawas responded to mestizo encroachment by further defining 
their common-property rights and bolstering communal support for their land-use 
customs.  
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In chapter 5, I presented a more discerning analysis of how the respective property-
rights processes impacted the evolution of indigenous governance systems and overall 
compliance with land-use restrictions in each reserve. I found that the property-rights 
process in Bosawas facilitated indigenous forest management and bolstered indigenous 
common-property rights in two ways. First, NGOs involved in the process reduced the 
costs of collective action necessary in concretizing indigenous land rights by helping to 
organize meetings and mediate conflicts. Their presence also helped to create a sense of 
importance and establish legitimacy of the de facto governance agreements. The import 
that NGOs gave to the process of establishing indigenous rights thereby reduced the risk 
of non-compliance, as all actors recognized that they were making a serious commitment 
in establishing a set of land rights and rules.  
Second, I found that mestizo and indigenous resident participation in the 
establishment of indigenous rights and land-use restrictions was critical to compliance. 
The analysis in chapter 5 demonstrated that the on-the-ground processes, not simply the 
prescribed policies, impact individual land-use decisions in the Mosquitia. In contrast to 
arguments that forest conservation demands strict enforcement measures and heavy 
sanctions, the findings in Bosawas are that indigenous and mestizo residents comply with 
land-use restrictions out of respect for the set of land-use rules they created; not because 
of government regulations or out of fear of costly sanctions. In interviews with mestizo 
and indigenous residents in Bosawas, they consistently mentioned participation in 
defining the territorial boundaries and land-use rules within those boundaries as critical in 
their decision of whether to comply with the respective governance arrangement.  
The analysis and results presented in chapter 6 further support the thesis that 
property-rights policies that support indigenous land rights bolster indigenous residents’ 
abilities to address agricultural expansion, both expansion caused by mestizos and the 
indigenous residents themselves. By comparing agricultural expansion and land-use 
institutions in a Miskito community within the boundaries of the Miskito territory to a 
Miskito community outside the territorial boundaries, I found that Miskito residents 
holding territorial rights in Bosawas are better able to prevent current encroachment 
pressures and address future land-use demands than are their Miskito neighbors living on 
public lands in the Bosawas reserve. The indigenous residents within the territory used 
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their collective-choice rights to craft a management plan intended to regulate both 
internal and external land-use pressures and promote sustained forest conservation. Those 
on public lands are struggling just to maintain their current communal lands and sustain 
their traditional land-use practices. 
The study findings demonstrate that it is possible, and at times more effective, to 
design forest governance regimes that complement local resource-user land-use 
institutions and achieve forest conservation goals. The study also suggests the intricacies 
involved in designing such a governance arrangement. Institution building is not easy, not 
from the ground up nor from the top down. The following highlights some specific 
findings that may contribute to our theoretical understanding of resource management 
and institutional change and guide the practical application of designing forest 
governance regimes. 
 
3 THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
One of the most fascinating and challenging aspects of this study is the analysis of 
institutional change in response to a disturbance. Mestizo migration, the creation of 
roads, and the introduction of exploitative industries are all common disturbances that 
threaten traditional institutional systems and forest conservation throughout Latin 
America. However, relatively little is known about how traditional peoples change their 
customary institutions in response to such external shocks (Berkes and Folke, 2000; 
Richards, 1997). Theories of institutional change are varied and range from predictions 
that institutions will collapse under stress caused by an outside disturbance to predictions 
that institutions are sticky and resistant and that even when confronted with drastic 
change, institutions will maintain their core characteristics (Gluckman, 1968; Knight, 
1992; North, 1990; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Terborgh, 1999).  
Findings from this study have significant theoretical and policy implications for our 
understanding of institutional robustness and its relationship to forest management. The 
study confirms that mestizo encroachment does disturb traditional indigenous land-use 
institutions and produces institutional change. Findings from Río Plátano and Bosawas 
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illustrate that the indigenous land-use institutions of the Miskito and Mayangna peoples 
have not remained stagnant in the face of mestizo encroachment. In some cases, the 
indigenous residents have adapted their traditional institutions to make them more 
resistant to mestizo encroachment; in other cases, residents are changing their customary 
practices and conforming to mestizo systems. The findings from this dissertation suggest 
however, that the policy process may mediate the impact and toll that the mestizo 
disturbance has on indigenous governance systems. 
 
3.1 Indigenous Response to Persistent Mestizo Encroachment: Institutional 
Change in the Context of Tenure Insecurity 
 
An important contribution of this study is the analysis of how mestizo migration disturbs 
the indigenous traditional land-use practices and the responses that indigenous residents 
have as encroachment persists over time. In my analysis of institutional change in Río 
Plátano, I found that under public management, indigenous common-property institutions 
weaken over time. The longer a community has experienced Miskito encroachment, the 
more likely it is that individuals will adopt mestizo private-property practices. 
Furthermore, the longer a community has experienced Miskito encroachment, the less 
likely it is that they will have faith in their own ability to control mestizo migration.  
For example, in Ahuas, a community that has yet to experience Miskito 
encroachment, the community has not collectively organized to monitor mestizo 
migration or land sales. Nevertheless, individual residents are positive that they can 
prevent future encroachment. In comparison, in Wampusirpe, a region that first began to 
experience mestizo migration in the last few years, residents have organized to monitor 
mestizo settlements, but they struggle to stop land sales. Furthermore, residents are less 
optimistic than their neighbors in Ahuas about their ability to prevent mestizo 
encroachment. Finally, although Banaka was one of the first communities to organize 
itself to monitor mestizo migration, the monitoring activities have severely deteriorated 
over time, and residents in Banaka are the least likely to believe that their community can 
prevent mestizo encroachment. 
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The changes occurring in the Miskito communities, however, did not necessarily 
reflect the institutional changes made by the Miskito leaders. The analysis of how the 
Miskito people of Río Plátano are adapting their land-use institutions to address mestizo 
encroachment illustrated disjuncture and tension between the rules made by Miskito 
leaders and decisions made by individuals in their respective Miskito communities. It 
also demonstrated that institutional changes in response to the mestizo disturbance are not 
necessarily linear, uniform, or coherent.  
With respect to the disjuncture between decisions made by the Miskito leaders and 
decisions made by individual residents, the analyses in chapters 4 and 5 illustrated how 
mestizo encroachment pits the traditional social benefits of common-property regimes, 
such as shared access and withdrawal rights to forest lands and shared access to all 
community lands, against the individual benefits of increased tenure security and profits 
from land sales derived from adopting mestizo private property institutions. Furthermore, 
the discussion of the costs of collective rule making and the results of Miskito land-use 
preferences and preoccupations demonstrated the tug-of-war that occurs within 
indigenous communities over whether to incur the costs and risks involved in defending 
customary land-use decisions and common-property rights.  
The fissures that mestizo migration produces in Miskito common-property 
institutions present a challenge to environmental governance. From a policy perspective, 
the gap between leaders’ decisions and individuals’ actions should caution against 
assuming that what leaders say represents what individual do. The findings from the three 
communities in Río Plátano suggest that any broad-based governance arrangement needs 
to gain the support of the majority of the residents, not just the leaders. If we were to 
gauge the robustness of the Miskito land-use institutions in response to mestizo 
encroachment solely on the decisions and attitudes of the Miskito leaders, we might 
conclude that the land-use institutions of the Miskito of Río Plátano remain strong and 
are capable of addressing the threats posed by mestizo migration. This is not necessarily 
the case, as the findings suggest that the longer a community is exposed to mestizo 
encroachment, the more uncertain Miskito residents are with respect to whether they can 
(or perhaps want to) prevent mestizo colonization.  
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3.2 Property-Rights Policies and the Robustness of Traditional Institutions 
 
The comparison of land-use institutions in Río Plátano and Bosawas demonstrates the 
impact the broader policy environment can have on the evolution of common-property 
institutions. Similar to arguments made by Ensminger (1997) that the broader property-
rights environment can greatly influence the evolution of local property-rights 
institutions, the findings from Río Plátano and Bosawas are that protected-area property-
rights policies and programs can have a decisive impact by either supporting or thwarting 
common-property institutions.  
In accordance with Taylor and Singleton (1993), who hypothesize that increased 
heterogeneity in a resource user group will produce the need for greater definition of 
resource rules and monitoring, the results from Río Plátano and Bosawas demonstrate 
that mestizo encroachment produced more exclusive land-use rules. Contrary, however, 
to the predictions by Demsetz (1967) that as a resource increases in value, individuals 
will favor private-property arrangements, this study shows that the evolution of property 
rights depends on the broader policy environment. The territorial property-rights 
institutions in Bosawas have not evolved into private-property regimes.  
In the case of Río Plátano, where a sense of insecurity surrounds all tenure rights, the 
study found that indigenous residents do, over time, begin to adopt private-property 
institutions. This is not, however, their first response to the demographic and market 
threats posed by mestizo expansion. In Río Plátano and Bosawas the first response of the 
residents to mestizo encroachment was to establish and defend their communal rights to 
the land. Upon learning of mestizo colonization of their homelands, indigenous residents 
in Río Plátano and Bosawas did seek to create a more exclusive property-rights system, 
but they demanded that that the property-rights arrangement protect their shared rights to 
the land and forest resources.  
In Bosawas, the creation of common-property institutions was supported by the 
broader political environment, and today, residents continue to comply with their 
customary common-property institutions and appear resistant to mestizo encroachment. 
In contrast, in Río Plátano, customary rights and institutions have not been respected or 
supported by the broader protected-area policy environment. Over time in Río Plátano, as 
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tenure insecurity has increased under government jurisdiction and with continual mestizo 
migration, some residents have begun to adopt and prefer private-property arrangements.  
The findings from Bosawas and Río Plátano suggest that there may be a pivotal 
window of opportunity when property-rights policies might be most effective. For 
example, in Río Plátano, conditions in Wampusirpe appear to indicate a window of 
opportunity for a supportive property-rights policy as Miskito residents expressed desire 
for support for indigenous resident’s rights and institutions. Residents in Wampusirpe 
recognize the problem of encroachment and have begun to organize and seek support for 
their institutions to prevent mestizo encroachment. In contrast, Ahuas has not yet reached 
the stage where residents recognize the problem of mestizo encroachment and are willing 
to undergo some costs in organizing to prevent mestizo encroachment.  
Likewise, conditions in Banaka now make it extremely difficult for property-rights 
policies to support Miskito rights and land-use institutions. Although the native residents 
originally organized and sought support to establish and monitor their communal 
landholdings, this support never materialized. Today, Miskito residents in Banaka have 
lost faith in their abilities to make rules and prevent mestizo expansion. Mestizos and 
Miskito are now intermixed within the region, making the creation and application of a 
common-property-rights regime all the more complicated.  
In comparison, in Bosawas, external support for indigenous rights to control mestizo 
expansion came within the window of opportunity of institutional change. In Bosawas, as 
in Banaka and Wampusirpe, residents recognized the threat of mestizo encroachment and 
prior to gaining outside support, Bosawas indigenous residents had begun to organize to 
stop the expansion. Although it may have been largely coincidental, TNC began to work 
in the region and provided a supportive political environment at an opportune moment. 
The mestizos had not become fully integrated with the indigenous residents in the region, 
and while the indigenous residents had begun to self-organize and address the problem of 
encroachment, they had yet to experience recurrent failures that deteriorate resident trust 
in the strength of their traditional institutions. The support from TNC and later Centro 
Humboldt contributed to a supportive political environment for land-use institutions in 
favor of common-property traditions and the establishment of territorial common-
property rights.i  
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3.3 Linking Property Rights, Institutional Robustness, and Forest Conservation  
 
The institutional analysis combined with analyses of satellite imagery and encroachment 
patterns found that Bosawas reserve under indigenous common-property management 
has been better able to control agricultural expansion caused by mestizo settlers than has 
the publicly managed Río Plátano reserve. The use of institutional analysis to understand 
the impact of the different property-rights arrangements demonstrated however, that it is 
not simply a matter of public management versus common-property management. The 
implications of this study are that the actors who hold the rights, the rules they make, and 
the processes they enact to apply and enforce these rules make a difference when it 
comes to controlling agricultural expansion and conserving frontier forests.  
The findings that clearly defined boundaries and monitoring serve to control mestizo 
migration are consistent with other theories and studies of successful resource 
management (Bruner et al., 2001; Gibson et al., 2000; Hanna et al., 1995; McKean 1992; 
Ostrom 1990, 1999; Terborgh, 1999). As noted earlier, conservationists repeatedly call 
for clearly defined boundaries and third-party monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
to protect valuable ecosystems and biodiversity (Bruner et al., 2001; Terborgh, 1999). 
The findings in the comparison of Río Plátano and Bosawas are, however, that it is the 
indigenous residents, not the public agency, who have successfully created and 
maintained clearly defined boundaries and monitored their land-use rules. The findings 
defy the conservationists’ assumptions about the inherent effectiveness of public 
management and challenges to indigenous resident’s abilities to conserve forests.  
Field visits and interviews conducted in Río Plátano found that when AFE-
COHDEFOR was given jurisdiction over the reserve, government officials drafted a set 
of rules on paper that restricted mestizo access into the cultural zone of Río Plátano 
reserve, but in practice, these rules were never applied. The boundaries in Río Plátano 
were never physically demarcated, and monitoring and enforcement by AFE-
COHDEFOR was sporadic at best. In contrast, in Bosawas, residents chose to establish 
their collective-choice rights by creating and applying boundary and scope rules that 
clearly defined their territorial boundaries and restricted mestizo access and withdrawal 
rights. The rules were applied and enforced through the physical demarcation of the 
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territorial boundaries and the creation of a corps of forest guards to monitor the 
boundaries and the management rules.  
I want to reiterate that successful forest conservation does not necessarily depend on 
public, private, or communal governance. My findings on property rights and agricultural 
expansion suggest, instead, that forest conservation depends on who has the interest and 
commitment to negotiate and prescribe a set of rules, and the desire to invest resources to 
apply the rule prescriptions. Río Plátano and Bosawas have very similar management 
rules on paper, but managing agencies AFE-COHDEFOR and the Biosphere Project have 
chosen to invest in other aspects of reserve management in Río Plátano, whereas the 
indigenous residents of Bosawas chose to invest time and money in key institutional 
mechanisms, namely boundaries, guards, and a forest management plan, to conserve their 
forest resources.ii
 The second contribution of the analysis of property rights, indigenous institutions, 
and forest conservation, is that it was not just who held the rights, but the process that 
established their rights and the subsequent rules that has led to successful forest 
conservation in Bosawas. Contrary to the deterrence model used by the conventional 
protected-area paradigm, the findings from Bosawas demonstrate that compliance is not 
dependent on third-party monitoring and costly sanctions. Rather, the results suggest that 
participants are more willing to accept and comply with rules that limit their benefits 
from a natural resource system if they are entitled to participate in collective-choice 
decisions about these limits. Some might argue that it was the simple creation of 
boundary lines and patrol guards that served to stop mestizo migration into the territories 
and that the property-rights process had little to do with mestizo migration. I contend that 
the boundary rules and the property-rights processes had to go hand-in-hand.  
The inability of the Miskito residents of Plis to defend their lands from mestizos is 
one example that demonstrates that just drawing a boundary line is not sufficient to stop 
mestizo encroachment. The residents of Plis cut their own boundary line around their 
community in 2001 and 2002. Nevertheless, this boundary is hotly contested by the 
mestizos and has not always been respected. Several mestizos noted that they were not 
consulted when the residents of Plis cut their communal boundaries, and whereas they 
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respect the territorial boundaries of the Miskito territory to the north, they do not 
necessarily respect the boundaries of Plis. 
Likewise, during the original demarcation process in Bosawas, the mestizo residents 
made it very clear that they would sabotage any efforts to restrict their activities if they 
were not permitted to participate in the property-rights decisions and if they did not agree 
to the rules. Both mestizo and indigenous residents recalled the periods of violence and 
tension between the mestizos and indigenous peoples as the indigenous residents began to 
exercise their common-property rights. Given the relative absence of enforcement 
mechanisms in the region, and the high number of mestizo settlers in comparison to the 
relatively low number of indigenous residents, the mestizos could easily overpower the 
indigenous territories if they chose not to respect the boundary lines. Nevertheless, the 
mestizos signed the property-rights agreement with the Miskito and Mayangna and, 
although it is only a de facto arrangement with minimal sanctioning capabilities, are 
keeping to the rules. Irrespective of legislated rules, it was the collective-choice process 
that occurred in Bosawas that was ultimately referred to as “the law” and complied with 
by both mestizo and indigenous residents. 
 
4 POLICY LESSONS FROM THE MOSQUITIA 
 
While it is difficult to generalize from any case study, the findings from the comparison 
of Río Plátano and Bosawas provide a number of lessons that present several policy 
suggestions with respect to ways that property-rights processes can contribute to frontier 
governance and promote long-term conservation goals.  
 
4.1 The Interplay between Formal Property Rights and Local Land-Use Institutions 
 
The study suggests that not just one property-rights arrangement serves to conserve 
forests. A principal lesson from this study is that property rights should be context 
specific and adapted to factors such as the traditional institutions of the resource users, 
geographic location, the specific ecosystems, the disturbances and environmental threats 
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under consideration, and the government infrastructure in the region. In the case of 
frontier forests threatened by agricultural expansion, the comparison of Río Plátano and 
Bosawas demonstrates that forest policies can control mestizo migration and promote 
greater sustained forest management by supporting indigenous residents’ common-
property rights and resource-use institutions. The findings from chapter 4 suggest that 
there may, however, be a limited window of opportunity for policy implementation. If 
policy support is enacted after traditional institutions have been sufficiently stressed by 
the disturbance and residents have begun to doubt the viability of their traditional 
resource institutions, it may be very difficult to revive resident institutions and support 
resident governance of frontier forests.  
 
4.2 Clearly Defined Boundaries and Monitoring 
 
The second lesson from the Mosquitia, the importance of clearly defined boundaries and 
monitoring, is not new, but it unfortunately remains overlooked in some property-rights 
and resource management arrangements. In Bosawas, the physical demarcation of the 
territorial boundaries was critical in stopping mestizo migration onto indigenous lands 
and the absence of clear boundaries in Río Plátano has left the indigenous residents’ 
cultural zone open to continued encroachment. In both Bosawas and Río Plátano, mestizo 
and indigenous residents repeatedly emphasized the importance of a boundary line that 
was physically demarcated so that all could identify property rights. In Bosawas, the 
indigenous forest guards monitor and maintain this boundary. In Río Plátano, however, 
residents complained that their enforcement activities were weakened because they did 
not have recognized rights with clearly defined boundaries to their lands.  
 
4.3 Application of Rights and Rules 
 
The third lesson from the Mosquitia is the importance of the property-rights process and 
rights established on the ground. Although Bosawas residents only held de facto rights, 
they had the presence and the perseverance to create and apply rules to define and defend 
their rights. In contrast, in Río Plátano, AFE-COHDEFOR held de jure rights to manage 
Tanya M. Hayes 206
the lands, but they were incapable of creating and applying rules that were recognized 
and respected by the residents and, instead of supporting local governance arrangements, 
served to thwart nascent rule-making efforts.  
While it may at times appear risky and challenging to craft forest policies that 
recognize resident’s resource-use institutions and rights, failure to do so may in fact be 
fatal for the forests and the local institutions that have sustained them. Part of the success 
of the de facto rights in Bosawas may be attributed to mestizo and indigenous residents’ 
participation in the definition of who would have rights to make decisions over the 
indigenous lands and in the collective-choice decisions to establish the boundary and 
management rules to those lands. This established governing bodies and a set of 
institutions that were largely respected by all. In contrast, in Río Plátano, the indigenous 
governing institutions were squelched by AFE-COHDEFOR, but no recognizable 
governance system was put in their place.  
The findings from Río Plátano and Bosawas indicate that in resource management, 
particularly in remote regions, resident participation in the definition of resource rights 
and management rules are critical to obtaining compliance. Participation must not remain 
a vague term that implies some sort of activity on the part of resource users in 
management discussions. Participation must clearly enable participants to clearly define 
their rights for making and enacting the actual rules. All too often local attendance at 
resource management discussions is assumed to be sufficient for engaging community 
residents in conservation programs and goals. The results from the Mosquitia suggest that 
unless residents feel like they hold the rights to make (and veto) the rules that restrict 
their access and withdrawal rights, they are unlikely to comply with said rules. 
 
4.4. Vulnerabilities: Financing Community Forest Conservation 
 
The final lesson from this study is that the creation and sustenance of traditional resource-
management institutions will most likely demand sustained financial and technical 
resources. Consistent funding is perhaps the greatest threat to the continued success of 
Bosawas and a limitation that hampers rule making and monitoring by the indigenous 
residents of Río Plátano.  
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In the initial design of this research program, I did not consider how the specific 
activities of external actors (in this case, NGOs) might be critical to the development and 
provision of indigenous property-rights and governance systems. However, the results 
from Río Plátano, and particularly Bosawas, clearly illustrate the need for sustained, 
ideally self-sustaining, support for indigenous governance organizations and their 
respective institutions.  
The costs of negotiating, rule making, and monitoring can be prohibitive. The 
conservation community estimates that an additional U.S. $27 to $30 billion dollars is 
needed annually to adequately manage protected areas (Molnar et al., 2004). This 
estimate is generally thought to imply the need to support government agencies. 
Nonetheless, community organizations are not immune from management costs. While it 
may be less expensive and more effective to have residents rather than public agencies 
make rules and monitor their lands, there are very real costs involved in rule making and 
monitoring. Many residents in frontier communities are simply struggling to support 
themselves and do not have the financial means to make excursions to organize meetings, 
draft boundaries, negotiate rules, and lobby the government for their rights. All too many 
conservation programs are enacted under the assumption that community residents will 
volunteer to maintain and monitor conservation projects. It is unreasonable to assume that 
traditional resource users necessarily have the time, skill, information, and money to 
negotiate with other actors to define, formalize, and defend their property-rights systems 
and create land-management plans.  
The discussion of management challenges in Río Plátano and Bosawas illustrates the 
difficulties traditional resource users must overcome in trying to craft new land-use rules 
and defend their homelands and the critical role that external agencies, such as NGOs or 
government organizations, can play in either supporting or thwarting their efforts. In 
Bosawas, TNC and Centro Humboldt were vital in supporting the establishment of 
indigenous common-property rights over the region. Centro Humboldt continues to have 
an active role in helping the indigenous association leaders draft proposals to receive 
grant money, refine their management plans, attend government and non-government 
meetings related to activities in the reserve, and pay and train the corps of forest guards. 
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Under the present circumstances, it is doubtful that the property-rights regimes 
established in Bosawas would survive without this support.  
Unfortunately, in both Río Plátano and Bosawas, continued funding is problematic. 
As an analyst of governance arrangements for resource management, I am wary of this 
dependency on outside support. Funding and resources are of course, crucial to 
governance. The difficulty lies in how to obtain and manage these funds. The findings 
from Bosawas suggest that anyone wishing to engage in the development of, or study of, 
property-rights arrangements for traditional peoples must examine the problem of 
sustained funding as this is a critical limitation of the longevity of local governance 
arrangements. 
 
5 ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND EFFECTS 
 
I stated in the introduction of this dissertation that as an analyst, my interest is in the 
outcomes of forest conservation and institutional change. Specifically, my interest is in 
how different institutional arrangements might promote forest conservation by stopping 
mestizo colonization of the Mosquitia frontier. The results show that the common-
property-rights system in Bosawas has bolstered indigenous governance in the region 
and permitted the residents to prevent mestizo encroachment. Forest conservation was 
my stated immediate policy goal for the region and with respect to present-day 
outcomes; Bosawas has been more successful in achieving this goal than Río Plátano.  
In evaluating the effects of the two different policy processes however, it is 
important to look beyond the immediate goal of forest conservation and examine how 
each protected-area regime supports citizens’ rights and governance arrangements for 
future frontier management. The Mosquitia is not an uninhabited virgin forest, nor is it a 
zoo. It is a region that has a variety of residents with different land-use demands and 
different development (personal and regional) goals. I noted in the introduction, and re-
emphasized in my concluding remarks in chapter 6, that I believe that ultimately it will 
be up to the frontier residents to understand how their actions are part of the changing 
environment, define their particular interests, and act accordingly. Personally, I find it 
exorbitantly costly and politically suspect to assume that the Mosquitia will be 
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successfully governed via public agencies acting in remote capital cities. Therefore, in 
evaluating the long-term effects of the different property-rights regimes I find it crucial 
to consider how each property-rights arrangement facilitates local organization, learning, 
and decision making so the residents can assess their options and collectively decide 
how they want to manage their lands. 
As I argued in chapter 6, I believe the indigenous residents inside the territories in 
Bosawas are better equipped to organize, learn, make land-use decisions, and govern 
their territories than are the indigenous or mestizo residents living on public lands (in 
Bosawas or Río Plátano). In Río Plátano, the future looks bleak. Neither the governing 
bodies of the indigenous residents, nor the mestizos, nor, for that matter, the government 
have much decision-making authority in the region. Residents frequently refer to the law 
of the Río Plátano as the “law of the strongest.” Whoever has the money (or the guns) 
decides how the resources will be used and the development activities that will occur in 
the region.  
In contrast to the emergent chaos in Río Plátano, those living in the indigenous 
territories in Bosawas have a governing body that is elected by the residents, is 
recognized by other governing agencies in Nicaragua, and is experienced (or gaining 
experience) in making resource-use decisions for the territory. This is a first step in 
establishing long-term governance capabilities in the region.  
Two potentially significant weaknesses in Bosawas, however, are the dependency on 
outside funding and the omission of mestizo participation in the establishment of 
mestizo land rights. As I discussed earlier, the fragility of the governance arrangements 
in Bosawas due to lack of sustainable funds and the unwillingness of forest guards to 
work without pay may at some point prove problematic. An additional concern is the 
inattention to the rights and demands of the mestizo settlers. The mestizos agreed to let 
the indigenous residents have their territory, but they themselves remain without 
governance venues to establish their demands for future land use in the region. This is a 
point of contention for the mestizos I interviewed in the region and a valid concern for 
future governance. As this study has demonstrated, given their numbers and more 
extensive land-use practices, mestizo respect for land-use rules and restrictions is crucial 
to sustained conservation of the natural resources in the region.  
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6 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study points to several ways we can improve our understanding of institutional 
change, property rights, and forest management. One growing area of research, largely in 
the natural sciences, is the idea of matrix ecology. An ecological matrix is one that 
recognizes that a variety of ecosystems, including for example, pristine forests, managed 
forests, farms, and residential areas, may all be combined to contribute to a healthy 
environment. The ecological matrix is a means of environmental planning in which 
environmental and social systems co-exist. Thus far, the ecological matrix has focused 
largely on ecosystems and has failed to consider how various policy arrangements and 
social systems might combine with the natural systems to complete the social-ecological 
fabric of the matrix.  
In future work, I would like to examine how matrix ecological models might be 
melded with polycentric governance models to enhance regional environmental 
management. In my own work on frontier management there are four issues that I 
consider crucial to improving our understanding of how to combine social and ecological 
systems and contribute to matrix/polycentric governance options for forest management.  
First, I am particularly interested in expanding the scope of my institutional analysis 
of resource management systems to include the mestizo migrants, their land-use 
institutions and governance structures, and resource demands. This study focused on 
property-rights policies aimed at indigenous residents and their impact on indigenous 
land-use institutions. In many frontier scenarios, including Río Plátano and Bosawas, the 
mestizos are an equally important group of resource users who are often ignored. In both 
Río Plátano and Bosawas the mestizos are also without rights and in many ways their 
land uses have a greater impact on sustained forest conservation. In future research I hope 
to look at the mestizo land-use institutions and investigate the types of property-rights 
arrangements that might complement some of their land-use institutions while promoting 
sustained forest conservation.  
Second, I would like to conduct a more detailed study of collective-choice rights and 
their relationship to compliance and frontier forest governance. Mestizo encroachment is 
not unique to the Mosquitia. It is occurring in other regions of Central and South America 
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and outside colonization of traditional peoples’ homelands is a problem throughout the 
world. There are ample opportunities to compare the outcomes of different property-
rights arrangements across Latin America. Mestizo encroachment in the Mosquitia is 
rather unique in that it is a more recent occurrence. Colonists have been migrating to the 
Amazon since the 1960s and 1970s (Hecht, 1993; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989; Southgate 
et al., 1991). Future studies could compare property-rights policies that were enacted in 
different countries in response to mestizo colonization of the frontier. In such a study, it 
would be important to pay particular attention to the establishment of indigenous land 
rights, the actors who hold the collective-choice rights, and the ability to control mestizo 
encroachment. Assuming certain countries’ property-rights policies have remained 
consistent over time, the analysis would provide greater detail of how policy regimes 
have impacted mestizos, and provide insights into the longer-term governance stability of 
the different property-rights regimes. 
The cross-case analysis would also be a venue to further explore the possible long-
term threat of indigenous residents’ resource use. In my dissertation, I have tried to 
explore possible future threats by comparing future land-use pressures within the 
indigenous territories and outside of the territories, but this analysis was largely 
hypothetical. The data collected in Bosawas serve as a baseline for future studies to 
compare (1) if the indigenous residents are able to maintain their borders, and (2) whether 
their land-use institutions serve to maintain their core forested areas. 
Third, in the context of the frontier, the development of polycentric environmental 
governance arrangements often implies the evolution and creation of community and 
regional governance structures. This study commented briefly on the difficulties that 
leaders in Bosawas and Río Plátano face in trying to sustain their governance structures 
and their dependency on external aid. Future work and research in community-based 
resource management must address the issue of the sustainability of local governance 
organizations and the role that external agencies have in maintaining local institutions 
and governance organizations.  
Finally, the fourth consideration in environmental governance structures returns to 
my interest in the collective decision-making process, but takes it one step further by 
considering what actors and processes influence the constitutional decisions that decide 
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who has rights (or restrictions) to certain lands. In environmental policy, particularly in 
developing countries, international non-government and government organizations 
frequently play influential roles in deciding how sovereign lands that do not pertain to 
their respective countries are used.  
For example, in Bosawas, the indigenous people and mestizos engaged in a process 
that ultimately defined the indigenous residents’ constitutional decision-making rights to 
their lands. These constitutional rights were later recognized by the Nicaraguan 
government. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the indigenous peoples of Bosawas 
would have obtained land rights, had they not had the support of large NGOs. TNC 
decided to support the indigenous residents’ demands for land, and not to support the 
mestizos. Similarly, in Río Plátano, the German development agencies and, originally, 
the U.S. Peace Corps played critical roles in pushing the Honduran government to declare 
publicly protected lands and in defining the environmental and developmental goals of a 
region about the size of the state of New Jersey. This is concerning.  
When it comes to environmental protection, some assume that protecting biodiversity 
is above politics and something to be desired (and implemented) under any 
circumstances. Chapin (2004) spoke of the competing demands for forest conservation 
and development in his critique of collaborative arrangements between indigenous 
peoples and conservation organizations. Chapin noted that conservation organizations 
want to use indigenous peoples to promote their conservation agendas, but do not want in 
turn, to recognize indigenous peoples’ demands for autonomy over their homelands. In 
the Mosquitia, I have heard from directors at two prominent conservation organizations 
that they do not want to get involved with tenure issues in the region because it’s too 
political. 
Environmental management is political. Any time someone places limitations and 
restrictions on who can use what lands and how it is a political act. It seems very 
reasonable that those individuals who will be most effected by the restrictions will find 
ways to object. The idea of matrix ecology is that different land uses can coexist while 
still meeting a region’s ecological needs. Nevertheless, this does not eliminate conflict. 
Some resource-use decisions simply do not go hand-in-hand with conservation. 
Satisfying one group’s or an individual’s land-use demands will mean that some others’ 
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demands may not be met. In future research, I would like to investigate how regional 
land-use goals are decided, who benefits and who loses in these regional plans, and the 
different venues that resource users have for voicing their demands. Future research in 
environmental management, and particularly frontier forest management, needs to 
carefully scrutinize how the goals are determined, whose demands are met by those 
goals, and who will suffer from the restrictions. 
 
 
Endnotes for Chapter 7 
 
i I did not discuss these findings in the dissertation, but it is important to note that in interviews the 
indigenous residents in Bosawas consistently expressed support for their territorial rights and the 
establishment of the territorial boundaries. Nevertheless, many also noted that within the territory they 
would like some individual rights to their landholdings. Many noted that they could not receive loans 
without individual titles. The political/economic limitations of living in a common-property system in a 
broader government system that primarily operates by recognizing individual rights is something I would 
like to examine in future research. 
ii Both AFE-COHDEFOR and indigenous associations of Bosawas receive external assistance to manage 
their forest reserves. I argue that in Río Plátano, AFE-COHDEFOR (in conjunction with the Biosphere 
Project) opted to spend the money on other aspects of reserve management, not in investing in monitoring 
of reserve regulations. I argue that they made the decision not to invest in reserve monitoring. Note that 
AFE-COHDEFOR did at one time have approximately six forest guards to monitor the reserve. These 
guards were let go due to insufficient funds (a forest guard makes roughly $60.00 a month). Nevertheless, 
the Biosphere Project is able to maintain its engineers, office space, conference meetings, and trucks (very 
few areas of the reserve are accessible by truck) in Tegucigalpa. 
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APPENDIX A 
“MIGUEL QUESTIONNAIRE” STATEMENTS AND RESPONSE CATEGORIES 
 
There is a man, Miguel (doesn’t really exist), who says things about his opinions on 
land use in the community of __________________.  Are you (or the people in your 
household, generally in agreement with Miguel? 1) Yes agree; 2) somewhat agree; 3) 
do not agree; 4) don’t know.  Could be that you think otherwise.  If disagree with 
Miguel, what do you think . . .  
 
The following are Miguel’s statements and the categories of responses given. 
 
 
1. Miguel says that the forests are for all of the Miskito people and that only Miskito 
can use them. 
a. Yes, Miskito only 
b. Don’t know 
c. No, all Hondurans can use forest 
d. Other 
2. Miguel says that he wants an individual title for his agricultural plots. 
a. Yes, individual 
b. Yes, individual (but in conversation not really understand idea of title) 
c. No, wants communal title 
d. No, wants communal (but in conversation not really understand idea of 
title) 
e. Don’t know 
3. Miguel says that wood is for subsistence use only, and not for commercial sale. 
a. Yes, only subsistence 
b. Don’t know 
c. No, should be able to sell some (for necessities) 
4. Miguel says that if he had more money he would use it to buy cows.  If yes, how 
many like (and how many have now). 
a. Yes 
b. Yes, but not too many 
c. No 
d. Buy cows and other things (not just cows) 
5. Miguel says that you shouldn’t put fences up because the people can’t pass. 
a. Yes, agree 
b. No, need fences (later coded whether need fences for animals or specified 
to protect private property) 
6. Miguel says that the community should care for/watch over the forests. 
a. Yes, agree community 
b. Should be each person watches over own (not necessarily community as a 
whole) 
c. No 
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7. Miguel says that the community can prevent the entrance (settlement) of mestizos 
a. Yes, can and are 
b. Sometimes 
c. No 
d. Can, but aren’t 
e. Think they can (but actually hasn’t happened yet—not a problem yet).  Ie 
not permitted. 
8. Miguel says it’s important to him to have his own plot of forest land to cut wood 
and hunt (later asked why yes or no). 
a. Yes, agree 
b. No 
9. Miguel says that sometimes it’s necessary to sell land, but only in the case of 
necessity. 
a. Yes, sell to anyone 
b. Yes, but sell only to natives 
c. Never sell 
d. (wrote comments on necessity—what is considered “necessity”). 
10. Miguel says that he would fight before letting anyone invade his land. 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. Miguel says that when someone sells land to a mestizo (or, in case of speaking to 
mestizo—someone not from the community), that the sale causes problems for the 
entire community. 
a. Yes 
b. Depends (depends on the person—not all outsiders bad) 
c. No 
12. Miguel says that the government should care for/watch over the forests. 
a. Yes 
b. Should support community 
c. No, (then followed by either the community or the individual residents 
should be responsible for forests) 
13. Miguel says that there is a lack of support on the part of the community for the 
care/vigilance of the forests. 
a. Yes, 
b. No 
c. Other—this question was often misinterpreted to mean lack of support for 
the community (rather than by the community) 
14. Miguel says that he should denounce someone who is destroying too much forest 
(then asked how much is “too” much and who the person would be reported to). 
a. Yes 
b. Depends 
c. No 
15. Miguel says that if a native neighbor doesn’t have land, he would give (or loan) 
his neighbor a piece of land. 
a. Yes 
b. Depends on the person 
c. No 
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APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY OF “MIGUEL QUESTIONNAIRE” RESPONDENTS 
 
Summary of Questionnaire Respondents in Río Plátano 
Region Community Gender Ethnicity Total
    Female Male Miskito Mix Mestizo Tawahka  
Ahuas Paptalaya 8 13 20 1 0 0 21 
Ahuas Ahuas 21 19 40 0 0 0 40 
Banaka Banaka 9 15 23 0 1 0 24 
Banaka Branz 3 4 0 0 7 0 7 
Banaka 
Fuente de 
Jacob 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 
Banaka Ibila 1 4 5 0 0 0 5 
Wampusirpe Bodega 8 8 11 1 4 0 16 
Wampusirpe Raya 4 5 10 0 0 0 10 
Wampusirpe Wampusirpe 17 20 33 0 3 1 37 
Total   72 89 142 3 16 1 162 
 
 
Summary of Questionnaire Respondents in Bosawas
Region Community Gender Ethnicity Total 
    Female Male   
MSB Wina 6 4 Mayangna 10 
MITK Pueblo Nuevo 2 6 Miskito 8 
Mestizo Buffer Yapuwas 2 8 Mayangna 10 
Mestizo Buffer Plis 2 4 Miskito 6 
Mestizo Buffer Lacos 1 6 Mestizo 7 
Mestizo Buffer Plisito 1 4 Mestizo 5 
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APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES USED IN SIMULATIONS 
 
Demographics 
Population of Miskitu in Pueblo Nuevo 1995 (persons) 86
Population of mestizos in Pueblo Nuevo 1995 (persons) 8
Population of Miskitu in MITK 1995 (persons) 1100
Population of mestizos in MITK 1995 (persons) 8
Population of Miskitu in Plis 1995 (persons) 88
Population of mestizos in Plis 1995 (persons) 5
Population of Miskitu in mestizo territory 1995 (persons) 88
Population of Mestizos mestizo Territory 1995 (persons) 3800
Miskitu population estimated growth 3.5%
Mestizo population estimated growth 12.8%
Land Use 
Crop land use by Miskitu (Ha/ person) 0.52
Pasture land use by Miskitu (Ha/ person) 0.04
Total land use by Miskitu (Ha/ person) 0.56
Crop land use by mestizo (Ha/ person) 0.41
Pasture land use by mestizo (Ha/ person) 0.97
Total land use by mestizo (Ha/ person) 1.38
Fallow time (years) 5
Crop time (years) 2
Growing rate in use of land by Miskitu (Model B) 2.17%
Growing rate in use of land by mestizos (Model B) 7.93%
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Participated in meta-analysis research project investigating the degree to which 
minority and impoverished communities are subjected to higher levels of  
environmental pollution as compared to white communities. 
 
Educational Outreach Coordinator, PACE Environmental Services, CA   2001 
Designed and taught bilingual (Spanish/English) educational energy  
conservation workshops for Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP).  
 
Volunteer Coordinator, Peace Corps, Panama           1998-1999 
Coordinated agroforestry and farmer-to-farmer extension seminars  
for Panamanian farmers.  Supervised 15 agricultural extension volunteers.   
 
Agro-Forestry Extension Agent, Peace Corps, Panama          1996-1999 
Taught soil conservation techniques to indigenous and mestizo farmers.  
Created a nutrition program that reached 30 communities and over  
300 women (and their children). 
 
 
RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS 
 
Principal field of interest is the interplay between international, national, regional and 
community governance arrangements for management of shared natural resource systems.  
Research focuses on how different property rights arrangements influence forest management 
and agricultural expansion in Central America.   
 
Teaching Interests Include: 
 
Environmental Policy  Comparative Public Policy  Methods
Common-Pool Resource Management  Theories of the Policy Process  Research Design 
Conservation and Development  NGOs and Public Policy  Qualitative Methods 
Property Rights and Land Management  Institutional Analysis  Participatory Rural Appraisal 
Indigenous Resource Management  Civil Society and the Policy Process  Quantitative Methods 
Matrix Approaches to Biodiversity 
Conservation    
International Aid, Conservation, and 
Development   
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SCHOLARSHIP 
 
I. Publications 
 
2006 Hayes, T. M. “Controlling Agricultural Expansion in the Mosquitia: Does Tenure  
 Matter?” Human Ecology (in press). 
 
2006  Hayes, T.M.  “Parks, People, and Forest Protection: An Institutional Assessment of the  
Effectiveness of Protected Areas” World Development (in press), Available on-line 
October 9, 2006. 
 
2005 Hayes, T.M. and Ostrom, E. “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas 
The Only Way?” Indiana Law Review (38)3: 595-617. 
 
 
II. Manuscripts in Preparation 
 
2006 Hayes, T.M., and Murtinho, F. “Indigenous Forest Reserves:  A Means to Sustainable  
Forest Management or a Band-Aid Solution?”  (Submitted to Development & 
Change, Sept. 2006) 
 
III. Selected Research and/or Consulting Reports 
 
2006 “Análisis de la Expansión Agrícola en Miskitu Indian Tasbaika Kum,  
Bosawas, Nicaragua” Technical report prepared for Miskitu association 
ADEPCIMISUJIN and Centro Humboldt, Managua, Nicaragua, March 2006. 
 
2006  “Resumen Comunitario de Banaka: La Expansión Agrícola en el Río Plátano” Technical  
report prepared for community of Banaka and MOPAWI, Raista, Honduras, February 
2006. 
 
2005  “Análisis de los Vínculos entre los Derechos de Propiedad y la Conservación: Lecciones 
de la Biosfera Río Plátano, Honduras y la Biosfera BOSAWAS, Nicaragua”  Technical 
report prepared for The Nature Conservancy, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 2005. 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS 
 
2006 “Controlling Agricultural Expansion in the Mosquitia: Does Tenure Matter?” Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, March 15-18, 2006. 
 
2005 “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas The Only Way?” Paper presented 
at the annual conference of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, 
D.C., November 30-December 4, 2005. 
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LANGUAGES 
 
Spanish: speak/read/write with high proficiency 
 
English: native language 
 
